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ABSTRACT
Patrick Edward Connor and the Military District of Utah:
Civil War Military Operations in Utah and Nevada,
1862-1865
by
Max Reynolds McCarthy, Master of Science
Utah State University, 1975
Major Professor: Dr. S. George Ellsworth
Department: History
Troops, requested by the federal government for the security during
the Civil War of the overland mail, telegraph, and emigrant routes, were provided by California for those portions of the routes which crossed the territories
of Utah and Nevada. A force, never exceeding 1, 200 in strength, commanded
by Patrick Edward Connor, was assigned a geographic responsibility, the
Military District of Utah.
Connor's California Volunteers established principal troop locations
at Fort Churchill and Fort Ruby in Nevada, and at Camp Douglas and Fort
Bridger in Utah Territory during mid-1 862. Major actions were conducted
against the Indians at the battle of Bear River and by the campaign of Spanish
Fork canyon, both in early 1863. Thereafter, a series of treaties achieved
peace with various Indian tribes.

viii

Connor also utilized his troops in a variety of activities peripheral to
his primary military mission. Important examples were a coloniza tion effort
at Soda Springs, continued and thorough area reconnaissance, and early efforts
to develop the territorial mineral resources.
Considerations of Mormon intentions, often believed by Connor to be
inimical to Union interests, occupied much of Connor's time.
Many writers record a generally unfavorable impression of Connor in
Utah.

However, it is the view of this author that the missions assigned to the

federal troops in the District of Utah during the Civil War were important and
were effectively carried out.
(203 pages)

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Thesis statement and Scope

In terms of numbers of troops engaged, battles fought, and casualties

experienced, the Civil War military operations which occurred east of the
Mississippi greatly overshadowed, in both the official and public views , those
conducted in the West.

In terms of national priority, the military issues of

the Civil War were clearly to be resolved on such battlefields as those of
Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Tennessee, and the other border and Confederate states. There were, however, significant military operations which
occurred in the West, although the relative troop strengths were small.

The

loss to the Union of the West due to secession, or to Confederate invasion, or
to an inability to continue operation of the physical links east-to-west was a
real possibility.
Portions of the Civil War operations concerned with the military
security of the West were conducted by the commander and troops assigned
to the Military District of Utah.

1

1

These troops were charged with an important

The time period receiving primary emphasis by this study is that
during which the District of Utah was in existence, commencing on August 6,
1862, when Connor assumed command and terminated on February 24, 1865 ,
when the Territory of Utah was, by War Department order, transferred from
the Department of the Pacific to the Department of Missouri.

2

mission which was effectively carried out under frequently difficult circumstances. The results achieved were salutary to the interests of the federal
government and to the purposes for which the troops were deployed and
utilized.
Although the military presence and field operations conducted in the
District of Utah during the Civil War were important and singularly successfu1, the treatment by some historians of the events does not reflect their

importance or the efficiency with which they were accomplished. While the
historical literature contains many favorable reactions to the military operations at the local community levels in Utah, Nevada, and California and at the
military Departmental level, such favorable assessments were by no means
universal.
For example, General Halleck's report summarizing federal military
operations of 1863--a most active year for the District of Utah--devotes only
four sentences to that subordinate command.

2

The report of the Secretary of

War for the same period included no mention of the District of Utah or of its
immediate, higher military headquarters. A definitely negative evaluation is
established by most of the widely read historical writers. History in general
has not dealt kindly with the federal troops in Utah during the Civil War, nor
with their commander, Patrick Edward Connor. A pattern is clear. The

2

u. S., Congress, House, Message of the President of the United
states and Accompanying Documents . . . , Report of the Secretary of Wa r,
December 5, 1863, 38th Cong., 1st sess., House Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 30
(x1184).

3

earliest histories of the period are r eplete with adverse opinions and
undocumented statements. These views have subsequently received
extensive, but generally unwarranted, credence by the later historical writers.
Some variances appear to exist between some historical fact and some of the
commonly accepted historical versions. The wide divergences between the
more commonly accepted writings concerning Connor and the federal troops
in Utah and what extensive research and analysis suggested the facts to be
impressed this author. A conscious desire to redress this deficiency became
a prime motivation of this thesis.

Thesis Organization

This thesis will address itself to the questions of why federal troops
were sent to Utah Territory during the Civil War; how the troops were raised,
stationed within the Territory, and reinforced, when necessary; how they were
employed in specific field operations against the Indians; how the troops were
used in certain quasi-military endeavors; and what were the characteristics
and accomplishments of the military commander.
After ha ving thus de sc ribed the military operations, the final chapter
will address specific areas of historical controversy concerning the troop
missions and locations . Evolution of some of the historical concepts is traced;
attempts are made to resolve the inconsistencies. However, it is aclmowledged
that irrefutable historical evidence necessary for the resolution is often lacking
and, in these cases, subjective judgments r esult.

4

Historical Precedents

There are factors, such as territorial political structure and personalities and historical experience, which strongly influenced, if they did
not actually control, the actions of the military commander in the District of
Utah.

The geographic area of Connor's command was initially defined by
the boundary limits of the territories of Utah and Nevada in 1862. The large
area approximated 180, 000 square miles and covered eleven degrees of
longitude and five degrees of latitude.
Relations between the white inhabitants of this vast area and the
representatives of the federal government are of special concern. A territorial
government had been in existence in Utah for twelve years before the arrival of
Connor. The experience of that local extension of the federal government with
the Mormons did not assist Connor in establishing cordial relations.

Since

1854 relations between the representatives of the federal government and the
Mormons had been extremely strained. The so-called "Utah War" of 18571858 was the nadir of these relations.
Nevada, which achieved statehood in the midst of the period covered
by this thesis, on October 31, 1864, was a far less complex matter. There
were no significant problems between the federal troops located in Nevada and
the officials of the territorial or state governments.
Before Connor's arrival in Utah, significant military activity featuring
such names as Fre'mont, Stansbury, Gunnison, Beckwith, Steptoe, Johnston ,

5

and Simpson had resulted in a vastly improved general knowledge of the area,
and new, better routes traversing the Great Basin in both east-west and
north-south directions.
From a military point of view, then, garrison locations from which
Connor's troops would operate were fixed or suggested long before his arrival.
Forts Bridger and Churchill were in existence in 1862. A military reservation
in Rush Valley had been laid out by Steptoe in 1854 and used in turn by Johnston.
Both Fremont and Stansbury had concerned themselves with a military post on
the emigrant trail--a possible genesis of Camp Connor at Soda Springs.
Simpson sought a location for a military post part way across the Basin.
Fremont was the first to see the need for a military post near the great Salt
Lake; Steptoe recommended stationing troops in Utah; Johnston established
Camp Floyd in Cedar Valley--a location dictated by considerations incident to
the Utah War.
Of greater importance to Connor, however, was the recent experi e nce
of mutual distrust and friction between the Mormons and the United States
troops under the command of Albert Sidney Johnston during the Utah War of
1857-8 and the accompanying military occupation of Utah to 1861.

3

3

Norman F. Furniss, The Mormon Conflict, 1850-1859 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1960); B. H. Roberts, A Comprehensive History of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Century I (6 vols., Salt Lake
City: Published by the Church, 1930), 4:181-557.

6

Military Policy and Organization

The effects of national military policy and organization on a commander operating within the existing military structure are decisive.

The

United states military policy did not create a military organization which
could be highly effective in the West. Cavalry troops were recognized as the
most efficient force to use against the highly mobile Indians, but costs preeluded their availability in required numbers. The necessity to correlate the
economy-structured military organization, heavy with infantry, with the
military mission would challenge the most resourceful commander. To a
great extent, the nature of the military forces dictated the tactics to be
employed.
Command of the forces in the field on a geographic basis had long
been an effective feature of United States military structure.

The establish-

ment of army subordinate, geographic commands was provided for during the
Civil War by Army Regulations of 1861.

4

Commanders of these geographic

departments exercised virtually complete autonomy over the manner in which
they created defenses and employed their troops.

5

4
u. S., War Department, Revised United States Army Regulations of
1861. With an Appendix Containing the Changes and Laws Affecting Army
Regulations and Articles of War to June 25, 1863 (Philadelphia: George W.
Childs, 1863), 13. Hereafter cited as Army Regulations of 1861.
5
Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army
and the Indian 1848-1865 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), 50.

7

Department of the Pacific

The geographical department most closely associated with the defens e
of the overland mail and telegraph and the emigrant routes was the Department
of the Pacific, which initiated its operations on January 15, 1861, in accordance with Headquarters of the Army General Order No. 10, November 22,
1860.

6

The new department, with headquarters at San Francisco, emtraced

the areas of its predecessor Departments of California and Oregon, an:!
included the states of California and Oregon, and the territories of Washington
7

and Utah.

Two officers occupied the position of commander of the Depar.ment
of the Pacific during the period of existence of the Military District of Jtah.
Colonel George Wright assumed command of the Department of the PaCific on
October 20, 1861.

8

Wright was an experienced Indian fighter; he was the victor

in significant battles against the Indians at Four Lakes and Spokane Plams
(near present Spokane, Washington) in early September, 1858. By the first of
November, Wright had been promoted to brigadier general.

9

For near.y three

6
u. S., War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilttion of
the Official Records of the Union and the Confederate Armies, Series I,
Volume L, in Two Parts (Washington: Government Printing Office, l8f7),
vol. L, pt. 1, p. 433. Hereafter cited as Official Records.
7
8
9

Nevada did not become a separate territory until March 1861.

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 666.

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 694.

8

years Wright held this position, to be superseded by Major General Irvin
McDowell on July 1, 1864.

10

No further changes in command occurred during

the Civil War years.
The Department of the Pacific itself was divided into various subordinate geographic commands, according to the number of troops assigned,
their missions, and the existing or potential threats to mission accomplishment. Although the department subordinate geographic structure changed
from time to time, the date of June 30, 1863, provides a typical organization.

11

At that time the Department of the Pacific consisted of the troops in

the immediate vicinity of San Francisco and which were commanded directly
by department headquarters; the District of Humboldt; the District of Southern
California; the District of Oregon; and the District of Utah.

Command of the

geographic areas subordinate to the Department of the Pacific was typically
exercised by a colonel or brigadier general.
The establishment of district boundaries was somewhat flexible.
Several examples exist of coordination between districts--particularly Utah
and Oregon--indicating mutual concern for joint action.

10

11
12

12

0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 886.
0fficial Records , vol. L, pt. 2, p. 505-507.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 411, 479, and 588.

9

The Military District of Utah

Most of the activity directed toward the defense of the mail, telegraph,
and emigrant routes took place within the Military District of utah. This
military district, comprising the territories of utah and Nevada, came into
being on August 6, 1862, when Colonel Patrick Edward Connor, enroute to Utah
Territory with troops from California, reached Fort Churchill, the first
military location in the area of his new command.

13

The organization within

the District of Utah was principally defined by the locations at which Connor's
troops were stationed.

14

District boundaries were occasionally changed.

Department of the

Pacific General Order 195, August 20, 1863, modified District of Utah area of
responsibility.

"The District of Utah will include the Territory of Utah, Camp

Ruby, Nev. Ter., and the new post established at Soda Springs, in the Territory
of Idaho. "

15

The effects of this directive were to remove Fort Churchill from

the District of utah

13

16

and to add the post (Camp Connor) which had been

Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 55.

14

For example, on June 30, 1863, the official returns showed subordinate elements of the District of Utah at Camp Douglas and Fort Bridger,
Utah Territory; Camp Connor, Idaho Territory; and Forts Ruby and Churchill,
Nevada Territory. Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 505-507.
15
16

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 585.

Fort Churchill subsequently had no troops which had been assigned
to Connor; after the deletion from the Utah District, the post was part of the
District of California. Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 711-713.

10
established by Connor outside his area of responsibility.

Even though Nevada

achieved statehood on October 31, 1864, there were no further changes in the
area responsibility of the District of Utah until February, 1865.
In the spring of 1865 several events occurred to bring about the discontinuance of the District of Utah. Anticipating an extensive campaign against
the Indians in his Department of Missouri, Major General Grenville M. Dodge
recommended to the War Department the addition of the Territory of Utah to
his department.
February.

18

17

This was done by the War Department on the 17th of

Dodge, on March 28, 1865, merged the districts of Utah,

Colorado, and Nebraska into one command under Connor; it was called the
District of the Plains, with headquarters initially at Denver.

19

The Territory

of Utah retained its military geographic identity as the West- Sub-district of
the District of the Plains.

Lieutenant Colonel Milo George, 1st Battalion,

Nevada Cavalry, commanded from Camp Douglas.

The Department of the

Pacific re-allocated the remainder of Connor's District of Utah command as
follows: Camp Ruby and all troops in Nevada were placed in the District of

17
Lyman Charles Pedersen, Jr. "History of Fort Douglas, Utah"
(unpublished Ph. D. diss., Brigham Young University, 1967), 152.
18
19

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 1147.

Francis Edward Rogan, " Patrick Edward Connor, An Army Officer
in Utah 1862-1866" (M.S. thesis, University of Utah, 1952), 147.

11

California.

20

All troops in Idaho Territory (including Camp Connor) were

incorporated into the District of Oregon.

21

Unit Organization

The troops involved in the District of Utah included two regiments-one infantry and one cavalry.

Regiments were composed of a headquarters of

field (line) and staff officers and their assistants and an authorized number of
companies. An infantry regiment was authorized ten companies, a cavalry
r egiment, twelve. The infantry and cavalry companies were designated by
letters starting with A and running through K and M, respectively. (The letter

"J" was not us ed in the designation of army companies.)
Personnel organizations of infantry and cavalry regiments are shown
below:
Cavalry Regiment
Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Major
Adjutant
Quartermaster

20
21

1
1
1
1 (Lt.)
1 (Lt.)

1
1
3
1 (Lt.)
1 (Lt.)

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 1148.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 1152.

22

Army Regulations of 1861, 505. See also Francis A. Lord, They
Fought for the Union (New York: Bonanza Books, 1960), 60 and 71.
23
Fred Albert Shannon, The Organization a nd Administration of the
Union Army 1861-1865 (Cleveland : The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1928) ,
2:270.

23

12
Position

Cavalry Regiment

Infantry Regiment

Regimental Commissary
Surgeon
Assistant Surgeon
Chaplain
Sergeant Major
Regimental Quartermaster
Sergeant
Regimental Commissary
Sergeant
Hospital steward
Principal Musician
Band Musician 24
Saddler Sergeant
Chief Farrier or Blacksmith

1
1

1

1
1

1

1
1

1
1
2
24

2

The organizations of infantry and cavalry companies were as
follows:
Infantry Company
Captain
First Lieutenant
Second Lieutenant
First Sergeant
Commissary Sergeant
Quartermaster Sergeant
Sergeant
Corporal
Musician
Wagoner
Teamster
Farrier
Saddler
Private
Total

25

1
1
1
1

4
8

Cavalry Company 23 • 25
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
8

2

1

64- 82
83-101

1
2
2
78

103

24
1nclusion of a band was optional with the regimental commander. If
included, the number of privates assigned to the band was deducted from the
total regimental authorization. Army Regulations of 1861, 19.
25

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 402.

13
Whereas the infantry and cavalry forces in the District of Utah were
organized in prescribed manners, this was apparently not true for the artillery.
Although Connor had from six to nine pieces of field artillery at all times during
his tenure in the District of Utah and although there were frequent references
to a "field battery" or a "light battery, "

26

no special organization of artillery-

men existed. Utley indicates that the gun crews for artillery pieces in the
frontier army were normally drawn from infantry or cavalry units and trained
as "instant artillerymen.

n

27

This was probably true in the District of Utah.

Artillery was involved in the campaigns against the Indians at Bear River and
at Spanish Fork Canyon.

In both cases the artillery was under the command of

Lieutenant Francis Honeyman.

28

Lieutenant Honeyman was a member of

Company I (and later other companies), Third Infantry Regiment, California
Volunteers.

29

The term, "Third Infantry Battallion, California Volunteers, " appears
in some of the literature pertaining to the later periods of the history of the
District of Utah.

30

A batallion was a headquarters used to command several

26

Richard H. Orton, Records of California Men in the War of the
Rebellion, 1861 to 1867 (Sacramento: State Office, 1890), 506. Rogan, 37.
Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 6.
27
28
29
30

Utley, 28.
official Records, vol. L, pt 1, p. 185 and 205. Rogan, 70.
orton, 585.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 1155.
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companies, but fewer than the full regimental authorization. When the Third
Infantry Regiment was formed, the period of service was "not to exceed 3
years . . . . "

31

the fall of 1864.
regiment.

32

Therefore, considerable personnel losses would occur in
Decision was made not to provide further recruits to the

Consolidation of organizations to contain all of the men who

remained in service occurred on October 29, 1864.

33

A battalion of four

companies (A, B, C, and D) resulted. A battalion was also used to co=and
the two companies of Nevada Cavalry which were used in Utah Territory.
Some caution needs to be applied regarding the degree of adherence
to prescribed organizations--particularly among volunteer units . Modifications
were frequently made to adjust to local condition.

31
32
33

.
Army Regulatwns of 1861, 505.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 995.

orton, 505. See also Fred B. Rogers, Soldiers of the Overland:
Being Some Account of the Services of General Patrick Edward Connor and
His Volunteers in the Old West (San Francisco, California: The Grabhorn
Press, 1938), 247.
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CHAPTER II
DECISION TO DEFEND

Facilities to be Defended

Communications routes through Utah and Nevada territories were
extensive and important. Oldest were the emigrant routes: the Oregon Trail,
the California Trail, and the many less-known "cut-offs " and interconnecting
routes.

The central route of the overland mail bisected the area, and by

March 1861, the central route had replaced the southern Butterfield route for
the daily U.S. mail.

In October 1861, the overland telegraph was completed.

If the problems inherent in the military protection of these routes

are to be appreciated, an insight into their physical descriptions is important.
The most obvious, common characteristic is their length.

These emigrant,

stage, mail, and telegraph routes were nearly 1, 000 miles long, through the
territories of Utah and Nevada and, although all were generally east-west in
orientation, they did not follow a single, common path.

The emigrant routes,

especially, utilized diverse paths throughout the northern half of the territories.
Another feature of importance in any consideration of protection is the
mobility of many of the elements of value or concern--the emigrant parties and
the passenger and mail stages. At any given time, the emigrant parties or the
stages could be located any place along the lengthy routes.

16
The stationary facilities associated with the overland mail and the
overland telegraph also complicated plans for protection. Several types of
facilities were located along the overland mail line.

Each fifteen to forty miles

there was a very simple facility, a "swing station," manned by a crew of three
or four men, and which provided a change of horses and very austere rest for
the stage passengers.

1

These stations were often associated with ranches

which grew the forage for that particular location.

Every third or fourth

station along the line was a more elaborate "home station, " which featured a
main building including sleeping rooms, a dining room, and frequently a telegraph office (after October 1861). In general, the detachments manning either
the swing or home stations were small. The stations were constructed in a
much sturdier fashion later in the period.

"Some of these (mail station) houses,

in the areas where Indians were hostile, were regular little fortresses.

Those

stations rebuilt after the Indian difficulties in Nevada in the summer of 1860,
were constructed of stone or adobe and were sixty feet square with walls eight
to ten feet high. "

2

1

LeRoy R. Hafen, The Overland Mail, 1849-1869: Promoter of
Settlement--Precursor of Railroads (Cleveland, Ohio: The Arthur H. Clark
Company, 1926), 304. Andrew L. Neff, History of Utah 1847 to 1869 (Salt
Lake City, Utab: The Deseret News Press, 1940), 726. Oscar Lewis, The
War in the Far West 1861-1865 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, Inc., 1961), 95.
2

Hafen, 176.
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The telegraph facilities included the wires crossing the country and
repair stations at approximately fifteen-mile intervals .

3

In general, the route

of the te legr aph followed the stage and mail lines as they existed in 1861.
The continued, uninterrupted use of these communications facilities
and routes was vital to the United States. Utley saw these communications as
the symbol of unity of Pacific and Atlantic under the U.S. flag.

4

Whitney quotes

the Lincoln telegraph message of October 20, 1861, to Acting Governor Fuller
of Utah: "The completion of the telegraph to Great Salt Lake City is auspicious
of the stability and union of the republic. "

5

There were a variety of more

practical reasons for keeping the overland lines open.

Travel by sea was

subj ect to disruption by Confederate privateers. Also, the federal government
was in need of western bullion.
The extensive investments by private business in the various communications were also important considerations in any plan for defense.

" Big

business, in the form of highly subsidized mail companies, c easelessly urged
that the government adequately protect the unguarded highway. "

6

Then, too, there were the interests of the territorial residents.
"Probably no people were more interested in the protection of the Overland

3

4
5

Neff, 730.
utley , 230.
Orson F. Whitney, History of Utah (4 vols., Salt Lake City: George

Q. Cannon and Sons Company, 1894), 2:31.

6

Neff, 627.
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Stage and Mail route which maintained regular contact between Salt Lake City
and points east and west than the citizens of Utah. "

7

The identification as to what needed protection and why were clear to
all.

There are numerous examples of concern. The Department of the Pacific

instructed the commanding officer at Fort Churchill on September 17, 1861, to
advise the Indian chiefs in his area that if they "wish to retain the good will of
the Government they must prevent their people from all interference with the
mail stages or stations, or the iron wire that passes through their country. "

8

A typical treaty with the Indians included Indian agreement not to molest the
telegraph and overland stage lines and to permit military posts to be built
along the routes .

9

The Threats

As we have seen, several factors considered in combination provided
the bases for determination that a military defense was required. One factor
was the importance of the facilities or activities. A second was their relative
vulnerabilities to disruptive or destructive actions. A third factor in the

7
Kate B. Carter, comp., Our Pioneer Heritage (Salt Lake City:
Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 1963), 6:3.
8
official Records, vo!. L, pt 1, p. 624.
9
Ray C. Colton, The Civil War in the Western Territories: Arizona,
Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah (Norman, Oklahoma: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1959), 169.

19
decision was whether a threat against the facilities existed, or was believed

to exist. Possible threats to the continued effective operation of the stage,
mail, and telegraph lines may have come from an Indian threat, a Confederate
or secessionist threat, or a threat resulting from possible internal civil disorder, that is, a Mormon threat.

The Indian Threat

The Indian threat was genuine; its scope and intensity are clearly
documented by history. Although accurate data is, of course, not available,
it has been estimated that approximately 35, 000 Indians populated the Great
Basin area about the time of the Civil War.

10

As a generality, Shoshoni,

including the Bannock and the Snake, were to the north, the Ute to the east,
and the Goshiute (Goshute) to the west. The Shoshoni and the Ute were
relatively more culturally advanced

11

and, therefore, capable of more serious

actions against white interests.
Although there were a multitude of festering reasons to provoke the
Indians to hostilities, two events in particular brought the issues to a climax.
The plight of destitute Indians was aggravated by severe winter conditions
during 1861-1862 ; the Indians were faced with the dilemma--plunder or

10
11

Neff, 369.

Leonard J. Arrington, " The Mormons and the Indians: A Review
and Evaluation," The Record (Pullman, Washington: The Friends of the
Washington state University, 1970), 3.

20
starve.

12

The withdrawal of federal troops from the frontier for the battle-

fields of t he Civil War during the summer of 1861 provided an opportunity
for the Indian to attempt redress of his grievances.

13

"Some tribes took

almost immediate advantage of the absence of the 'long knives.' Others
reacted only a little more slowly. "

14

The mobility of mail, express, and passenger stages and of emigrant
parties along the extensive overland routes made them particularly vulnerable
to Indian attack. The numerous, isolated, small, lightly manned stage stations
and the wires, pole s, and repair stations of the overland telegraph were also
highly vulnerable. As might he expected, provisions, livestock, and other
means of sustenance were the usual objectives of an Indian adventure.

These

items of booty were sought wherever they could be found with an acceptable
e leme nt of risk to the Indians.

Isolated mining parties,

15

stage stations, and

stage coaches offered particularly tempting circumstances.

12

16

Since the

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 667 and 731; Neff, 390; Lewis,

70 .
13

Colton, 207; Neff, 622; Lewis, 72, 95.

14

u. S. , Department of the Interior, Soldier and Brave: . . . (New
York: Harper and Row, 1963), 16.
15
16

Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 588.
Hafen, 242.

21
telegraph offered little in the way of "booty appeal," the lines probably were
not usually the objectives of Indian attacks.

17

An inevitable result of the Indians' efforts to obtain material things
from the whites was the destruction of life and property. Station keepers,
drivers, passengers, and an occasional soldier were killed.
and stages were burned.

19

the burning of U.S. mails.

18

Stage stations

Particularly objectionable were the pillage and
20

That the Indians had sufficient capability in terms of numbers and
military potential so as to constitute a genuine threat to the overland mail
and to the security of the West in general appears obvious --particularly under
circumstances of the United States preoccupied with a civil war.

17
Numerous authors such as Margaret M. Fisher, Utah and the Civil
War (Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret Book Company, 1929), 21; Rogers, 150;
and Pedersen, 151, report Indian damage to and disruption of the telegraph
lines. Neff, 731, indicates, however, that, because of Indian superstitions
and lack of awareness of the importance of the telegraph, "frequently when
stage and freight were in jeopardy, the single span of wire was unmolested. "
18

Fisher, 112.

Hafen, 250.

19
Edward w. Tullidge, The History of Salt Lake City and Its Founders
(Salt Lake City, Utah: Star Printing Company, 1886), 252; Colton, 166.

°Fisher, 133.
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22
The Confederate or Secessionist Threat

There were no incidents of overt Confederate action within the
territories of Utah and Nevada.

However, there was a considerable body of

political dissent, generally termed secessionist, existing in California and in
western Nevada, which had significant military impact on both the Department
of the Pacific and the troops for the District of Utah.
The California secessionists were most vocal in the southern part of
the state.

21

Rogan reports that the secessionist element was strong and

divisive even in Stockton, Connor's home, and that Connor was a "mark of
especial detestation" to some of the California southern sympathizers.

22

In

Nevada the southern "hotbeds of treason" were Virginia City, Carson City,
and Gold Hill.

23

An understandable concern by the military in the existence of a threat

from the Confederacy and the secessionists is easily documented.

24

This

concern manifested itself in several ways, including the deployment of troops.
For example, the First Infantry California Vblunteers, originally called to

21

Lewis, 21. See also Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 496 and
502; pt. 2, 107 and 130 .
22
23
24

Rogan, 7.
Lewis, 32 and 34.

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 472, 493, 510, 538, 541 and
547; pt. 2, p. 108.

23
federal service for use on the overland routes, was diverted by General
Wright to southern California because of increasing, dangerous disaffection
there.

25
General Sumner used the existence of a secessionist threat as his

basis for urging the "absolute and immediate necessity for a government of
some kind in Nevada Territory. n

26

Connor, enroute to Utah, wrote to Department of the Pacific from
Fort Churchill on August 3:
I find since entering this Territory that there are many
sympathizers with the Southern rebels along our entire
route. • . . they are known and can be identified as open
and avowed secessionists. I have not as yet taken any
steps to check them by arrest and punishment, but await
further instructions from headquarters. 27
A culmination of over a year of official apprehension about secessionist activity and of Connor's personal experience in both California and
Nevada was reflected in Connor's Orders No. 1, August 6, 1862:
... Being credibly informed that there are in this district
persons who, while claiming and receiving protection to life
and property, are endeavoring to destroy and defame the
principles and institutions of a Government under whose
benign influence they have been so long protected, it is therefore most rigidly enjoined upon all commanders ..• to cause
to be promptly arrested and closely confined until they have
taken the oath of allegiance to the United States, all persons

25
26
27

0fficial Records , vol. L, pt. 1, p. 623.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 518.
Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 48.

24
who from this date shall be guilty of uttering treasonable sentiments against the Government . . . • Traitors shall not utter
treasonable sentiments in this district with impunity .... 28

The Mormon Threat

There are a large number of scholarly treatises which address in
detail the general subject of the relations between federal civil and military
representatives in Utah and the Mormons immediately prior to and during the
Civil War period. It will suffice here, for the purpose of suggesting the
possibility of a threat from the Mormons to the federal military forces or to
the accomplishment of their mission, to consider relatively broad generalities.
Particularly important at this stage a re those factors which may have influenced
the decision to send troops to Utah and Connor's attitudes concerning the
Mormons prior to his arrival in Utah.
Only slightly over four years had elapsed between the passage of
Johnston's army of the Utah War through Salt Lake City (June 26, 1858) en
route to the establishment of Camp Floyd, and the arrival of Connor (October

28
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 55. This portion of Connor's
initial order was deeply resented by some historians for what must have been
an assumption that it was directed specifically at the Mormons. It was not;
the proclamation was directed to "traitors"--the secessionist variety. Rogan,
22, quotes Whitney (below) and then falls into the same morass of faulty history
in citing this action by Connor as an initiation of his personal vendetta against
the Mormons. "Even the mild-mannered historian Orson F. Whitney comments that this (Connor's] proclamation in its wording indicates that Connor
expected to find traitors . . . . This proclamation foretold the difficulties that
would arise once Connor entered the stronghold of Mormonism."

25
20, 1862). The problems causing the dispatch of the Utah Expedition were
fresh in the memories of men and must have influenced Connor and his
troops.
Further, in June, 1862, just prior to Connor's departure from
California, the "Morrisite War" had occurred.

This event was emphatically

civil disorder in the area where Connor was to operate and could readily be
conceived by anti-Mormons as bloody, religious persecution.
Overt actions by the Mormons to threaten directly federal interests
in the Territory of Utah did not occur.

However, the presence of the large

concentration of Mormons athwart the overland routes and suspicions as to
their motives and intentions during the national travail of civil war could
easily be conceived as causes of concern.
One area of concern had overtones of religion.

Mormons believed

that the coming of the Civil War was in fulfillment of a prophecy and revelation by Joseph Smith in 1832. Thus, the Mormons could manifest "no surprise
or dismay, "

29

and could readily dissociate themselves from involvement in

its ou tcome.
Other factors considered possibly to contribute to difficulties between
a military commander and Mormon elements of the population in his area of

29
T. B. H. Stenhouse, The Rocky Mountain Saints ... (New York:
D. Appleton and Company, 1873), 420. Neff, 619.

26
responsibility were identified in an official Army report in July, 1861.
a.

30

A large percentage of Mormons are foreign, with little under-

standing or regard for American government, laws or institutions.
b.

The Mormon Church is a closely structured hierarchy in itself

and would compete with any local government for the allegiance and obedience
of the people.
c.

Based on their experience, the Mormons are taught to hate

Americans as "slayers of the founder of their religion, as the persecutors of
their people. "
The relative ease of determining the Mormon potential to disrupt
federal interests in Utah and the extreme difficulty in ascertaining their intentions must be recognized.

The critical considerations, however, were not

what the Mormons intended to do, but what they were capable of doing if they
so elected, and particularly what Connor's assessment of the situation was.
There are many indications, summarized below, that Connor sincerely believed
in the existence of a Mormon threat to the accomplishment of his mission.

This

belief by Connor was first influential in the missions ultimately assigned to his
troops and in their locations within Utah Territory.

31

By March 1863, the

30
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 548. This report, prepared by
Major James H. Carleton, commander of Camp Fitzgerald, near Los Angeles,
was intended to analyze the political sentiments of the people in his area, some
of whom were Mormons. The impact of this report is not known. However, it
certainly was known to Department of the Pacific and~ have been known to
Connor.
31

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 119.

27
threat was considered to be of such magnitude that Connor considered that
pre-emptive use of his forces against the Mormons may be necessary for
survival.

32

Apprehension of Mormon intentions resulted in the cancellation

of a planhed expedition against the Indians.

33

That civil disorder in Mor-

mondom had the potential to disrupt the mails--and Connor's mission--was
dramatically illustrated at this time by "worried Gentiles" of Salt Lake City
who, on May 9, 1863, "wired the government that unless quick action was taken

to remove the troops and the obnoxious officials, ensuing difficulties might
result in the disruption of the mail and telegraph lines. "

34

Belief in the seriousness of the Mormon threat and the possibility of
its use against the authority of the United States was also held by General
Halleck.

35

The Decision

In view of the nature, importance, and vulnerabilities of the overland

communications routes and the threats as they existed or were perceived to
exist to their continued effective operation, a decision to provide military
protection was inevitable.

32

orton, 511.

34

Robert J. Dwyer, The Gentile Comes to Utah: A Study of Religious
and Social Conflict, 1862-1890 (Washington: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1941), 15.
35

nwyer, 17.

28
One of the preliminary steps to implement such a decision was
legislative.

Congressional action--an "Act to Authorize the Employment of

Volunteers to Aid in Enforcing the Laws and Protecting Public Property," was
approved July 22, 1861.

36

This act, in general, authorized the call to federal

service of volunteers for service in artillery, cavalry, or infantry units for
periods of from six months to three years.

Volunteer units so raised were to

organize and operate under basically the same regulations and laws as did the
units of the regular army.
Units were obtained in response to specific calls from the secretary
of war to the governors of the respective states and territories.

37

Individuals

and the units they comprised were received into the service of the United
States by muster.

36

38

Army Regu!ations of 1861, 504-508.

37
Francis B. Heitman, comp. , Historical Register and Dictionary
of the United States Army, vol. 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1903), 285, indicates that under the se procedures California provided a total
of 15,725 men during the Civil War, and Nevada, 1, 082. Although portions of
the Utah militia were employed on federal service in 1862, Heitman does not
include the Territory of Utah among those political entities which provided
federal forces. Cavalry and infantry volunteer units from California and
cavalry from Nevada were utilized in the Military District of Utah.
38
Army Regulations of 1861, 481. Muster was a military procedure
whereby the membership of a given organization was verified and reported to
the Adjutant General.

29
A variety of early, tentative, temporary, expedient, and frequently
ineffective military measures to protect the overland routes, taken prior to
the deployment of Connor's troops, influenced Connor's operations.

Fort

Churchill was established in July 1860, in response to requests from a wide
variety of sources for protection along the overland route.

39

Commanders of

existing military posts were directed to provide escorts to mail coaches.

40

A

Protective Corps headed by a military officer as "superintendent of the emigration" was detailed during the summer of 1861.

41

As an illustration of the gravity of the situation, in July 1861 the
War Department suggested to General Scott, commanding the army, the
possibility of using paroled companies of Confederate prisoners "to take part
in Utah. "

42

This plan was not implemented; the adjutant general subsequently

determined that the proposal was a violation of parole.

39

Ferol Egan, "The Building of Fort Churchill, Blueprint for a
Military Fiasco, 1860," The American West, IX (March 1972), 5.
40
41
42

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 454.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 460.

official Records , vol. L, pt. 1, p. 537. The Confederates had the
practice of paroling captured federal troops immediately after their capture.
Initially, such troops were discharged on their return to federal control on
parole, since a condition of parole was an oath "not to bear arms or to aid
the United States directly or indirectly until . .. exchanged." Later, paroled
troops were kept in special camps under military control as a disciplinary
measure. See Lord, 319.
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The last military effort prior to the arrival of the California
Volunteers along the western portions of the overland routes involved the
Mormons.

In April 1862, Indian depredations against the overland mail were

extensive to the east of Salt Lake City, and more particularly to the east of
Fort Bridger. "The Colorado troops, who would have been the logical ones

to handle this situation, were busily engaged ... in northern New Mexico. "

43

44
In addition, volunteer troops from neither Ohio to the east nor California
to the west were yet deployed along the overland routes. A request for
assistance brought help from the utah militia. A small party of twenty-four
volunteers under Robert T. Burton was placed on the routes to the east of
Salt Lake City during the period April 26-May 31, 1862. A second force, the
Lot Smith company of cavalry, operated in the same area, but for a longer
period, April 28 to August 14.

45

Department of the Pacific Planning for the utah Operation

The first national call to California for volunteers came by telegram
and Pony Express relay on July 24, 1861. " The War Department accepts for

43

Hafen, 246.

44

The Eleventh Cavalry Ohio Volunteers bad responsibility, under
the District of Nebraska, for defense of the overland routes immediately to the
east of the District of Utah.
45

Fisher, Utah and the Civil War, provides the most complete account
of the operations of the Utah Militia in defense of the overland routes. The
book consists primarily of diary entries of participants, including Burton and
Smith.
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three years one regiment of infantry and five companies of cavalry to guard
the overland mail route from Carson Valley to Salt Lake and Fort Lawrence
[sic]. "

46

This call resulted in the muster and organization of the First

Infantry California Volunteers, commanded by Colonel James H. Carleton.
This regiment was diverted, however, on September 17, 1861, from its
intended mission of guarding the overland mail route to one of settling disaffection in southern California.

47

Headquarters of the army was notified of the diversion of the First
Infantry California Volunteers on the 27th of September.

The headquarters of

the army position was stated by Major General McClellan, Commanding U.S.
Armies, to General Wright on November 13:
Will you please order the necessary force (probably one or two
regiments), if possible under Colonel Carleton, to protect the
Overland Mail Route; the number of troops to be employed is
left to your discretion. Please confer with Louis McLane about
the location of the troops. 48
General Wright responded on the 20th of November that he had
"recalled Colonel Carleton from his command in the southern district, and as

46
47
48

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 543.
Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 623.

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 720. The California Volunteers
from which the "replacement" troops would be drawn were in existence or
were being organi zed as a result of a second War Department call, August 14,
1861, for "four regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry, to be
placed at the disposal of General Sumner. " Of interest to this study were the
Third Infantry California Volunteers and Second Cavalry California Volunteers.
See Orton, 12.
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soon as he arrived I shall organize his command of at least one regiment,
for the protection of the Overland Mail Route."

49

General Wright also indi-

cated that, in coordination with Mr. Louis McLane (mail company agent),
tentative locations along the route for troops had been selected for Simpson's
Park (326 miles from Sacramento), Ruby Valley (98 miles from Simpson's
Park), and Camp Floyd (217 miles from Ruby Valley). Governor Nye was
notified of Wright's "design to establish troops at Simpson's Park, Ruby
Valley, and Camp Floyd. "

50

Extremely adverse weather during the winter of 1861-1862 caused
delays in the contemplated troop movement and hardships to the soldiers,
most of whom were living In temporary camps pending their deployment to
Utah Territory. In mid-January General Wright wrote of "unprecedented rains
and storms (in California) which have continued uninterruptedly for the past
six weeks [which] have submerged and saturated the whole country to such an
extent that it is absolutely impossible to move. "

51

Four months later the

effects were still being felt . Wright wrote again: " The season is more than
a month later than usual.
deep ... n

52

The snow on the Sierra Nevada Mountains is very

His estimate was that Connor could not move until approximately

the middle of June.
49
50
51
52

Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 730.
Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 735.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 813.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 1069.
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After a delay of three months, a communication from the War
Department on March 21, 1862, took on an almost imperative note.
The Secretary of War directs you to make the necessary
preparations and disposition of your troops to protect
emigrants and the Overland Mail Route from Indian hostilities and depredations. 53
Wright's response of the 26th of March disclosed his plans for "protection to the Overland Mail Route as far as Salt Lake or Fort Bridger. "

54

The protecting troops were to be provided by two companies of cavalry
already at Fort Churchill and three more companies of cavalry and six
companies of volunteer infantry in California, but ready to move as soon as
the roads were passable.
Colonel Carleton could not be spared from extremely important duties
in southern California, but Wright assured his superiors: "I have an active
and reliable colonel of volunteers, well suited for this service. n

55

Although

the new commander was not mentioned by name, this is the initial shift in the
identification of the commander for troops in Utah.
On March 27th, General Wright reassured the War Department that

the instructions of the secretary of war for protection of the overland mail
route would be carried out as soon as practicable, that is, as soon as troops

53
54
55

0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 942.
0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 953.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 954.
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and supplies could cross the mountains.

Units in California designated to

constitute the force were "three companies of cavalry near this city (San
Francisco) and the six companies of the Third Infantry California Volunteers,
now at Benicia Barracks ..• "

56

On April 29th Wright wrote that the troop and supply movement could

not commence before the end of May, but that in the meantime the necessary
supplies were being accumulated. He assured his superiors that the route
through his area of responsibility could be "traveled in perfect safety; had it
been otherwise, I would have forced a passage over the mountains and thrown
troops on the line at any cost. "

57

The matter of locations of military posts along the overland route was
again discussed. "The distance from Sacramento to Fort Bridger is about
800 miles, and it will be important to have a careful examination of the whole
route made and suitable points selected for posts. Ruby Valley is well spoken
of; it is about midway between Fort Churchill and Camp Floyd. "

58

Another reassurance to the War Department was sent by General
Wright on May 22.
Colonel Conner, with seven companies of his regiment . ..
will move on the 26th instant and encamp beyond Stockton,
preparatory to crossing the mountains at the earliest moment

56

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 957.

57

Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 1039.

58

lbid.
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practicable, and advance on the Overland Mail Route.
The cavalry force designated for the same service will
be thrown forward at an early day. 59
The 30th of May saw yet another communication to the War Department concerning troops for the overland mail route.
Supplies are being collected and transportation preparing
for crossing the Sierra Nevada, as soon as the roads are
practicable for wagons, probably about the 20th of June.
I have two companies of cavalry at Fort Churchill, and
one company temporarily near Pyramid Lake, which with
the two companies of the same regiment, Second Cavalry
California Volunteers, now near this city, will constitute
the mounted force I designed for Colonel Connor's command. Three companies of the Third Infantry California
Volunteers are now serving in the District of Humboldt. I
propose as soon as their services can be spared, to order
them to join Colonel Connor. . • . Unless otherwise instructed, I shall advance Colonel Connor to the neighborhood of
Salt Lake, establishing one, possibly two, intermediate
stations between Fort Churchill and Utah. 60
Consideration of the facilities on the overland route and their importance and vulnerabilities to the threats perceived to exist led inevitably to a
decision to employ military defensive measures. Almost a year passed
between the decision to defend and the final designation of a force of California
Volunteers, under the command of Colonel Patrick Edward Connor, to provide
that defense . The delay in placing troops along the western portions of the
overland routes resulted from the time necessary to raise and equip volunteer
units, a change in the designation of the major troop unit to be employed, and

59
60

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 1091.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 1110.
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the late winter season of 1861-1862. The planning completed, in early 1862
the preparation of Connor's force for duty in the District of Utah was underway.

37

CHAPTER III
DEPLOYMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA VOLUNTEERS

Troop Preparations

Coincident with General Wright's actions informing the War Department of his plans to use elements of the Third Infantry and Second Cavalry
California Volunteers for the overland routes were certain preparatory actions
concerning the troops.
The Third Infantry was organized and mustered during late 1861 at
Camp McDougall, near Stockton (Headquarters and Companies A, B, D, I,
and K) and at Benicia and Benicia Barracks (Companies C, E, F, G, and H).
The Second Cavalry was mustered at Camp Alert in San Francisco.
Almost immediately upon organization, some of the companies of
both regiments were committed to defensive roles.

Four companies (A, B,

C, and D) of the Third Infantry were assigned to posts in the Humboldt a rea .
Two companies (A and H) of the Second Cavalry were deployed early to Fort
Churchill, to be joined later by a third company (M) to operate in that same
general area.
On March 28 Connor was directed by General Wright to put his command (Third Infantry) in readiness for movement at an early date.

1

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 960.

1

The first

38
step was to recover the four companies, which had been deployed to the
Humboldt, to rejoin the other companies of the regiment at Benicia Barracks.
By June 30 the assembly of that portion of the regiment designated for Utah
was complete; seven companies were at Benicia Barracks.

2

On May 19, as a preliminary step for the march across the mountains,
the Third Infantry was ordered to move to the vicinity of Stockton.

3

The

troops arrived on the evening of the 26th, and established their camp, which
they named Camp Halleck, at the fair grounds.

4

The other unit to comprise a major portion of Connor's force, the
Second Cavalry, was alerted on June 16 to prepare for movement by the 1st
of July.

5

The regimental headquarters and Companies K and L from Camp

Alert were to join the other three companies already in Nevada.
The Third Infantry continued its preparations at Camp Halleck. On
June 26th General Wright inspected Connor's regiment at that location and
reported: "The regiment made a fine appearance; the arms, clothing, and
equipments were in high order. ,s After thus reassuring himself as to the
condition of his troops, orders were quickly issued on July 5, 1862, by

2
3
4
5
6

Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 1169.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 1081.
Rogers, 19; Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 1104.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 1142.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 1165.
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General Wright's headquarters to provide the official designation of troops for
the protection of the overland mail route.

7

1. Under instructions from the War Department to protect
the Overland Mail Route within this department, the Third
Infantry California Volunteers and the headquarters, with
five companies of the Second Cavalry California Volunteers,
are designated for that purpose.

2. Col. P. Edward Connor, Third Infantry California
Volunteers, the senior officer of the column, will move,
with his headquarters and seven companies of his regiment, now encamped near Stockton, as soon as practicable, crossing the Sierra Nevada Mountains and advancing
on the Territory of Utah.
3. Col. Columbus Sims, Second Cavalry California
Volunteers, will move from his camp near this city at an
early day, with his headquarters and two companies of his
regiment, by water to Sacramento, and thence by land along
the mail route.
4. After crossing the Sierra Nevada Mountains, Colonel
Sims will report to Colonel Connor, by whose orders he
will be governed in his further movements.
5. Colonel Connor will establish a post at Ruby Valley,
with the headquarters of the Second Cavalry and Companies
H and K of the same regiment, 8 and then advance to the
vicinity of Salt Lake with his seven companies of infantry,
Price's company of the Second Cavalry, and his field battery, and select a suitable position for a post.

First Movement

After engaging in an extended hassle with the supporting quartermaster over wagons to transport supplies, at 9 o'clock in the morning on
7
Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 5.
8

For reasons to be discussed later, troop units of the Second Cavalry
were not used at Ruby Valley.
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July 12, Connor's command of seven infantry companies departed in compliance with departmental orders issued on the 5th of July.

9

At this stage,

Connor's column consisted of approximately 750 men. Accompanying were
55 wagons, each carrying 3, 000 pounds of supplies, several carriages for
officers' families, at least five and probably six pieces of field artillery,
and three wagon-ambulances. Departure was through Stockton to the jaunty
military tune, "The Girl I Left Behind Me. " One week later the regiment was
just west of Placerville, and on the 25th the mountains had been crossed.

10

Fort Churchill

August 3 saw the column at Fort Churchill, a post established in
July 1860, and garrisoned continuously since that date.

The command arrived

"in excellent health and spirits" and having "stood the trip remarkably well. ,1l
Here, on August 6, 1862, at the first military post in the area to
comprise his district, Connor assumed command.

12

A halt here was necessary to overhaul and repair the wagons and
harnesses; besides, Colonel Sims and the Second Cavalry had not yet arrived.

9
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 19. Also, see Aurora Hunt,
The Army of the Pacific . , . (Glendale, California: The Arthur H. Clark
Company, 1951), 188.
10

Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 31 and 39.

11
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 48. Rogers, 21, apparently
erroneously indicates August 1 as the date of arrival at Fort Churchill.
12

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 55.
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Connor was concerned that a large westward emigration along the route that
season would have depleted the supply of grass for his animals.

He planned

to move his command from Fort Churchill to Ruby Valley in two increments.
The Headquarters and Companies K and L, Second <tavalry California
Volunteers, had departed Camp Alert on July 21, crossed the Sierra Nevada
Mountains at Henness Pass, and arrived at Fort Churchill on August 11.

13

Their arrival brought more problems for Connor. Colonel Sims had expertenced severe disciplinary problems with his troopers. Thirty men had
deserted along the route of march.

The commander of Company K was under

guard. The remaining men and officers were reported to be in a state of
insubordination. Connor reported to the Department of the Pacific:
. . . I am informed by Major McGarry and other officers
that if the companies designated for that purpose are left
at Ruby Valley with Colonel Sims in command there will
not be thirty of them left in sixty days. On the route the
officers threatened to leave the colonel and march their
companies to this post without him. 14
This situation necessitated some adjustements to the planned, future
assignments. On August 15th two companies of infantry were designated to

13

Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 60.

14
Ibid. By Department of the Pacific orders, Sims was superseded in
command of his regiment on the 19th and ordered to remain at Fort Churchill,
but was not to assume command there. Connor was by the same directive
required to submit a report concerning Sims' behavior on the march across the
mountains. Major McGarry was placed temporarily in charge of that portion
of the Second Cavalry Regiment with Connor. On January 31, 1863, Sims
resigned from the service and George S. Evans was placed in command, in
compliance with orders of December 6, 1862.
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man the Ruby Valley location. The Headquarters, Second Cavalry, with
Companies A, H, and K, were designated to continue the march toward
Utah under regimental control.
Third Infantry.

Company M was ordered to march with the

Company L, Second Cavalry remained at garrison Fort

Churchill.
The Third Infantry California Volunteers (seven companies) and
Company M, Second Cavalry California Volunteers, departed Fort Churchill
on August 15.

15

By December 31, 1862, Company L, Second Cavalry, had

been augmented by the arrival at Fort Churchill of Company A, Third Infantry,
recently relieved from duty in the Humboldt area.

16

Fort Ruby

Two and one-half weeks were consumed before the column of seven
infantry companies (C, E, F, G, H, I, and K) and one cavalry company
reached Ruby Valley on the 1st of September.

The road was rough; the dust

was deep; and extremely high daytime temperatures on the Nevada desert
necessitated marching during twilight hours.
regularly, despite the heat, sand, and sage.

Dress parades were held
17

Connor's force, under his

immediate control, now totalled approximately 1, 000 men. General Wright

15
16
17

Rogers, 22.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 271.
Hunt, 190.
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was able to report to Washington that: "The command is in good health and
under the admirable discipline established by Colonel Connor is perfectly
reliable for any service required of it. "

18

Location of federal troops in Ruby Valley had been contemplated
since the inception of plans for defense of the overland routes. References to
the possibility of locating forces at Ruby Valley appear under dates of
November 20, 1861, and April 29, June 21, and July 5, 1862.

19

However,

not until July 25 did General Wright direct the establishment of a post at Ruby
Valley.

20
The troops were set to cutting timber for construction of winter

quarters for the garrison and a storehouse for the fort at the southern end of
Ruby Valley. A reservation of six miles square was established.

21

The fort

was officially dedicated on the 20th of September.

18

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 95 and 97. Major McGarry,
with Company K, Second Cavalry, had not departed Fort Churchill until August
31. Rogers, 259, quoting a soldier's diary, Third Infantry, indicates the
arrival of Companies A and H, Second Cavalry, at Ruby Valley on 15 September.
General Wright, in the reports cited in this footnote indicates three companies
of cavalry arrived at Ruby Valley on September 1. In all probability, he was
unaware of the manner in which Connor had directed his command at this stage
of the march.
19
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 730, 1039, 1110, and 1151;
vol. L, pt. 2, p. 5.
20
21

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 39.

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 143; Rogers, 28; " In Nevada's
Fort Ruby," The Salt Lake Tribune, Home Magazine, March 2, 1969, p. 8 and
12, provides an interesting description of current Fort Ruby ruins.
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The matter of a garrison for the new fort was an issue between
Connor and departmental headquarters. The initial plan (June 16) had been
for the Second Cavalry Headquarters and Companies H and K to garrison the
Ruby Valley location. 1n view of the disciplinary problems with Sims, this
plan was changed on August 15 and a garrison of two infantry companies was
directed.

By September 19 the matter was still active.

Department of the

Pacific strangely directed Connor: "As no provision has been made for cavalry
at Ruby Valley [no mention of the August 15 plan], you will leave (Major]
Gallagher and two companies of infantry at that point. "

22

Unless the other

three companies of his regiment still in California were to join him in Utah
that winter, Connor recommended on the 20th that only one infantry company
be left at Fort Ruby. Wright was adamant: "The other companies will not join
you this winter.

Two companies will be left at Ruby. " Companies C and F,

Third Infantry California Volunteers, constituted the first garrison for the new
fort.
The provision of supplies from California to be placed along the route
was another bothersome concern for Connor. The contractor, James Street,
was unable to keep up.

23

When Connor arrived at Ruby Valley on the 1st of

September, he reported to General Wright: "No supplies here or ahead. "
A report of continning deficiencies in supplies was made on September 16.

22
23
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Rogers, 28.
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Not until the 1st of October had the supply situation been resolved sufficiently

to permit the onward movement of the troops to Utah.

24

Because of the supply-enforced delay in movement of his troops from
Ruby Valley, Connor made a personal visit to Salt Lake City by stage during
the period of September 5th to the 13th. This preliminary visit to the city of
the Mormons had a marked effect in formulating Connor's views concerning
its inhabitants, and, in all probability, influenced both Connor's concept of
his mission and the subsequent official statement of that mission by his higher
military headquarters.

Following his return from Salt Lake City to Fort

Ruby, Connor's official report to the Department of the Pacific included these
observations;
It will be impossible for me to describe what I saw and heard
in Salt Lake, so as to make you realize the enormity of
Mormonism; suffice it, that I found them a community of
traitors, murderers, fanatics, and whores. The people
publicly rejoice at reverses to our arms, and thank God
that the American Government is gone, as they term it,
while their prophet and bishops preach treason from the
pulpit. The Federal officers are entirely powerless, and
talk in whispers for fear of being overheard by Brigham's
spies. . . . I have a difficult and dangerous task before me,
and will endeavor to act with prudence and firmness. 25
It is difficult to conceive the circumstances that would have provided

the bases for so antagonistic a view of the Mormons as held by Connor.

His

stay in the city could not have exceeded five days; sources of the information,

24
25

0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 97, 125, and 143.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 97 and 119.
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other than personal observation, on which his opinions were based are not
disclosed.

That Connor held the extreme views he voiced, however, cannot

be disputed--nor can the fact that his opinions influenced his concept of his
duty in Utah.
However, a direct military benefit came from the reconnaissance.
Connor reported: "The country between this point [Ruby Valley] and Salt Lake
is an alkali desert, scarce of wood and water . . . , " Knowledge gained from
the journey could be the means of saving the command "much suffering for
want of water. "

26

While the troops were delayed at Fort Ruby, it became necessary to
send a force to suppress some Indian disturbances on the Humboldt.

27

Details

are discussed in Chapter IV.
At Fort Ruby in late September another event of some significance to
the California Volunteers occurred. At the request of the officers and men of
his regiment, Colonel Connor telegraphed a request to Major General Hallec k,
General-in-Chief in Washington, for duty for the Third Infantry California
Volunteers on the battlefields of the East. The regiment "pledges General

26
27

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 119.

0fficial Records, vol. L , pt. 2, p. 124, 125, and 144. Irma Ha nce
and Irene Warr, Johnston, Connor and the Mormons: An Outline of Military
History in Northern Utah (Salt Lake City, Utah: Privately published, 1962),
24, erroneously attribute the delay in the movement of the main body of troops
from Ruby Valley to this "side expedition against the Indians."
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Halleck never to disgrace the flag, himself, or California. The men enlisted
to fight traitors . . . . We desire to strike a blow in this contest. "

28

The

request included an authorization for the government to withhold $30, 000 in pay
then due, or if that were not sufficient to offset the transportation costs, the
men would pay their own transportation expenses to Panama. Of course, this
request came to naught, and the records fail to disclose General Wright's
views on the action of the regiment.
On the 2nd of October, 1862, the march of Connor's column from
Fort Ruby to Utah was resumed. In column at this time were five companies
of the Third Infantry (E, G, H, I, and K) and two of the Second Cavalry (A and
M)--a total of slightly over 700. Their exact destination remained somewhat

28

0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 133. Rogers, 25, utilizing
additional sources, has a very complete description of this event. Hubert
Howe Bancroft, History of Utah 1540-1886 (San Francisco, California: The
History Company, 1890), 611, interprets this gesture, typical of the effusive
patriotism of the day, as one of "disgust when it became known that Zion was
their destination. " Whitney, 2:73-75, providing no historical documentation
other than their September 24th "demand" to General Halleck, manages to
devote three pages to the disappointment and " humiliation" of Connor's troops
at the "galling, undignified" prospect of service In Utah and their "burning
with impatience to go to the seat of war. " Such distortion, if left in Isolation,
does not provide an important misrepresentation of history. However, later
scholars, such as Rogan, 23-27, and William Fox, "Patrick Edward Connor,
'Father' of Utah Mining" (M.A. thesis, Brigham Young University, 1966), 12,
cite Whitney's views as apparently authentic evidence of "insubordination
among the troops and officers," a "state of dissatisfaction," and an attitude
of being "slighted and insulted." The implications relative to the ability of
Connor and his troops for unbiased, effective service in Utah are all too
obvious.
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imprecise.

General Wright was to base his decision regarding the exact

location of troops in Utah on the recommendations of Colonel Connor, and
these could not be submitted until Connor had personally seen the area. Until
that time, the prospective post in Utah would be described as "in the vicinity of
Salt Lake ... to be the headquarters of Colonel Connor. "

29

Connor's initial

visit to Utah occurred during the second week of September, and his discussions via dispatches with General Wright of the options available for troop
locations--abandoned Fort Crittenden or "another location .... on a plateau
about three miles from Salt Lake City"

30

--immediately followed.

General

Wright approved the location near the city, and so advised the adjutant general
of the army.

31

On the evening of the 17th, Colonel Connor advised General Wright
cryptically: "Have just arrived. Will cross the Jordan to-morrow. "

32

This

event was considered by many of the troops to be a milestone in the progress
of their march. Rumors--entirely unconfirmed or abetted by Connor, who had
"a fashion of keeping his own counsel"--were circulated that " the Mormons
objected to our close proximity to their city and would forcibly resist an attempt
on our part to cross that stream." The possible origin of such rumors 1from
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Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 39.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, 1. 119.
0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, 1. 130 and 150.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 180.
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investors in the property of old Fort Crittenden and who desired to further
its sale at handsome profit to the newly arrived army was also noted.

" ... like

the Israelites of old [we would] ... cross the Jordan, or else have a fight
,33
The rumors of forcible opposition were false; the crossing was uneventful and on Monday forenoon, the 20th of October, 1862, Connor's troops
were ready to end their march.

Correspondent Anderson indicates the selec-

tion of a route six miles longer than an alternate available, but which would
take the California Volunteers through the very center of the " metropolis of
the modern Saints."

34

Just outside the city itself, the column was halted and

organized for the grand entrance .

35

The order of march was as follows:

Advance Guard of Cavalry
Connor and Staff
Cavalry Brass Band
Companies A and M, Second Cavalry California Volunteers
Light Artillery Battery
Infantry Field Band
36
Companies E, G, H, I, and K, Third Infantry California Volunteer s
Staff
Quartermaster and Commissary Wagons
Rear Guard of Infantry
33
John A. Anderson, chaplain of Connor's regiment and a corresponde nt for the San Francisco Bulletin, in dispatches dated October 17 and 18,
1862, as quoted by Rogers, 41-46. Also, see Stenhouse, 602.
34
35
36

Rogers, 54.
Rogers, 50.

Rogan, 37.

Tbis grouping is sometimes listed as Third Infantry Battalion since
only five of the regiment's ten companies were present at this time in Salt
Lake City.

50
Into the city they marched, and, after a brief halt for an official
welcoming address by Governor Harding in front of the governor 's mansion,
moved on to their selected camp site.

Correspondent Anderson reports of

their passage through Salt Lake City: "Every crossing was occupied by
spectators, and windows, doors and roofs had their gazers.

Not a cheer, not

a jeer greeted us .... there were none of those manifestations of loyalty that
in any other city in a loyal territory would have been made. "

37

At 9:30p.m.

that evening, Colonel Connor telegraphed General Wright: "Just arrived.
Encamped on site of new post.

Command in good health and discipline. "

38

Camp Douglas

From the campsite on the bench overlooking the city--a troop location
then designated as "Camp No. 49, near Salt Lake City"-- Headquarters, District
of Utah officially established Camp Douglas, named in honor of Senator Stephen
A. Douglas of lllinois, on the 26th of October, 1862: " Pursuant to orders from
departmental headquarters a military post [comprising approximately 2, 560
acres] is established at this camp, to be called Camp Douglas. "

39

The

military attract! veness of the location selected is well stated in a report from
Colonel Connor to the adjutant general of the army soon after Connor's arrival.

37

Rogers, 51.

38
0 fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 187. The initial camp was near
the location of the present post cemetery.
39

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 195.
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Camp Douglas is, Connor wrote,
..• situated at a distance of three miles east of Great Salt Lake
City, at which place there is a post-office and telegraph office,
with good facilities for communications both east and west daily.
. . . It is on an elevated spot which commands a full view of the
city ..• with a plentiful supply of wood and water in its vicinity,
and in the neighborhood of numerous quarries of stone adapted
to building barracks. If it is contemplated to establish a
permanent post in this Territory, I know of no spot so desirable
as this. Besides the above advantages, it is the center from
which diverge three roads to California, two to Oregon, and the
great Overland Mail Route to the east. The low price of forage
for animals is an additional advantage which it possesses, and
the health of the soldiers has also materially improved since
their arrival here. 40
The first order of business was to hiy out the camp and to construct
adequate protection for men, animals, and supplies against that would prove to
be a very long and severe winter. The diary of Corporal Tuttle, Company K,
Third Infantry California Volunteers, rather understates the situation with the
observation that the winter of 1862-1863 was not a mild one.

41

He reported

six separate snow storms during December and the occurrence of the last snow
storm of the season on April 23.
Nevertheless, Colonel Connor described a reasonably substantial
frontier military installation in a report of February 26, 1863.
The quarters . •. are temporary shelters of tents placed over
excavations four feet deep, with good stone and adobe fireplace.
They are warm and comfortable, capable of accommodating
twelve men each, are all dry, well ventilated, and convenient
to good water. They are kept clean and in good order. . ..

40
41

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 218.
Hunt, 192 .
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The officers' quarters consist of thirteen small buildings constructed of logs and adobes over ground excavations of from
three to four feet deep and covered with boards, straw, and
earth. They have good fireplaces, and average four rooms
each. The building occupied by the commanding officer is
above ground, constructed of adobes, contains five rooms,
two of which are occupied as adjutants' offices. The above
are all temporary structures and only adapted to shelter this
winter. 42
Also, there were two above-ground, stone and adobe buildings used
as a guard house and a bake house. Commissary and quartermaster offices
and stores were under a single cover, made of paulins stretched over a substantial 200-foot frame.

Hospital facilities were provided by a small log

structure and three tents, made warm by boards and earth. The four cavalry
stables, two quartermaster's stables, and the blacksmith shop were constructed of willows bound together by uprights and well lined and covered with
straw and earth.

Connor added a final touch to his description: "The buildings

combine comfort with economy."

Fort Bridger

Connor had scarcely had time to begin even the preliminary work to
develop the post of Camp Douglas before another problem required attention,
and he so advised the Department of the Pacific on December 2:
On Saturday last they [Indians] stole 100 horses from Fort
Bridger Reserve ... and fears are entertained that they
will attack some of the stations of the Overland Mail. I

42

0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 326.
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have therefore ordered Company I, Captain Lewis, of my regiment, to garrison Fort Bridger this winter. I shall order
detachments of his company to the different stations in this
district east of here, if I find it necessary. 43
Following Connor's initiative by only four and seven days, respectively,
came two telegraphic messages from Major General Halleck in Washington to
General Wright in San Francisco suggesting strongly the propriety of garrisoning Fort Bridger.

44

Halleck's second message reported that others--the Over-

land Mail Company, the Post Office Department, and the Department of the
Interior--were urging "the r emoval of Colonel Connor's command to Fort
Bridger and Ham's Fork, as a check upon the Indians. "

45

When General Wright received Halleck's first telegraphic message,
he had not yet received Connor's message of the 2nd of December, but, nonetheless, he informed the adjutant general in Washington that "Colonel Connor,
the commandant of that district . . . [had not intimated] ... the necessity of
posting troops at Fort Bridger." However, in view of its importance and the
existence there of good quarters already built, he advised Washington that
Connor would be directed to garrison Fort Bridger with one or two companies.
43

Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 182. Hunt, 194, erroneously
contends both that the War Department ordered that Fort Bridger be garrisoned
and that Connor protested the dividing of his command, when he complied with
the War Department order.
44
Fort Bridger was established in the valley of Blacks Fork of the
Green River as a private business venture by Jim Bridger in 1842. It passed
to Mormon control in 1853 and was burned by them with the approach of Johnston's army in 1857. Johnston established troops at the location, however.
They were withdrawn in the summer of 1861.
45

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 241 and 244.
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The resulting directive to Connor was a permissive one. "In addition

to the garrison sent to Bridger . . . occupy such other points on or near the
overland route, as you may deem essential for its proper protection, retaining,
however, your present position."

46

General Wright had one of two options concerning the Halleck suggestions. He could consider that:
(1) The Indian threat was not as great as portrayed to Washington.
(2) The suggestion to move Connor was based upon ulterior motives
of unknown individuals. Wright's motivation also may have been
to substantiate or further reinforce his decision to approve the
location of troops at Salt Lake City.
After being ordered by Connor on December 2, troops of Connor's
command in at least company strength were to garrison Fort Bridger during
the entire period covered by this study.

Camp Connor

The establishment of Camp Connor and its associated civil community,
Morristown, at the big bend of the Bear River in Idaho Territory, in late May,
1863 , is the subject of a separate chapter. The camp is mentioned here only

to include it specifically in the list of military posts established or garrisoned
under the direction of the District of Utah.

46
added. )

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 244 and 251. (Underscoring
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The initial garrison at Camp Connor was provided by Company H,
Third Infantry California Volunteers, and so it remained until Company C was
substituted for Company H upon reduction in the number of companies in the
regiment with the consolidation action in October 1864. General Connor
finally withdrew the troops in February 1865 to assist him in his anticipated
campaign on the plains.

The Minor Posts

Three additional military posts established by Connor and his troops
complete the inventory.
In 1854, Colonel Steptoe had established a military reservation,

subsequently used by Johnston, in Rush Valley.

In early 1864, because of a

reduced need for cavalry troops and a desire to obtain forage for the cavalry
animals, Connor ordered two officers of the Second Cavalry to select a
cavalry camp west of Great Salt Lake.

The general location selected was in

Rush Valley; two posts were established--Camp Conness, named after Senator
John Conness of California, and Camp Relief.

47

The official returns for

June 30, 1864, disclose that, on that date, the bulk of the cavalry--four

47
Rogers, 115. It is interesting to note that Richard H. Orton,
throughout his book, erroneously places Camp Conness in Idaho Territory-possibly because of the spelling similarity with Camp Connor. Orton is not
the sole source of confusion on this matter. Official ~. vol. L, pt. 2,
p. 958 and 981, erroneously refer to Camp Connor as being in Utah Territory,
but the correct location, based on the troop units involved, was obviously
Camp Conness.
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companies, Second Cavalry, and two companies, First Nevada Cavalry-were stationed at Camp Conness.

48

A third minor installation, Camp Schellbourne, near the overland
mail station at Schell Creek, is identified by the Department of Interior study,
Soldier and Brave.

49

Troops stationed there in 1862 were assigned to patrol

Schellbourne Pass and Egan Canyon. Troops to garrison Camp Schellbourne
were probably provided from Fort Ruby, a major District of Utah troop location.
From the discussion in this chapter concerning the manner in which
Connor's troop elements were deployed, we may now progress, in subsequent
chapters, to a consideration of how they were utilized.

48
49

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 885.

u. s.,

Department of the Interior, 197.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPEDITIONS, ENGAGEMENTS, AND SKIRMISHES

The Pattern Established

Civil War military operations within the District of Utah were conducted in accordance with many controls--either explicit as in the official
troop mission or implied or general as was the case regarding Indian policy.
The primary thrust of such military operations was against Indians along the
overland routes. A consideration of the policies under which these operations
were carried out is important, particularly so since Connor's methods of
dealing with the Indians are subjects of considerable criticism among many
writers.
Prior to any discussion of Connor's Indian policy, several factors
need to be placed in perspective.
in the formulation of Indian

~·

First, Connor was not primarily involved
His principal task was the accomplishment

of his military mission, that is, the protection of emigrant and transportation
commerce over the overland routes through the area of the District of Utah.
Second, how he was to accomplish the mission charged to him was
controlled or influenced by external policies which were at the best general
and frequently vague and contradictory. The manner in which Connor attempted
accomplishment of his military mission was not significantly at variance with
the policies of his immediate civil counterparts or military superiors.
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Although there were philosophical divergences within American society
between humanitarians and advocates of a stern policy oriented toward
advancing white interests as to a proper national Indian policy, as proximity
to the Indian became reality, the implementation of policy took on most
evident tones of harshness. When brought into focus on the frontier, that
body of opinion favoring a national policy of dealing firmly with the Indians-with military force, if necessary--found unequivocal and almost universal
expression.
A quotation from Governor Doty illustrates both the frontier attitude
and a harmony between civil Utah territorial policy and Connor's implementation of that policy. On August 9, 1863, in writing to Brigadier General Wright,
he said:
... some of the Goshute tribe in Tooele Valley, who are suing
for peace--protest that they are friendly to the whites and are
afraid the soldiers will kill t hem. This is the condition in which
I desire to see all the tribes in this Territory. They now realize
the fact that the Americans are the masters of this country, and
it is my purpose to make them continue to feel and to acknowledge
it. Without this there can be no permanent peace here and no
security upon the routes of travel. This has been mainly accomplisheq_ by the vigor and bravery of the troops under your command.
As Connor's policy toward the Indians was guided by that of the
territorial governor, so must it be in conformance with the policies of his
military superiors. General Wright clearly demonstrated a strong desire to

1
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 583 .
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avoid hostilities, but retributive punishment was to be applied as a matter of
policy in the event of failure to persuade the Indians to follow the path of
peace.

2

In general, salutary results were attributed to the policy of severe
punishment to those Indians who opposed white interests by active resistance.
General Wright gave his assessment to the War Department on November 18,
1862, and June 9, 1863, as follows:
.•. result of his [McGarry's] expedition to •.. punish Indians
engaged in the late massacres on the Humboldt River. The
swift retributive punishment which has been meted out to those
Indians will doubtles s have the effect of preventing a repetition
of their ~rbarities. It is the only way to deal with those
savages.
The active and energetic campaigns which have been made
against the Indians in the Owen's River Valley, Cal., and in
the District of Utah during the past winter and spring have had
the most happy results in bringing those Indians to sue for
peace. A very large number of Indians have been killed, and
the great mass of the survivors have laid down their arms and
met the commanders of those districts in council. 4
A final factor deserving of consideration is that, until approximately
rnid-1863, Connor's activities with respect to the Indians were primarily
reactions to hostilities initiated by the Indians. Subsequently, Connor, having

2

The Indian policies and attitudes of General Wright may be found by
consulting Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 735, 745, 746, 753, 766, 770,
and 798. See also Army Regulations of 1861, p. 246; Hance and Warr, 37 and
41; and Lewis, 77.
3
4

Hance and Warr, 41.
0ffi cial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 478.
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made his presence and influence felt among the Indians, was relatively free
to pursue his own policy--or, more precisely, the results of his military
implementation of national and regional Indian policies.

Mormon Indian Policy

Although the Mormon policy toward the Indians was not a controlling
factor in Connor's operations, it was most certainly one strongly influential.
Mormon Indian policy was itself an outgrowth of several influences.

The most

important of these, and the one which imparted the most unique characteristics
to the Mormon policy, was one of religious conviction.

Mormon religious

doctrine, as espoused by the Book of Mormon and by early leaders of the
church, announced a deep concern for the welfare of the Indian.

The Mormons

considered that they had an obligation to bring about the redemption of th.ts
"fallen" people.

5

The Mormon religious and humanHarian concern for the Indians was
also tempered by an element of frontier realism. When necessary, the
Mormons would fight.

Arrington expresses the dilemma as "two opposing

principles. "
(1) In all their dealings the Mormons must keep in mind that
the Indians, however bloodthirsty, depressed, and miserable,
were their brothers and that they deserved understanding and
help.

5
nean L. Larsen, You and the Destiny of the Indian (Salt Lake City,
Utah: Bookcraft, 1966), deals extensively with the general subject of Mormon
religious beliefs concerning the Indians.
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(2) On the other hand, God's Kingdom could not be established
if his servants were wiped out, so survival and the developmegt
of the Kingdom required tactics aimed at physical protection.
However, being on the frontier and in close contact with the Indians,
the Mormon policy would be to avoid trouble whenever possible. A recognition
that it was more economical to feed and clothe them than to fight them became
a hallmark of Mormon policy.

7

Measures designed specifically to improve the lot of the Indians and
to decrease the causes for friction between them and the Mormons included
establishment of community storehouses or bins from which food could be
drawn for the Indians when the need arose . Indian farms and missions were
also established.

8

In practice, Mormon Indian policy tended to be viewed with suspicion
by many non-Mormon whites.

Mormon doctrine was considered by many as

potentially disruptive in giving the Indians an exaggerated sense of their position in society.

Mormon missionaries were ordered out of Indian country by

local residents as "disturbers of the peace. " Mormon efforts were resisted
as unwarranted "tampering" by federal Indian agents.

But the greatest

criticism of Mormon policy came from federal officials and troops who

6
Arrington, " The Mormons and the Indians: A Review and Evaluation,"
4.

7
M. D. Beal, A History of Southeastern Idaho: ... (Caldwell, Idaho:
The Caxton Printers, Ltds., 1942), 128.
8

Arrington, "The Mormons and the Indians: .. • , " 15.
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regarded Mormon actions as probably treasonous and most certainly exhibiting
a gross lack of concern for the welfare and survival of fellow white men.
There would be at least three parties to any Indian-white dispute in the Great
Basin--the Indians, the Mormon, and the non-Mormon whites. Issues would
not be contested on the basis of "whites against the Indians, " and this was
incomprehensible to the non-Mormon whites.

Materialization of the Indian Threat

The most significant influence on military operations in the District
of Utah was the extent to which the Indian potential to disrupt operations on
the overland routes developed. The existence of the threat caused the deployment of troops to the threatened areas; the Indian decision to exercise their
potential for attack dictated to a great extent the military operations.
Indian hostilities were major proplems both for federal officials and
inhabitants in Utah Territory. "In Utab Connor found Shoshonis, Bannocks,
and Utes in hostile array, the mail and telegraph route under attack east and
west of Salt Lake, and the Oregon Trail from the Platte to the Snake all but
closed. "

9

The "trouble center was among Shoshones or Snakes who roamed

northern Utah along the line of the Overland emigrant and mail route."

9
10

Utley, 223.
Neff, 390.

10
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A chronological tabulation of reported instances of Indian hostilities
in Utah during the period 1860 to 1865 clearly shows the sporadic nature of
the attacks. After relatively quiet years of 1860 and 1861, most of 1862 and
roughly the first half of 1863 provided an unwelcome contrast to the near
peace that prevailed earlier. During this period, numerous Indian attacks
occurred all along the emigrant and mail routes from the Platte River bridge
(near present Casper, Wyoming) in the east to Gravelly Ford and Pyramid
Lake in the west.

Mail stations and coaches, telegraph stations, military

escorts, emigrant parties, and several hundred livestock all felt the effects
of Indian belligerence.
of Indian aggression.

Lives of many whites were sacrificed to the resurgence
Many others were wounded.

11

By mid-July 1863, the pendulum had swung to the opposite extreme.
During the last half of 1863 and all of 1864 not a single Indian attack is mentioned in all of the literature consulted. In late May and early June of 1865,
two stations on the overland route were attacked and a skirmish with soldiers
near the Platte bridge occurred.

12

Otherwise, there had been almost two

years of relative peace and quiet along the overland routes.

11
..
OffiCial Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 154 and 1040; and pt. 2, p. 124,
407, 481, 500; Beal, 236; Rogers, 29, 32, 68, 88; Fisher, 37, 119, 121;
Hafen, 242, 245, 249, 250, 251; Colton, 160, 162, 166, 167; Peter Gottfredson,
History of Indian Depredations in Utah (Salt Lake City, Utah: Skelton Publishing
Company, 1919), 118, 119, and 120.
12

Rogers, 160.
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Connor's Indian Policies

Connor's methods of dealing with the Indians are characterized by
several readily discernible features. There was a distinction to be made
between "good" Indians and "bad" Indians. Good Indians were those who would
manifest a peaceful disposition; bad Indians, by contrast, were those who
interferred with the orderly operation of the emigrant and overland routes or
with the property of the citizens using those routes. Whereas peace and goodwill of a beneficent government would prevail for good Indians, a terrible
retribution would be brought to bear on the bad ones. Bad Indians were to be
thoroughly whipped and taught the consequences of their bad behavior. The
development of a genuine fear by the Indians of severe retribution for past or
future transgressions was important. Parleys with Indians believed to be
guilty of depredations would follow the administering of the "chastisement"
while the punishment for transgressions was fresh in mind. In addition to
punishment in battle, the retribution included the systematic destruction of
Indian shelter and means of sustenance.
Although an effort was made to ascertain specific guilt for depredations and to identify the "bad" Indians, certain practical difficulties were
experienced. It was hoped that "friendly" Indians would turn over the guilty
culprits on request, or that the taking of Indian hostages would motivate other
Indians to a spirit of cooperation with the soldiers. Execution of hostages was
occasionally resorted to for non-compliance with ultimatums from Connor's
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commanders, but with little improvement in results. Also, some hostages
were released on occasions to carry a warning back to their tribes of the consequences of bad behavior. In the absence of information to the contrary,
presence of male, adult Indians in the general area of recent depredations
was accepted as evidence of guilt.

Indian women and children were specifically

excluded from the intended military retribution, notwithstanding the systematic
destruction of shelter and means of sustenance, but the identification of Indians
by sex during a general military engagement was extremely difficult.
Another feature of Connor's actions with the Indians was that implementation was sometimes more severe than warranted by the actual policy
statements guiding Connor and his troops. During the first forays against the
Indians by Connor's troops--the McGarry expedition from Fort Ruby during
October 1862--the frequency of reports of Indian prisoners shot while
"attempting to escape" strongly suggested initial excesses by inexperienced
troops. Also, during battle, the motivation of revenge to redress past offenses
was strong on both sides.

13

Connor's own words provide a good summary of his policy:
The policy pursued toward the Indians has had a most happy effect.
That policy, as you are aware, involved certain and speedy punishment for past offenses, compelling them to sue for a suspension
of hostilities, and on the resumtpion of peace, kindness and
leniency toward the redskins. They fully understand that honesty
and peace constitute their best and safest policy. In consequence
every chief of any importance in the district has given in his

13

orton, 176,
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adhesion with profuse promises of future good conduct. Throughout the length and breadth of the Territory peace exists with all
the wandering and heretofore savage and marauding bands. During
the past winter and spring at various times the several chiefs and
petty leaders have visited Camp Douglas, where they have been
kindly received and hospitably treated by the command. In default
of ability on the part of the Indian Department to provide fully for
their wants, and also in pursuance of what was esteemed sound
policy, I have from time to time distributed among them small
quantities of provisions, such as flour, sugar, etc., to meet their
immediate necessities, and in testimony of the good will of the
military authorities toward them as long as they behave themselves and manifest a peaceful disposition. 14
Harsh though the application of certain of these methods appears
today, it is the view of this author that they offered the
effective mission accomplishment by Connor.

£!!!r approach to

The small number of troops

available, the lack of mobility by the infantry, the vast distances to be covered,
the nature of the Indian enemy, and the nature and vulnerability of the facilities
to be protected mitigated against adoption of a purely defensive strategy.

Tactical Conduct

Several features of the conduct by Connor or his troops of tactical
operations against the Indians were both unique and commendable. A prominent characteristic of orders by Connor's headquarters for tactical operations
against the Indians was their detail and completeness. Connor was not inclined
to leave an excess of freedom of action to his subordinates.

14

Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 887. Also, see Official Records,
vol. L, pt. 1, p. 178, 179, and 182, pt. 2, p. 420, 527, 528, 1037, and 1186
for other expressions and policy.
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Cavalry was recognized as decisive against the mobile Indians, a nd
insofar as possible, the maximum amount of his cavalry force was kept under
Connor's centralized control. So long as the Indians constituted a threat,
cavalry was almost continuously in the field.

In May 1863, Major Gallagher,

at Fort Ruby, assured recently promoted General Connor that the use of
cavalry was always as directed by Connor and that cavalry troops "have not at
any time been kept at this post longer than was absolutely necessary to rest
and shoe their horses. "

15

Connor strongly adhered to the principles of surprise and decepti on.
Night marches were usually directed. Guides were utilized to improve prospects for success in finding the Indians.
Connor wisely attempted to blend the characteristics of all of his
forces so as to achieve optimum effectiveness in their combined use. Connor's
use of artillery was especially significant. When infantry and artillery were

to be used in conjunction with cavalry, these two types of forces, whose rates
of movement varied so widely, were started at different times so that the
slower moving forces would arrive at the battle area prior to or simultaneously
with the cavalry.

15

16

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 420.

16
Infantry or artillery, with supporting wagon trains, could average
perhaps 10 to 25 miles per day, dependent on terrain. Cavalry could, in the
same period cover over sixty miles. See Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1,
p. 714, and Orton, 175.
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Once an Indian camp had been located and the approach march completed, every effort was made to surround the camp before commencing the
attack.

17
Selection of the season and weather for an attack would also tend to

reduce the Indian's basic advantage in mobility. Connor was "clear in the
opinion that the winter or early spring is the only time when Indians can be
successfully pursued, punished, and brought to terms. "

18

During the summer

and early fall periods, the Indians tend to scatter in the mountains, particularly
if warned of a threat from the soldiers.
In addition to the garrisons by major units, defensive measures along

the overland routes were provided by location of small troop detachments at
selected mail and stage stations and, when necessary, by provision of military
escorts for stages operating over particularly threatened sections of the
routes.
Connor never lost an opportunity to remind the Indians of his district
of what was expected of them in the way of behavior. Whenever and for whatever purpose troops were in the field, Indians were sought out and advised of
the benefits resulting from good behavior and the dire consequences of the bad.

17
18

..
Offtctal Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 229.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 1037; Orton, 511.
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Engagements and Skirmishes

Heitman and Dyer provide a listing of "battles, actions, combats,
skirmishes, military events, etc." and "battles, campaigns, etc. in the
Territories," respectively.

19

Although the criteria for inclusion in these

various categories are not provided, it may be assumed that contact with the
enemy and the degree of involvement in terms of numbers of troops engaged
and casualties suffered are some of the criteria. In any case, contacts of
Connor's troops with the Indian, based on the above two references, are
classified in this study as "engagements" or "skirmishes" and are listed
chronologically as follows:

20

(Minor "actions" have been deleted.)

1862
October 9, 11, 14, and 15
November 23

Skirmishes, Humboldt Route
Skirmish, Cache Valley

1863
January 29
April 1
April 4 and 15
April 12

Engagement, Bear River
Skirmish, Cedar Fort
Engagements, Spanish Fork Canyon
Skirmish, Pleasant Grove

19

Heitman, 2:301-.363. Frederick H. Dyer, A Compendium of the War
of the Rebellion (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959), 2:983, 989.
20
The reader is cautioned that an analysis of military actions by
Connor's forces against the Indians based solely or primarily on a purported
listing of battles, engagements, skirmishes, etc. , as have been prepared by
Heitman or Dyer, is very likely to be extremely faulty for several reasons.
First, the temporary relocations and deployments of troops to counter the Indian
threat are omitted, and yet the results of such deployments were potentially
very significant in controlling the Indians. This was especially true in 1864
after the Indians had become generally subdued, but military preventive deployments continued. Temporary relocations of troops were typical of Connor,
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In the Sections of this Chapter immediately following, the principal
skirmishes and engagements involving Connor's troops are discussed as a
means of providing typical, specific illustrations of his Indian fighting methods
and procedures. Such discussion is not intended to imply a full coverage of all
of his combat act! vi ties.

The McGarry Expedition along the Humboldt
While the column for Utah was still at Ruby Valley, Colonel Connor
was advised from Fort Churchill that Indians had murdered twenty-three
emigrants at Gravelly Ford on the Humboldt overland route and on September
16 Connor informed Department of the Pacific that he would attend to it.

21

An

expedition under Major McGarry, Second Cavalry, was formed on September
30 and consisted of Companies Hand K of McGarry's regiment.

The troops

were directed to proceed towards Salt Lake City via the northern route and
the City of Rocks. A final rendezvous point ten miles north of Salt Lake City
was designated. McGarry was directed to leave his troops at that point and

once the threats to the military mission permitted decentralization of forces.
In addition poth the· Heitman and Dyer lists are grossly imcomplete,
Actions initiated from Fort Churchill or Fort Ruby tend to be omitted~ Also,
use of company or installation returns (routine, periodic, official reix>rts)
has been neglected.
Many "actions" occurred, involving both troop and Indian casualities,
which do not appear in the chronological or area lists. See Official Records,
vol. L, pt. 1, p. 183 and 230; pt. 2, p. 368, 385, 407, 420, and 834; Orton,
181 and 182; and Pedersen, 119.
21

0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 124 and 125.
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report to Connor in person if Connor were at that time in the vicinity of Salt
Lake City, or, if not, to await further orders at the point designated. McGarry
specifically was not to enter Salt Lake City with his small force before Connor' s
arrival.
Connor's orders to McGarry concerning treatment of the Indians were
detailed and explicit.
On the route ..• you will examine every valley or place where
you have reason to believe .•. hostile Indians are congregated,
whom you will capture; lnt if they resist you will destroy them.
In no instance will you molest women or children. If .•.
friendly Indians deliver to you Indians who were concerned in
the late murder of emigrants, you will (being satisfied of their
guilt) immediately hang them, and leave their bodies thus
exposed as an example of what evil-doers may expect • . . . You
will •.. destroy every male Indian whom you may encounter in
the vicinity of the late massacres. This course may seem harsh
and severe, but I desire that the order may be rigidly enforced,
as I am satisfied that in the end it will prove the most merciful. 22
By the 5th of October McGarry and his troopers had reached Gravelly

Ford without having encountered any Indians. On the 9th, 11th, 14th, and 15th
contacts with Indians were made and prisoners were taken. Twenty-two of
these prisoners were killed by troopers after having been disarmed and while
"attempting to escape." Additionally, four hostages were executed on the 14th
when prisoners subsequently released had fail ed to bring into McGarry 's camp
those Indians responsible for the massacre of the emigrants .

22
23

23

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 144.

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 179. Reports of kill ing prisoners
attempti ng to escape do not appear for actions subsequent to this expedition.
Execution of hostages did, however, also occur later. Ca rter, 6:118.
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McGarry reached the rendezvous point north of Salt Lake City on
October 28 and reported to Connor at Camp Douglas on the next day.
Connor's endorsement to McGarry's report included these comments:
I am satisfied from verbal information received from officers
of the expedition that the Indians who have been punished were
a part of those who had committed the late murders, and that
the punishment was well merited. I hope and believe that the
lessons taught them will have a salutary effect in checking
future massacres on that route. 24

Rescue of the Emigrant Bo_x_ in Cache Valley

Within one month's time Major McGarry was again ordered to the
field against the Indians.

His troops consisted of approximately 60 men of

Captain Smith's Company (Company K).

His mission was to rescue a ten-year

old emigrant boy whose parents and older brother had been murdered during
the summer, at which time he and three sisters were taken captive by the
Indians.

The sisters later died while in captivity.

The boy's uncle, Zachias

Van Orman, had located the lad among a group of Indians under Bear Hunter,
encamped near Providence in Cache Valley. Theuncle requested military
assistance in recovering the boy and offered to serve a s a guide for the troops.
Connor's instructions were again complete.
You will march by night and by a trail which will be shown you by
a guide who will accompany your command. Surround the Indians,

24 0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 178.
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if possible, before they become aware of your presence, and
hold them prisoners while you .. . [search for] ... a large number of stock stolen from murdered emigrants . . • . You will
search the Indian camp thoroughly for the emigrant boy, and
if you should not find him you will demand him of the Indians,
and if not given up you will bring three of their principal men
to the post as hostages. You will also investigate as to their
complicity in the massacres of last summer, and if you have
reason to believe any of them are guilty you will bring all such
to the post for trial. You will not fire upon the Indians unless
you find it necessary to the proper execution of your instructions. 25
This military operation was brief.

The troops left Camp Douglas on

November 20 and by 11:00 p.m. on the 22nd they had traversed the 100 miles
to Franklin in Cache Valley.

The Indian camp was located early on the 23rd

and was surrounded, but, except for two squaws, the Indians had fled during
the night. At about 8 o'clock in the morning about thirty to forty mounted
Indians, armed with rifles and bows and arrows, appeared from a canyon to
the east.

The cavalry mounted and approached the Indians and were fired upon.

The fire was returned for a brief period after which Chief Bear Hunter asked
for a termination of the fighting.

Bear Hunter and four other Indians were

taken as hostages and held for exchange of the boy.

The boy was returned at

noon on the 24th and the hostages were released. The stock, reported to be
there, was not recovered.

Three Indians were killed and one wounded during

the skirmish.
The troops left Cache Valley on the morning of the 25th and were back
at Camp Douglas on the afternoon of November 27.
25

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 229.
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Bear River/ Bear Run

26

The Bear River engagement, which occurred on January 29, 1863,
is treated separately in Chapter V.

It is mentioned at this point only to indi-

cate chronological continuity with respect to the other military actions against
the Indians.

The Campaign at Spanish Fork Canyon

27

The Spanish Fork Canyon campaign was precipitated by some Indians,
believed by Connor in April 1863 to have been Goshute, who had wintered
among the Mormons in Tooele Valley, and who were suspected by Connor of
being the perpetrators of attacks against overland facilities west of Salt Lake
City in the spring of 1863 . Connor also believed that these Indians were being
encouraged in their misdeeds by Mormons in an effort to force troop withdrawal
from Camp Douglas and the stationing of the troops nearer to the locations of
actual Indian attacks.

26

Dyer, 983 and 989, identifies a skirmish on January 26 at Bear Run/
Bear River with which he err oneously associates troop casualities of fourteen
!tilled and forty-nine wounded. These casualties correctly should be associated
with the Bear River engagement of January 29. Other than Dyer's listing there
is no information available supporting any troop action at a location named Bear
Run on January 26. It must be concluded, therefore, that Dyer is totally in
error in listing such a skirmish on that date. A marker on U.S. Highway 91,
near Richmond, Utah, commemorating the Battle of Bear River, also erroneously indicates January 26 as the date of the engagement.
27
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 198-208. In a ll probability,
the offending Indians were Utes and they are so identified by Connor in June
1863. See Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 479.
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The campaign was begun at 6:00 p.m. on the 26th of March when
Lieutenant Ethier and ·twenty-five men from Company A, Second <Cavalry,
departed Camp Douglas in an attempt to make contact with these Indians,
rumored to be heading south through Cedar Valley in the vicinity of the site
of Fort Crittenden. During the next five days, Lieutenant Ethier and his
party reconnoitered Skull and Cedar valleys extensively, without contacting
the elusive Indians. On the 1st of April while in Rush Valley, Lieutenant
Ethier received a directive to return immediately to Camp Douglas. While
enroute via Fort Crittenden the troops spotted some Indians emerging from
Trough Canyon. Since his horses were in extremely poor condition from a
week of hard riding, the Lieutenant obtained a stage coach from the Fort
Crittenden overland station to transport him and thirteen of his men. The
coach, accompanied by eight men on the best horses, transported the small
detachment to battle.
Approximately 100 Indians were prepared for battle in the vicinity of
Cedar Fort.

The lieutenant received what he regarded as false reports from

Mormon sources concerning the Indian deployments and numbers, and these
reports were ignored. The action was begun on his best estimate of the
Indian situation.

Firing was brisk on both sides. The military broke off the

engagement when reports reached them that their horses were in danger of
capture.
Further Mormon treachery was suspected relative to tentative plans
to leave a small troop detachment to guard Cedar Fort. Seeing Mormons in
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consultation with the Indians made Lieutenant Ethier suspicious and he left
no troops to guard the Mormon settlement.
The lieutenant returned to Fort Crittenden from which location General Connor was advised of the developments. As a result , a la rger body of
troops was sent from Camp Douglas.

Lieutenant Ethier reported to Captain

Price, commander of the larger troop detachment, at Cedar Fort on the
morning of April 3.
Captain Price with fifty-one men from Company M, Second Cavalry,
had hurriedly departed Camp Douglas at 1:00 a.m. on the 2nd of April.
Shortly after noon and after having travell ed forty-five miles, Price's detach,ment had joined up with Lieutenant Et?ier at Cedar Fort and had moved on to
Fort Crittenden.

The Indians were moving southeast f rom Cedar Valley.

Price moved his detachment, now totalling nearly seventy-five men, to the
head of Cedar Valley, crossed into Utah Valley , and by 2:00 p.m. on tbe 3rd
the troops were at Goshen, the southern-most settlement in Utah Valley .
At 3:00p.m. on the 4th the troops were at Spanish Fork where they
received reports from Mormons that no Indians had been seen for ten days.
With only about an hour of daylight remaining and contrary to what the Mormon
r eports would indicate, two Indians were spotted. A scouting party pursued
these two Indians into Spanish Fork Canyon where forty to fifty armed
Indians were encountered . The Indians were reported to have fired the first
shots.

The Indians wer e chased about three-quarters of a mile up the canyon,

at which time the troops broke off the engagement because of darkness and the
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defensively strong position provided to the Indians by the canyon. The Indians
haras sed the troop withdrawal.
Attempts were made to maintain contact throughout the night through
the use of troop pickets.

The pickets established that the Indians had not

departed via the mouth of the canyon, but a scouting party sent up the canyon
on the 5th of April found no Indians. They were apparently in full retreat up
the twenty-five mile long canyon enroute to San Pete Valley.
With these developments, Captain Price terminated this phase of the
operation.

Pric e's cavalrymen had covered 165 miles in five days.

were tired; rations were running low.

Horses

The Indian force opposing them was

estimated by local citizens to be at least 200. After camping at Provo on the
night of the 5th, the detachment was back at Camp Douglas by 3:00 p.m. on the
6th of April.
Captain Price observed his satisfaction with the performance of his
troopers.

"My officers and men conducted themselves fully in keeping with

previous reputation. "
By the 11th of April a more substantial troop effort against the Indians
was underway from Camp Douglas.

Colonel Evans, Commander , Second

Cavalry, was to command the expedition.

His troops consisted of forty-seven

m en from Company A, Second Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Ethier;
forty- nine from Company H, commanded by Lieutenants Clark and Bradley;
and one howitzer and five gunners from the Third Infantry , under t he supervision of Lieutenant Honeyman.
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The plan called for the establishment of a base of operations at
Pleasant Grove, a settlement situated about forty miles south-east of Camp
Douglas and about thirty-five miles north of Spanish Fork Canyon, where the
Indians were believed to be located.
The first troop element to move to the designated base of operations
included Lieutenant Honeyman and his gunners, with the howitzer and its
ammunition concealed in an ambulance wagon for deception.

They departed

Camp Douglas on the morning of April 11 and reached Pleasant Grove on the
morning of the 12th. He placed his twelve mules in a corral of a Mormon
settler and awaited the arrival of Colonel Evans and the cavalrymen.
At 6:00 p.m. that evening about 100 Indians infiltrated the town and
surrounded Honeyman's location.

For protection he occupied an adobe house

where his a mbulance and mules were located and fired two howitzer shots from
the house.
collapse.

The adobe walls cracked and there was danger that the house would
The howitzer fire was stopped . The house was riddled with fire

from Indian weapons until about 8:00 p.m., but miraculously none of the
artillerymen was hit.

Five of the mules had been killed , however. At 8

o'c lock the Indians stopped firing, collected the surviving mules and the other
government property, and departed with their booty.
Colonel Evans' report of Honeyman's skirmish at Pleasant Grove is a
severe indictment of Mormon attitudes to United States milita ry forces.
. . . all this occurred in the town of Pleasant Grove ... in the
heart of a Mormon town, where there were perhaps not less
than 100 or 150 white men (Mormons), in the broad daylight
75 or 100 savages attack and attempt to murder six American
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citizens and do carry off mules, harnes s, and other government
property, and not a hand is lifted to assist or protect them ...
but on the contr ary they stand around the street corners and on
top of their houses or haystacks complacently looking on,
apparently well pleased at the prospect of six Gentiles (soldiers)
being murdered. 28
Colonel Evans and the main body of cavalry reached Pleasant Grove at 3:00
a.m. on the 13th. As soon as daylight came, scouts were sent out in different
directions to locate the route the Indians had taken.
Reinforcements were received from Camp Douglas. On receipt of
word of the events of the 12th, General Connor sent Captain Price and sixty
men of his Company, together with replacement transportation for Lieutenant
Honeyman's howitzer, to a ssist Evans.

They reached Pleasant Grove at

11:00 p.m. on the 13th.
The 14th was spent in further r econnaissance, following what were
subsequently believed to have been deliberately false reports from the Mormons
as to the Indian location. Late that day a maj or trac k was detected that suggested that the Indians were again e n route to Spanish Fork Canyon. Evans
encamped near Provo, and believing that the Mormons were keeping the Indians
informed of the troop locations and actions, engaged i.n some further deception.
He made oral contracts for the delivery the following morning of hay and grain
for the mules and horses, thus suggesting an intent to remain in camp until
after the scheduled morning delivery.

However, at midnight the troops made

quiet preparations to move.

28
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 206.
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The mouth of Spanish Fork Canyon was reached just at daylight
on the 15th of April. Eighty of the cavalry were dismounted and the horses
secured on a picke t line under a small guard. Forces of dismounted flankers
and skirmishers were formed to move up both sides of the canyon. About
fifty men, including Hof1eyman and his howitzer, under Evans operated in the

center. At about 5:00a.m. the Indians had been contacted about one mile into
the canyon and the battle commenced. Honeyman and his small artillery piece
proved decisive in this battle. Covered by Honeyman's accurate artillery fire,
the force in the canyon center was able to advance steadily. After the center
force had closed to within revolver range, the Indians broke, and the "forward"
and "charge" calls were sounded on the bugle. By 11:00 a.m. the Indians had
been chased fourteen miles up the canyon and had scattered "like quails . " The
engagement was terminated as a success.
The Indians, who were estimated to number about 200, had suffered
thirty killed and an unknown number wounded. The troops experienced one
killed and two wounded.

Evans proudly noted that "both officers and men

behaved as soldiers should [and] ... sustained their well-earned fame as the
'Fighting Second ' . "

Peace with the Indians

By June 2, 1863 , some encouraging developments were being experienced with the Indians. Connor reported to the Department of the Pacific:
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"Indians are suing for peace. I leave for Bridger today to meet 500 of them.
My policy will wi n.

n

29

On June 10, Connor summarized the situation in a communication to
the comma nder of the District of Oregon.
While at the lower ferry, in the vicinity of Fort Hall, I met about
200 Snake Indians with whom I had a talk. They are friendly, and
will remain so. Those also in the vicinity of and on the road to
Bannock City are friendly. I had a talk with 700 Snake Indians
at Fort Bridger last week. They say they are tired of fighting
and want to be at peace. They gave me up 150 horses and mules
which they had stolen. The fight of last winter is telling on them.
There are two small bands at large yet, who are hostile. They
number about 100 men. Troops are now in pursuit of them, and
I hope soon to destroy them . I have no fears for the safety of
the emigration to the Bannock Mines. How it will be to the Boise
Mines I am unable to say.
The Ute Indians, with whom Colonel Evans had a fight at
Spanish Fork this spring, have sent word that they desire to
make peace with me. On the whole, I consider the Indian
troubles in my district very near at an end. 30
On July ,3, 1863, Connor's work with the eastern Shoshoni was given
official stature when Connor and Governor Doty offici ally concluded a treaty
of peace with Indians at Fort Bridger.

There were certain problems a s sociated

with the treaty system and its application to the India ns. Regarding this initial
treaty, Hafen had this comment: "The t r oops a long the line howeve r, were

29
30
31

Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 470.
Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 479.
Neff, 392; Hafen, 25 2.
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undoubtedly a more effective guarantee of peace than the treaty signed at the
fort. "

32
Other treaties quickly followed.

On J uly 14th a peace council was

held by Doty and Connor with about 700 Utes near the mouth of Spanish Fork
Canyon.

Shortly afterward, Connor could confidently predict "the end of the

Indian difficulties on the Overland Stage Line and within this district from the
Snake River, on the north, to Arizona, on the south and from Green River to
Carson Valley. "

33

On the 30th of July, the northwestern Shoshoni, and their

chiefs, Pocatello and Sanpitch, came to terms at Box Elder (Brigham City).

34

The next day General Wright advised the War Department: " The different
tribes of Indians living within the District of Utah a ppear anxious for peace.
Most of them already made treaties of peace with General Connor. "

35

On the

1st of October, Governors Doty and Nye jointly negotiated a treaty with the
western Shoshoni at Ruby Valley.

36

The Goshute m ade their peace with Doty

32
Hafe n, 252. The "probl ems" relating to treaty implementation
wer e not solely on the side of t he Indians . Delay s by the United States government were notorious. The Fort Bridger treaty was finally ratified by the U. S.
Senate on March 7, 1864, but was not proclaimed in full force until June 7,
1869. Neff, 393.
33
34
35
36

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 529.
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and Connor at Tooele Valley on October 12.

37

at Camp Connor was completed in late October.

A final treaty with the Bannock
38

With this act, Connor was able to report to General Wright on
October 27:
... I have the honor to report the settlement of terms of peace
with all the Indians within this military district from the Snake
River on the north to the lower settlements of Utah, and from
the Rocky Mountains on the east to Reese River on the west, a
region heretofore constantly infested by roving bands of savages,
and desolated by their horrid barbarities on passing emigrants
for a long series of years. For the first time in the history of
the country it may now be truly announced that the great emigrant roads through the Territory may be safely traversed by
single persons without danger to life or property or fear of
molestation by Indians. . . . the Indians . . . are evidently
seriously inclined to peace in the future , and, after the severe
experiences of last winter, spring, and summer, will hesitate
long ago ere they again provoke hostilities. 3 9

Evaluation

Actions against the Indians while Connor commanded the District of
Utah may best be evaluated in terms of the significrulCe of the several treaties
which evolved and the results achieved by the po sitioning of District of Utah
troops.

Governor Doty addressed the first of these points:
The importance of these treaties to the government and to its
citizens can only be appreciated by those who know the value of

37
38
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the continental telegraph and Overland stage to the comme r ci al
and m e r cantile world , and the safety and security which peace
alone can give to emigrant trains, and to the gold discoveries
in the north. 40
Colonel Maury, First Oregon Cavalry, addressed the second point in
June 1864, in a report to hi s district headquarters: "I learn unofficially that
General Connor has established a camp of one com pany of cavalry at the mouth
of Raft River. . . . [This will bring] . . . much benefit to the security and
peace of the immigration to Oregon and California. "

41

This same point of

benefit to peace and security was also made concerning the establishment of
Camp Connor at Soda Springs.
Abraham Anderson , writing about Connor in his informal history of
Soda Springs, expresses a frontiers man's perspective of Connor's Indian
policy.

"In some cases the punishment that had to be administered [by Connor

to the Indians] ... was necessarily severe. "

40
41

42

Pedersen, 67.
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(Blackfoot, Idaho), January 11 and 19, 1929.
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CHAPTER V
THE BATTLE OF BEAR RIVER

A few miles northwest of present-day Preston, Idaho, occurred on
January 29, 1863, one of the most s ignificant engagements between organi zed
troop units and the Indians in the history of the American West. And yet the
battle was and remaiUB little known.

History has given its attention to the

larger fields of the Civil War, and contemporary and subsequent controversy
surrounding the troop commande r has served to dim the significance of his
victory.
The battl e ls a classic ln frontier milltary planning.

The advance

preparations and tenacity of the Indians in defense and the gallantry and
perserverance of the federal troops in the attack under the most severe
challenges of weather and terrain deserve more attention from historians.
This was a battle in which each side deliberately selected its role in advance.
Chance did not bring on the battle; chance did not force the Indians to combat.
The issue was vigorously contested on the fie ld of battle. It is a distortion
of events to characterize the resulting large number of Indian casualties as
a massacre.

The Indians were severly defeated in a combat they courted.

The results of their defeat were important to the tranquility and development
of the intermountain west.
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Contributory Events

A series of events, occurring over an extended period of time,
eventually culminated in a military expedition against the Indians in northern
Cache Valley.

In view of the Mormon practice of providing food and other

necessities to the Indians, winter encampments of the Indians were likely to be
in relatively close proximity to Mormon settlements. Such was true in the
winter of 1862-1863 when a large body of Shoshone and Bannock Indians,
under Chiefs Bear Hunter and Sagwich, located near the mouth of a small
stream which emptied into Bear River, approximately twelve miles northwest
of Franklin.

Demands and pressure of these Indians on the settlers became so

great that many outlying homes were abandoned and the settlers withdrew to
Franklin and other settlements.

1

Schindler and others attribute a more aggressive, retaliatory attitude
on the part of the Indians as a response to the execution of four hostages by
Major McGarry at Bear River ferry in early December 1862.
Indian hostilities became more serious and more frequent.

2

In any event

In late December,

a party of miners, including one William Bevins, from the Salmon River
mines attempted to reach northern Utah settlements for supplies.

The party

was attacked by Indians near Franklin and one man was killed. After reaching

1
Rogers, 67; Colton, 164.
2

Harold Schindler, Orrin Porter Rockwell, Man of God, Son of
Thunder (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1966), 321.
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Salt Lake City, Bevins appeared before Chief Justice Kinney on January 19,
1863, and prepared an affidavit concerning the attack on his party.

3

He also

reported that another party of ten individuals had been slain by Indians a few
days earlier in the same general vicinity. At about this same time A. H.
Conover reached Salt Lake City with a report that two men who had departed
Bannock City on November 25th carrying mail and gold dust had last been seen
near the head of Marsh Valley.

Presumably these two couriers had also been

slain by Indians.
In response to these events Chief Justice Kinney issued a writ for the
arrest of the Indian Chiefs believed to have been involved--Bear Hunter,
San Pitch, and Sagwich.

Enforcement of the writ of arrest was placed in the

hands of U. S. Marshal Isaac L. Gibbs, who, anticipati ng opposition from the
Indians, requested a military escort of Colonel Connor to protect him in
serving the writ.
By law, Connor did not possess the aut hor ity to utilize his troops as
requested by Marshal Gibbs until a "civil poss e had been called, tried and
failed. "

4

However, under the authority of his military mission in the territory,

Connor was already planning an expedition against the marauding Indians prior
to Gibb's request.

Connor's official report to Department of the Pacific, fol-

lowing the Battle of Bear River, provides his basis for planning his puniti ve

3

4

whitney, 2:77.

orton, 175.
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expedition and his reaction to the request for a military escort for the U. S.
Marshal.
. .. i nformation received from various sources of the encampment of a large body of Indians on Bear River, in Utah Territory,
140 miles north of this point, who had murd e red several min ers
during the winter, passing to and from the settlements in this
valley to the Beaver Head mines, east of the Rocky Mountains,
and being satisfied t hat they were a part of the same band who
had been murdering emigrants on the Overla nd Mail Route for
t he last fifteen years, and the principal acto rs and leaders in
the horrid mas sacres of the past summer. I determined, although the season was unfavorable to an expedition in consequence of the cold weather and deep snow, to chastise them if
possible. . .. previous to my departure Chief Justice Kinney
. .. made a requisition for troops fo r the purpose of arresting
Indian c hiefs Bear Hunter, San Pitch, and Sagwich. I informed
t he mars hal that my a rrangements for our expedition against
the Indi a ns were made, and that it was not my intention to take
any pri soners , but that he could accompany me. 5
Marshal Gibbs did, in fact, accompany the expedition, a lthough, as
Whitney comments , " for what purpose is not clear," s ince Connor had declined
his requ est for assistance in serving the writ of arrest.

6

T he Plan

Based on the troops available at Ca mp Douglas and his schem e of
employment, Connor designated the following troop elements to comprise the

5

Official Reeords, vol. L , pt. 1, p. 185 and 187. Connor's statement , " It was not my intention to take a ny prisoners," is generally interpreted
as a commitm ent to "no quarter" in the anticipated engagement. It logically
could have meant a denial of his intention to act as a posse.
6
whitney , 2:78.
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expedition:

7

Infantry:

Artillery:

Cavalry:

Element
Company K, Third Infantry,
Captain Hoyt commanding

69

Two howitzers under the supervision of Lieutenant Honeyman

12

Companies A, H, K, and M,
Second Cavalry
Command and staff:

Train:

8

220
8
309

Fifteen wagons carrying twenty
days of supplies.

In addition to the military force, a competent guide, to compensate
for the unfamiliarity of the California Volunteers with the territory, was
required.

A Mormon, Orrin Porter Rockwell, went on the federal payroll on

January 22, at Salt Lake City, to fill this need.

9

The scheme of employment included the principle of surprise as an
essential ingredient to success. "Feeling assured t hat secrecy was the surest
way to success, I [Connor) determined to deceive t he Indians by sending a
small force in advance, judging, and rightly, they would not fear a small

7
Official Records, val. L, pt. 1, p. 185; Daily Union Vedette ,
January 30, 1864.
8
colonel Connor was in command. Surgeon Reid of the Third Infantry
was present by virtue of Ills position and the anticipated combat. In addition,
Majors Gallagher and McGarry, three captains , and four lieutenants, present
at Camp Douglas for a general court martial, were members of the expedition
on a volunteer basis.
9

schindle r, 322.
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number . "

10

Accordingly, the infantry, artillery, and the supply train ele-

ments were to move as a single unit, marching during daylight.

This group-

ing was Connor's " small force in advance" intended to lull the Indians into a
feeling of security and to preclude their scattering if they detected the presence
of a strong military force. Whether the ruse was the cause or not, the Indians
chose to remain in their position and fight.

11

Connor, Rockwell, and the cavalry wen'> to depart Camp Douglas
several days later than the small, advance force.

By marching the cavalry

only at night, it was hoped to retain the element of surprise.

Troop Movement to the Battle Area

The advance force of infantry, artillery, and the train, under Captain
Hoyt, left Camp Douglas, amid falling snow, on the afte rnoon of Thursday,
January 22.

12

By Tuesday, the 27th, this force had reached Mendon in south-

ern Cache Valley.
The cavalry force was held at Camp Douglas until sundown on the
25th.

13

The night was clear but intensely cold; the cavalry force was required

10

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 185.

11

uttey , 224, indicates, without further explanation, that "Bear
Hunter probably had no intention of fleeing."
12
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Pedersen, 56.
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to move into the very face of a biting north wind. Despite these adverse
weather conditions, the cavalry force traversed s ixty - e ight miles to Box
Elder (Brigham City) during their first night march. The cavalry overtook
the infantry force at Mendon on the night of the 27th.

14

From Mendon the two elements of the force used different routes
and different timing in reaching the small settlement of Franklin. The infantry
and attached units left Mendon at 11:00 o'clock p.m. on the 27th and had
travelled the thirty miles to Franklin by 4:00 o'clock p.m. on the 28th. The
cavalry delayed at Mendon until 4:00 o'clock a . m. on the 28th, at which time
they departed for Summit (Smithfield).

They rested there until 9:00 o'clock

p.m. , so as to insure their arrival at Franklin at night. They reached
Franklin at midnight.

Arrival at Franklin

Franklin served as a rendezvous point fo r the troops before their
movement against the Indian encampment. By coincidence Bear Hunter was in
Franklin on the afternoon of the 28th to collect wheat from the Mormons when
the infantry force approached the settlement.
He did not seem worried when he saw the infantry approaching
the town , and did not leave until the soldi ers came quite close .
An inhabitant said to him, "Here come the soldiers. You may
get killed ," to which he replied, "May-be-so soldi ers get kill ed
too." Out of town, he evidently quickened his pace , for he

14
Whitney, 2:78.
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lightened his load by dumping the sacks of wheat along the way
to his camp. 15
Connor's plan of maneuver visualized the arrival of both the infantry
and cavalry forces at the Indian encampment at the same time, so as to
surround the encampment before daylight. Hoyt's infantry and the two howitzers
were to leave Franklin for the Indian encampment twelve miles away at 1:00
o'clock a.m. on the morning of January 29th. Some difficulty was encountered
in locating a local guide to show the troops the way over the snow-covered
fields to the ford of the Bear River, and Hoyt's force was delayed about two
hours in leaving Franklin.

16

The cavalry would, in conformance with the plan, depart Franklin
two hours after the infantry.

The delay involving the infantry posed a problem,

for, if the plan were followed, the combined force would now arrive at the
Indian encampment after daylight.

Connor was apprehensive that, with the

coming of light, the Indians would discover the strength of his force and flee.
Connor altered his plan in view of existing circumstances and moved the
cavalry by rapid march from Franklin at 4:00 o'clock a.m.
The cavalry passed the infantry and artillery about four miles from
the Indian encampment, near present-day Pre ston, Idaho . At daylight the

15

16

Rogers, 70.
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cavalry bad reached the high bluff near t he east (left) bank of Bear River "in
full view of the Indian encampment . .. about one mile distant."

17

The Indian Po&ition

The Bear River flows a winding course through a relati vely narrow
defile in the vicinity of the location of the Indian e ncampment. To the east is
a high bluff overlooking the river and its narrow flood plain. A mile or so to
the west of the river begin low foothills covered with stunted cedar trees. The
Indian encampment, consisting of approximately seventy-·five shelters made of
brush and wagon canvas and an Indian population of 500 to 600

18

, lay in a ravine

which Jed from the west-side flood plain toward the foothills. In the small
section of the area in which the battle occurred, the river ran generally eastwest and the ravine in which the Indian village was located ran north-south.
Through the lowest portion of the ravine ran a small creek, known after the
battle as Battle Creek, and which drained into the Bear River . The river,
swift in places and four to six feet deep , was crossed at a fo rd whi.ch was
located about three-quarters of a mile east of the battle area.
The ravine, which pr ovid ed a naturally strong defensive position for
the Indians, was about three-quarters of a mile long and six to twelve feet deep,

17
18

0ffl.Cl"al Records ,

VO I •

L , p t • 1 , p. 186 .

Thi s population figure is an estimate derived from the number of
Indians reported killed (224 to 368), the number of squaws and papooses captured (160.), and the number of braves reported to have escaped (22-100) .
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with nearly perpendicular sides, and was thirty to forty feet wide . At the
bottom of the r avine, where most of the lodges were located, was a heavy
thicket of willows.

Other willow thickets existed within the ravine just below

the embankment top.

These upper thickets had been supplemented, where

necessary, by artificial covers of willows to facilitate hiding the Indian warriors from observation--a form of both natural and man-made camouflage .
Firing steps had been chipped into the frozen east-side embankments by the
squaws also to assist in cover and concealment for the Indian braves.

19

Rifle

supports had been prepared of forked sticks and woven willow loopholes.
The natural geography of the area was also important.

Escape from

the ravine was possible to the north into the foothills or to the south onto the
narrow flood plain of the river. Whe n approaching the ravine from the east
over the flood plain, the view is generally "up hill " to a ground observer;
nothing can be seen below the crest of the embankment.

" The troops, to

approach the ravine, had to pass over two 'benches' or slight declivities,
which necessarily exposed them to the fire of the Indians before they could
have time to see the po sition of the latte r. "

20

The season and the weather served also to enhance the security of the
Indian s' position . The river bottom was frozen to hard ice and large ice chunks

19
20

Deseret News, Feb ruary 11 , 1863 , as quoted by Schindler, 323 .
orton, 176.
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floated in the cold waters . In addition, most of the area was under a twofoot layer of snow .

21

From the extent of the preparation of their position, it seems conelusive that the Indians intended to fight and to fight defensively, but the
decision may have been based on possible reports , if Connor's ruse were
successful, of a relatively small oppo sing troop force.

The extent of their

satisfaction with the potentials of their situation is illustrated by Orton: "they
undoubtedly fancied themselves in perfect security.

. .. they had all their

ponies tied up together, and the squaws and papooses were about the lodges
as usua l. "

22

To oppose Connor's troopers from the formidable defensive position
were approximately 300 warrior s, mostly well armed with rifles and having
plenty of ammunition.

23

The Engagement

Although Connor's troops had departed from Camp Douglas with a
total strength of slightly over 300, only approximately 200 were available to
take part in the battle. This great reduction in effective strength resulted
from those left along the route to Franklin because of frost-bite (75 men),

21
22
23
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those with the supply train and the howitzers, and those guarding the cavalry
horses.

24
Once the troops reached the vicinity of the Indian encampment,

preparations for battle were rapid.

The cavalry quickly descended from the

bluffs to the river ford and, with difficulty, cross ed the river. After the
companies made the crossing they were dismounted and every fourth man was
detailed to hold horses.

Companies K and M were the first to cross, followed

imm ediately by Companies A and H.
Colonel Connor had ordered Major McGarry, who commanded the
cavalry element, to surround t he Indians before attacking them.
several circumstances tended to preclude achieving this goal.

25

However,

First, almost

as soon as the cavalry reached the west side of the river, an Indian sniper
fired and wounded a trooper, thus forcing the cavalry to dismount. Second,
the nature of the terrain did not lend itself to a troop maneuver to surround the
Indians.

Third, the Indians engaged in inflammatory provocations intended to

goad the volunteers to attack.
Schindler, utilizing contemporary news accounts in the Deseret News
as a source, describes these provocative actions . "As the first rays of sun
illuminated the scene, a Shoshone chief in full battle regalia ... appeared on
the breastworks above, and waving a lance at the soldiers, raced ... along the

24
25
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embankment crown. "

26

Other India ns chanted military orde rs in derision,

punctuated by the taunt " come on you California sons of bitches. •• As the battle
was joined and as a final gesture of contempt "braves flaunted the dried scalps
of white women at the oncoming bluecoats, then retreated behind the embankment to begin the slaughter. "

27

At about 6:00 o' clock a.m. the battle was started with McGarry leading his dismounted cavalrymen as skirmishers in a frontal attack on the Indian
position. This tactical effort was attempted for about twenty minutes without
succe ss, and during which time most of the troop casualties were experienced.
Connor, who had initially remained on the east bank "to give orders
to the infantry and artillery," made the assessment, on reaching the immediate
scene of the fighting, that it was "impossible to dislodge them [the Indians]
without great sacrifice of life"

28

by continuation of the frontal attack. He,

therefore, ordered Major McGarry and twenty men to turn the Indians ' left
flank which was left "hanging" or exposed where the ravine entered the foothills.
At about this time, the infantry arrived at the river ford and attempted
to cross but were unable to do so.

Connor ordered the cavalry detachment with

the '' led" horses to assist the infantry across the river.
26

nese r et News, February 11, 1863, as quoted by Schindler, 324.

27

Whitney,2:78, places a slightly different interpretation on these events.
He sees the Indians as having utili zed a pre-emptive engagement to force the
troops to abandon the effort to surround the Indian e ncampment.
28

official Records , vol. L, pt. 1, p. 186.
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Upon arrival on the battlefield, Hoyt's infantry was ordered to reinforce McGarry's flank attack on the Indian left. The flanking attack succeeded;
cavalry and infantry crossed the north end of the ravine and, in a half-circle,
moved down both sides of the ravine, subjecting the Indians to a destructive
enfilading fire.
Elements of Company A now broke through the Indian position from
the east and entered the ravine.

Portions of Companies K and M, Second

Cavalry, were positioned at the mouth of the ravine; the Indians were now
surrounded. Some Indians broke and ran, "but few tried to escape .•. but
continued fighting with unyielding obstinacy, frequently engaging hand to hand
with the troops until killed. "

29

The troops at the mouth of the ravine extracted

a "terrible execution" upon the Indians.
Indians were counted.

30

In a single spot, forty-eight dead

Most of the Indians who did escape from the mouth

of the ravine were shot while attempting to swin the river or killed in the
dense willow thickets that lined the river bank.

31

The battle was over by

10:00 o'clock a.m.

Due to the deep snow, the artillery did not reach the field in time to
be used in the action.

29
30
31

Ibid.
Whitney, 2:79 .
0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 186.
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Casualities

Troop casualties were heavy; approximately one-third of the force in
action was killed or wounded.

Fourteen of Connor's troops were killed on the

field and four officers and forty-nine men were wounded. Of the wounded, one
officer and six men later died.

32

To this number must be added the seventy-

five who were incapacitated due to frost-bite.

33

Indian casualties are more difficult to assess.

Connor's report indi-

cated that the troops had found "224 bodies on the field" but " how many more
were killed I am unable to say. "

34

A detailed inspection of the battlefield to

ascertain Indian casualtie s was not practicable since the condition of Connor's
wounded necessitated their immediate evacuation. Among the dead were Chiefs
Bear Hunter and Lehi.
The Tullidge account cited in footnote 34 indicates that ninety of the
dead Indians were women and children.

The suggestion that the killing of

other than Indian males was intentional is contradicted by a diary entry of one

32

utley, 224; Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 184, under a date
of February 20, indicates that five of the wounded men had died.
33

Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 186 .

34
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 187; Whitney, 2:79, expresses
the view that the number reported killed was doubtlessly exaggerated. To the
contrary, the number reported killed was probably too small. Tullidge, 290,
quotes a Colonel Martineau, who wrote a military history of Cache Valley, as
stating that an eye-witness from Franklin had counted 368 dead Indians. To
this must be added an unknown number of wounded who would later die.
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of Connor's troopers.

"As soon as the squaws and children saw that the

soldiers did not desire to kill them they came out of the ravine and walked to
the rear of the troops, where they sat down in the snow 'like a lot of sage
hens'. "

35
Disposition of the captured Indians and their stores was quickly made.

One-hundred and sixty squaws and children were left on the field with a small
quantity of captured wheat for their sustenance. Seventy lodges a nd a la rge
quantity of wheat were destroyed.

Arms and 175 captured Indian horses were

retained by the troops.
The number of Indian warriors who escaped is unknown. Rogers
indicates 22, Whitney, 50, and Tullidge (again quoting Colonel Martineau),
about 100.

36

Return to Camp Dougla s

On the afternoon of the 29th the troops recrossed the river and camped
for the night.

Of the total force on the field only one officer and twenty-five

men were considered fit for guard duty.

37

Evacuation of the wounded back to medical facilities at Camp Douglas
was of primary importance. The Mormon guide, Rockwell, went to Franklin

35
36
37

Rogers, 74.
Rogers, 73; Whitney, 2:79; Tullidge, 290,
Rogers, 74.
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and "commandeered" ten teams and sleighs to transport the wounded.

38

The

first day t he wounded reached Mendon, and on the second day were at Ogden.
At Farmington they were transferred from the sleighs to carriages and wagons.
They reached Camp Douglas on the night of February 2.
The dead were returned in baggage wagons, and were buried in the
post cemetery at Camp Douglas.
The main body of troops experienced considerable difficulty in their
return to Camp Douglas due to deep, drifted snow in the pass from Cache Valley
between Wellsville and Brigham City and were forced to return to Wellsville.
Mormon Bishop W. H. Maughan of Wellsville turned out men and teams from

.

.

his settlement to ass1st the movement through the pass.

H

On the evening of February 4, the m ain body of troops returned to
Camp Douglas.

4

° First in the procession was a drove of 100 captured Indian

horses. Then came Connor and the guide, Rockwell, in a carriage loaned
from one of the settlements along the way.
companies.

Major McGarry led the cavalry

Last were the infantrymen, mounted on captured Indian horses.

The i nfantry had been gone for two weeks, the cavalry a few days less.

38
Schindler, 327.

39
40

Rogers, 75.

Rogers, 76. Schindler, 327, indicates the date of return as
February 3.

103
Mormon Attitudes

Connor's official report of his expedition included these observations
concerning Mormon attitudes: " ... in my march from this post no assistance was
rendered by the Mormons, who seemed indisposed to divulge any information
regarding the Indians and charged enormous prices for every article furnished
my command. "

41

Concerning the material captured in the Indian camp, Con-

nor reported that he had destroyed a large quantity of wheat and other provisions which had been furnished the Indians by the Mormons. Captured arms,
so rumor said, were "received [by the Indians] from inhabitants of this territory in exchange for the property of massacred emigrants. n

42

In view of the facts that Mormons had provided two guides--Rockwell
and one from Franklin--had assisted in the transportation of the wounded from
the battlefield, had fed and entertained some of the troops at Logan subsequent
to the battle,

43

and had assisted the troops in the passage of the snow-blocked

route south from Wellsville, Connor's report would appear to be incomplete
or misleading.

Tullidge takes Connor to task on this point. "Colonel Connor

•.. did an injustice to the people of Cache Valley . . . . The records of Cache
speak of the absolute sympathy of the entire people of Cache with the California
Volunteers, and their gratitude to them for redeeming them from Indian

41
42
43

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 186.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 187.
Tullidge, 290.
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depredations. "

44

Indeed, the victory at Bear River was viewed by the Mormon

branch in Logan as an "interposition of Providence in behalf of the settlers . "

45

Recognition

Connor's r eport of the Bear River expedition particularly cited Major
McGarry, Major Gallagher, and Surgeon R. R. Reid with "highest praise for
their skill, gallantry, a nd bravery throughout the engagement . .. . "

46

Speak-

ing of all of his troops he stated: "Of the good conduct and bravery of both
office!'s and men California has reason to be proud."
When General Wright forwarded Connor's report to Washington, he
co mmented that the victory should "commend the Column from California and
its brave commander to the favorable notice of the General-in-Chief and War
Department. "

47

General Halleck recommended the promotion of Connor to brigadier
general "for the heroic conduct of himself a nd men in the battle of Bear River."
The recommendation was approved by Secretary of War Stanton and, on March
29, 1863, Connor was appointed a brigadier general.

44
45

Tullidge , 288 and 289.

Tullidge, 290.

46
47

Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p . 187.
Official Reco r ds, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 184.
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Significance of the Battle

The view that the Battle of Bear River was highly significant to the
history of the West is generally endorsed by all historians. Rogers calls t he
campaign "one of the most successful expeditions of the West against hostile
.
48
.
Ind1ans. "
Tulhdge, Whitney, Bancroft, Hafen, Neff, Ricks, and Utley all
see the battle as decisive in bringing the Indians to peace and in the development of the West.

49

However, there is also an undercurrent of objection to

the number of casualties inflicted on the Indians. Neff states that the "unsuspecting natives were practically exterminated.

,so

Bancroft, after praising

the imposition of peace on the Indians resulting from the battle, rather inconsistently comments: "Had the savages committed this deed, it would pass
into history as a butchery or a massacre. "

51

Whitney provides a view more

in consonance with the facts as developed by this author.
If the battle in its latest stage had possessed less the elements
of a massacre, Colonel Connor and his command would have
been more generally praised by some people; but perhaps it
would not then have provied a lesson so well remembered by
the savages. As it was, it completely broke the power of the

48

Rogers, 76.

49
Tu!lidge, 290; Whitney, 2:80;Utley, 224; Bancroft, 631; Hafen, 249;
Neff, 392 and 630; Joel E. Ricks and Everett L. Cooley, (Eds . ), The History
of a Valley: Cache Valley, Utah--Idaho (Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret News
Publishing Company, 1956), 51.
50
51

Neff, 735. The judgment, "unsuspecting, " is absurd.
Bancroft, 631.
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Indians, and conveyed to them a warning that it has never been
necessary to repeat. 52
The extent to which the genuine significance of an historical event
can be distorted, misrepresented, or diminished is illustrated by a quotation
from an unidentified cri tic of Connor in Utah in July 1885.
It is neither patriotic nor brave to pounce upon a snow-bound
freezing and starving band of Indians and cruelly slaughter
bucks, squaws and pappooses [sic]. The traveller to the north
is to this day, and will be for generations to come, pointed to
the cove on Bear River, "where Connor massacred the Indians,"
and never is heard a complimentary word for the hero of the
awful butcher. 5::S

52
53

whitney, 2:80.
Fox, 31.
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CHAPTER VI
AN ARMY ENDEAVOR IN WESTERN SETTLEMENT

In May of 1863 Brigadier General Patrick Edward Connor led a party

of troops and civilians from Camp Douglas, Utah Territory, to Soda Springs
in neighboring Idaho Territory.

Here simultaneously were established a new

military post, Camp Connor, and a new civilian settlement, Morristown. This
operation is of interest because of Connor's motivation in moving beyond the
geographic limits of his own command, as an example of federal official and
church friction in Utah, and as an effort by the army to influence solutions
to primarily civilian problems.

The establishment of a settlement at the great bend of the Bear River
at a location known to the Indians as Tosoiba-- sparkling waters--and, less
elegantly, to the trappers and early emigrants as "Beer Springs" resulted
from several seemingly unrelated events, one of the most important of which
was the discovery of gold in Idaho successively on the North Fork of the Clearwater (February 20, 1860), near Florence (August 12, 1861), and in the Boise
Basin (August 2, 1862).

The discovery of gold in Idaho Territory and in

Montana greatly increased the emigrant traffic along the Oregon Trail to a
degree reminiscent of the peaks of the early 1850s. As a means of illustration, the first permanent settlement in Idaho was made in 1860 and, thus, the
1860 census records no data for Idaho.

However, by 187 0 Idaho had a
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primarily adult population of 14,999 with a labor force of 10,879 of whom
60. 5 percent were employed in metal mining.

1

The outbreak in 1862 of

Indian attacks and depredations over an extended area endangered the rather
extensive travel to the gold fields.
A second occurrence affecting the establishment of a new troop location and settlement in Idaho Territory was the so -c alled "Mo rrisite War. "
Prior to the arrival of Connor 's troops in Utah, an armed conflict occurred in
June 1862, in the vicinity of Ogden between an apostate religious group called
2
Morrisites and the Territory of Utah.

Following this encounter some of the

Morrisites dispersed to Carson Valley in California and to Montana; some gave
up their beliefs and remained in Utah; and some adhered to their religion under
the protection of federal troops at Camp Douglas.
The presence of the Morrisites at Camp Douglas was a potential
source of further friction with the Mormons.

1
Leonard J. Arrington, The Changing Economic Structure of the
Mountain West, 1850-1960 (Logan: Utah State University, 1963, Monograph
Series, vol. X), Table 111, 30 and Table 111A, 41.
2
The name "Morrisites" is derived from that of the leader of the
group, Joseph Morris. A complete treatment of the Morrisite affair is contained in John Banks, "A Document History of the Morrisites in Utah"
(Unpublished B. A. thesis, University of Utah, 1909). The fact that the predominant portion of the inhabitants of Utah were Mormon suggested to many
an element of religious persecution associated with the Morrisite episode.
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Connor's Expedition

Connor indicated his plan to establish a new post "on the overland
emigrant route about 150 miles north of this post, in Idaho Territory" to
Department of the Pacific on April 22, 1863.
r espects.

3

The plan was unique in several

First, for over ten years Fort Bridger and Fort Hall had been

adjacent installations on the Oregon Trail; a need for an intermediate station
or settlement had not been demonstrated. Second, a settlement at Soda
Springs would "leap frog" by approximately 75 miles the then-existing limits
of settlement, if Salt Lake City is considered as the center of the settled
areas.

The northern-most location in Cache Valley , Franklin, was settled on

April 14, 1860, in what later proved to be Idal10.

Preston would not be settled

until 1866. Bear Lake Valley would not have a settlement until September 26,
1863, at Paris.

Both Marsh Valley and Malad Valley would not receive their

first settlements until 1864. Third, the proposed location for the settlement
at Soda Springs was entirely out of the command territory of Brigadier Ge ne ral
Conno r , although there is evidence of prior coordination with the commander of
the District of Oregon, within whose area Soda Springs was located.

4

Connor, perhaps anticipating a requirement for some justification,
listed several reasons for his contemplated action: the importance of the
position on the emigrant trails to both Oregon and California; the proximity of

3
4

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p . 411.
0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 479.

110

important mines; the need to protect overland emigrants; the fact that the
location is in the vicinity of a summer rendezvous of hosti le Indians; and "to
form the nucleus of an anti-Mormon settlement, and a refuge for all who desire

to leave the Mormon Church and have not the means to emigrate farther. ,s
Certainly one of the limitations in controlling the Indians was the
necessity to move troops great distances in any campaigns against them.
Immediate response to hostile actions was impossible.

Location of troops in

outlying areas was a valid consideration. There would, also, be prestige
benefits from the presence of Connor's troops on the Oregon Trail.
Further, movement of the Morrisites out of Utah should minimize
the possibilities of further ci vii conflict with the Mormons and enhance the
tranquility of Connor's command.

The idea of a non-Mormon settlement was,

insofar as can be de termined from the official records, entirely Connor's .
His letter of April 22 , which has already been cited, also sets his expected
date of implementation of his plan as " next week. " The re was hardly time
for nonconcurrence from his commander in San Francisco.
The official purpose of the expedition is recorded as being the e stablishm e nt of "a new post in that region for the protection of overland emigration to
Oregon, California, and the Bannock City mines."

5
6

6

Pertaining to the

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 411.

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 226-229. This ci tation is from
Connor's official report of June 2, 1863, concerning his expedition. This
same report, as an original source, has been used for subsequent quotations
regarding the expedition itself.
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Morrisites, Connor observed:
Prudential reasons, applying as well to this command as to the
Morrisites themselves, rendered it advisable that they should
be removed from the vicinity of this camp [Camp Douglas] and
beyond the evil influences and powers of the Mormon hierarchy.
The party under Connor's command moved in two elements and by two
generally different routes from Camp Douglas to their destination, "a point at or
near the great bend of Bear River known as Soda Springs. " The first element
or main body, consisting of 160 Morrisites (53 families, seven single men,
and four widows) escorted by Company H, Third Infantry California Volunteers,
under the command of Captain Black, departed Camp Douglas on May 5, 1863.
Their route northbound was to Brigham City (Box Elder), Bear River, and by
an "old beaten road through cache and Marsh Valleys and across the
mountains, via Sublett's Cut-Off" to Soda Springs.
The second element, under Connor himself, and including Company H,
Second Cavalry California Voluntee rs (Lieutenant Clark, commanding) departed
Camp Douglas on May 6 and overtook the main body 25 miles to the north.
The combined parties reached Brigham City on May 8.
Here Connor's element embarked upon a mission of area reconnaissance.

The party of cavalry crossed the Bear River at its lower ferry and

moved thence up the plateau bet\veen the Malad and Bear rivers.

After cross-

ing the divide between the Great Basin drainage area and that of the Columbia
and its tributary, the Snake, the party used a route down the western side of
Marsh Valley to a c rossing of the Port Neuf River north of Sublett's Cut-Off.
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The east (right) bank of the Port Neuf was followed on a bearing a little east
of north to the Snake River ferry (near present-day Glenns Ferry). It was
now May 13 and Connor's group was approximately 200 miles from Camp
Douglas.
Exhibiting the practices of a constant , capable military commander,
Connor used every opportunity for reconnaissance and seeking hostile Indians.
After his party left Brigham City, he employed two night marches hoping to
surprise some Indians who had escaped from the field at the Battle of Bear
River and who were rumored to be in the vicinity. He also negotiated with
Indians encountered at the crossing of the Port Neuf and at the Snake River
ferry.

All Indians contacted were friendly and cooperative.
Connor's expedition resulted in significant improvements to the early

road and trai l network in southeastern Idaho and northern Utah. When Connor
had reached the Snake Rive r ferry he was down river (northwest) of Soda
Springs approximately 70 miles via Fort Hall. The normal route from the
ferry to the Bannock City mines was to proceed nearly 70 miles from the ferry
back up the Snake to a point generally due north of Soda Springs. Connor sought
and found a shorter, direct route from Soda Springs north to the mines .
Connor's party of cavalry arr ived at Soda Springs on May 17 and,
finding the main body not yet there , he reconnoitered a route south from Soda
Springs toward the settlements in Cache Valley. The route ran from Soda
Springs along the west (right) bank of the Bear River, through a gap in the
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mountains, to the cross ing of the Bea r near the Indian battleground. This
route was 40 to 50 miles s horter than the Marsh Valley approach.
On May 20 the main body arrived at Soda Springs. "A suitable and
eligible location was selected on the north bank of Bear River, near the great
bend, and four miles east of where the Soda Springs Valley opens into Old
Crater Valley" [northern Gentile or Gem Valley].
Connor was careful to record the advantages of the site selected:
good and abundant water easily diverted for irrigation; abundant wood for fuel
and timber for building; the fertility of the soil and its suitability for cultivation as deduced from the presence of a good vegetation. As possible disadvantages, he was almost prophetic in noting "the shortness of the season and
the altitude of the place . . .. "

Morristown

Immediately ·following site selection, a land survey and development
of the settlement were begun.
aside for a township.
130 feet.

Two hundred acres were surveyed and set

Each family was allotted a parcel of land 25 feet by

Streets were laid out para llel to the river and were intersected by

streets parallel to Soda Creek. This resulted in a plat roughly triangular in
design with a few lots west of Soda Creek, but none south of the river.

Houses
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were one-room structures with dirt floors and mud packing between logs of
the walls.

7

The initial town site came to be known alternatively as Old Town or
Lower Town to distinguish it from Upper Town--a recognition of a shift in
the "center of gravity" of settlement to a new, higher location.
Business of the new town was related primarily to traffic on the
Oregon Trail.

Blacksmithing was the first private business and was a godsend

to emigrants, settlers, miners, and loggers.

Tasks included making horse

shoes, ox shoes, and nails for building, and repairing wagons. Scrap iron was
essential and was obtained from emigrants passing through and by a diligent
search of the trail for miles to gather discarded metal. Other items containing metal fixtures were occasionally found floating down the Bear River.

Axle

grease lubricant for the many wagons was produced locally by melting tar or
gum from pinion pines and combining this with tallow.
Attempts at farming were very discouraging. Freezing temperature occurred often, even during summer nights. Men tried
building fires and smudges in an effort to ward off the effects of
the frost, but with small success. During the second winter,
more than half the livestock was lost by reason of extreme cold
and lack of feed. Five successive grain crops were destroyed
by freezing weather. 8

7
Lula Barnard, Faunda Bybee, and Lola Walker, Tosioba (Salt Lake
City, Utah: Utah Printing Company, 1958), 54.
8

Barnard, Bybee,andWalker, 62.
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Camp Connor

While the Morrisites were building their log cabins, General Connor
surveyed a military reservation, to be known as Connor's Fort or Camp
Connor, one square mile in size located on a hill just to the east of the first
town site.
The fort, to be garrisoned by Company H, Third Infantry California
Volunteers, was built in the shape of a huge picture frame, with the doors to
the various rooms opening onto a central court.

9

Construction was of logs;

the building was approximately 100 feet square. Two distinguishing features
of the fort were a ninety-foot flagpole of which General Connor was extremely
proud and a two-story adobe brick bu!ld!ng erected in the center of the enclosure. The lower floor of this building was used for post supply and a store;
the upper room was a place for social gatherings and for council and court
meeting.

This building boasted a shingle roof.

The Decline of Morristown and the
Closing of Camp Connor

A combination of several factors by early 1865 brought about the
decline of Morristown.

9

The climate was adverse to farming and stock raising.

Barnard, Bybee, and Walker, 56.
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As an additional consideration, there was a failure to achieve a rallying of all
Morrisites to the new settlement,

10

and it failed to grow.

Withdrawal of the troops caused the closing of Camp Connor.

The

Indian troubles in this part of the West had, by early 1865, been reduced to a
minimum. A decision was made by Connor to withdraw the troops from Camp
Connor for use, under Connor's command, in the District of the Plains. 1n a
letter of February 25, 1865, General Connor wrote as follows to his higher
headquarters, Department of the Pacific:
There is now a thriving settlement at Camp Connor (Soda Springs),
who are sufficiently numerous to protect themselves, and deeming
that the troops at that post were more needed for the protection of
the Overland Mail Line, I have thought it best to withdraw them. 11
The closing of the military camp precipitated the abandonment of the
civil settlement.

12

Evaluation

Failure is perhaps too strong a term to be used in describing Connor's
endeavors at Morristown and Camp Connor. True, his colony and his military
post did not survive.

10
11

Military posts, however, are notoriously ephemeral;

Beal, 182.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 1145.

12
Soda Springs was later resettled by the Mormons. 1n 1870 Brigham
Young issued a call for volunteers to recolonize Soda Springs. A new survey
was completed by Jesse W. Fox and in the spring of 1871 Mormon settlers
arrived and the New Town-- Upper Town--Soda Springs village was secure in
its future.
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once the need for them passes, they are closed. Mo r eover, some continuity
remains of the colony. Descendants of some of the original Morrisite settlers
still reside in Soda Springs, a nd descendants of some of Connor's soldiers
stationed at Camp Connor remain as respected citizens of Idaho.
Another factor in evaluating the worth of Connor's efforts in establishing a settlement in southeastern Ida ho is their effects on later, successful
colonization. Reconnaissance and improvement of travel routes by Connor
and his contribution to Indian pacification in the area certai nly made the tasks
of his colonist successors easier and simpler.
Connor's place in the history of the West would seem assured through
his "Idaho venture," even had this been his sole constructive accomplishment
during three and one-half years as a federal a rmy officer with his headquarters
in Utah Te rritory.
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CHAPTER VII
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES

There were, during the existence of the Military District of Utah,
many contemporary events and circumstances which strongly influenced the
military operations. It is the purpose of this chapter to highlight certain of
these which posed particular problems or challenges to Connor, the military
commander. It should not be inferred that all "problems and challenges" are
identified, nor is it intended necessarily to provide a complete discussion of
any of the circumstances selected for consideration. The purpose is merely
to illustrate how a variety of largely external considerations tended to define
or to limit Connor's oper ations.
The most important non-military problem facing Connor was his relations with the Mormons.

Four other problems of a primarily military nature

were also particularly troublesome: the manner and extent by which his command would be reinforced: whether the post established at Camp Douglas
would continue to be utilized as the location for major troop units; whether
federal troops would be r e moved from Utah Territory; and the reorganization
of the California Volunteers, necessitated by the expiration of their initial
terms of servic e.
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Relations with the Mormons

Previously in this study, Connor's perception of a threat from the
Mormons to his command or to the accomplishment of his mission has empha sized conditions existing prior to his a rrival. There were, however,
certain events which occurred after the arrival of his troops in Utah and which
had an immediate impact on Connor's military situation. It is not intended to
present a detailed coverage of this broad and extremely complex non-military
field; rather, coverage is deliberately limited and is provided only to suggest
possible or probable influences on Connor's assessment of his situation.
A speech by Governor Harding in early December 1862, offensive
to the Mormon territorial legislature, initiated a political crisis of major
proportions between the primarily Mormon inhabitants of the Territory of Utah
and the federal territorial officials sent there to govern . This crisis culminated
in March when a Mormon "committee" called upon the governor and two of the
federal judges and requested their resignations and departure from Utah. All
refused.

1
On December 20, Connor reported to General Wright that, since the

troop arrival in Utah, Connor had been aware of efforts being made by
Brigham Young to dissever Connor's command under the guise of scattering
troops along the line of the overland mail company as a "check against the

1

Tullidge, 291-318.
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Indians. "

2

Governor Ha rding had also heard of s imilar efforts, and, on the

19th of February, 1863 , he advised Gene ral Wright that no one knowing the true
situation in Utah would initiate such an order. The governor further suggested reinforcement of Conno r with two additional regiments--approximately
1, 500 men. If the troops we re to be withdrawn "it would be but justice to the
federal officers here to order them home also, for there would not remain a
shadow of . . . authority in their hands. "

3

Connor shared the governor' s views concerning the Mormons, and
possible troop withdrawal; in February Connor identified his objections to
Mormon attitudes to Department of the Pacific . He charged frequent and
flagrant violations of the federal law, particularly as concerned polygamy.
"Civil law is a perfectly dead letter in the statute books. "

4

Conno r's further charge of disloyalty and military preparations by
the Mormons attracted both deparimental and national level military attention:
Brigham has been engaged in mounting ca nnon, obst e nsibly for
protection against Indian depredations , and by this means has
placed himself in a position of formid able importance as an
enemy. He has fifteen cannon , 9, 12, and 24 pounders ready
for use . . . . I truly believe [he] only awaits a serious reverse
to our arms, or a foreign war , to break out into open rebellion. 5

2
3
4
5

official Re cords, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 257.
offt cia l Records , vo l. L , pt. 2, p. 314.
official Reco rd s, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 319.
lbid.
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Two months later an added t hreat, the po ssibility of involvem ent
with the Indians, "urged on by the Mor mons," worried Connor.

6

This matter

of friction between Connor and the Mormons because of their Indian policies
continued to be a major problem.

Connor, almost in retrospect of his experi-

ences in Utah, wrote on April 6, 1865:
The Indians [in Utah] were , I firmly believe, incited to acts of
hostility against the mails and immigrants, for the purpose of
involving us in a war, and, as we were but few in numbers,
thus hoping to get rid of us. . . . During the fall of 1862 and
wi nter and spring of 1863 my command was a ctively engaged
against the Shoshone, Ute, and Goshute Indians; and at the
ba ttle of Bear River I captured large quantities of wheat,
together with many articles which the Indians could not have
7
obtained had they not been on friendly terms with the Mormons.

Reinforcements

Under these circumstances of extremely strained r elations with the
Mormons and increasing belligerence on the parts of the Indians in early 1863,
Connor reacted by strongly and repeatedly reque sting reinforcements for his
command.

8

An a lmost frantic search for means of reinforcing Connor was

put in motion by the combination of the Mormon and Indian threats. Two genera! approaches we re explored: Reinfo r ce with currently available troop units,

6

offic ial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 257, 391, 415, and 481.

7
Offi cial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 1184.
8
official Reco rds , vol. L, pt. 1, p. 199; pt. 2, p. 320, 415, 495,
and 529.
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or raise new troop units for that purpose. Some of the specific measu r es
within the two general approaches were fruitful; some were not.
As a form of military "wis hful thinking," both Wright and Connor
recommended immediate reinforcement by units from east of Utah Territory.

9

There is no record of action on these recommendations .
The possibility of raising new units for Connor's command from manpower resources available within Utah was also considered, but did not
achieve any positive results. On April 22, 1863 , Connor wrote to the Department of the Pacific:
I r eceived on the 15th instant a copy of the dispatch from the General-in-Chief to the general commanding the department, which
says I may be able to raise companies in Utah or out of emigrant
trains. The latter would be impossible, as t he emigrants coming
this way ar e afflicted with the gold fever, and the Mormons are
too disloyal to be trusted with arms, even if they would enlist,
which I doubt. There is, however, a class of peopl e here known
as Morrisites . • . . A company could be raised from among men
to garrison a post which I contemplate establishing on the overland emigrant route about 150 miles north of this post, in Idaho
Territory. 10
Connor's proposal to enlist one company of infantry from among the
Morrisites was approved by General Wright on May 6, provided t hey would
enlist for "three years or during the war. "

11

Apparently the Morrisites did

not c hoose to enlist for such a period or perhaps the fact that the approval was

9
10
11

Official Records, vo!. L, pt. 2, p. 430 and 481.
official .Records, vo!. L, pt. 2, p. 410.

Official .Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 427.
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dated one day following Connor's relocation of a major portion of the Morrisites
to Soda Springs was the significant factor. There is no furthe r record of action
on the proposal.
The "untapped" Utah territorial manpowe r pool continued to appeal
to higher headquarters.

In late 1864, General McDowell placed a call on

Governor Doty for four companies of volunteer infantry from the Territory of
Utah.
I . . . request that you will . . . raise by voluntary enlistment for
the service of the United States four companies of infantry ....
As the U.S. forces in Utah are simply for the protection of the
overland communications and the keeping the peace between the
whites and Indians and maintaining the authority of the United
States, and have no special reference to the Mormons, I have
supposed the raising of these companies, if practicable tp do
2
so, would m eet with no opposition from that community.
A copy of t he request to Governor Doty was provided to General
Connor with the request that Connor "afford all facilities in your power to
riase these companies in Utah, as it may be difficult to send you forces from
this part of the department. "

13

When no action on the request to raise Utah

troops was apparent after 2 1/2 months , Headquarters, Depa rtment of the
Pacific, inquired of Connor: "· .. what, if any, progress has been made in

12

official Records, vol. L , pt. 2, p. 1000.

13
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 999. There is no record of
Connor action on McDowell's request . However, since Connor 's attitude in
April 1863 is a matter of record and since McDowell's request to raise troops
was to the governor, it is doubtful that Connor did anything.
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raising the four companies of volunteers ?"

14

Connor provided what appears

to be an exasperated reply on January 3, 1865:
. . . Governor Doty .. . informs me that he addressed to MajorGeneral McDowell a letter in October last, declining to raise
volunteers in this Territory for reasons which commended themselves to his judgment, and which he would be pleased to give if
the department commander so desires. 15
The possibility of Mormon defense of the overland routes through the
Terri tory of Utah without the call of troops to federal service was rumored.
Connor reported in June 1863 his understanding that Brigham Young had
offered "to protect the Overland Mail Line against the Indians for a given sum
of money, on condition that the military shall be withdrawn. "
his evaluation of the rumored offer.

16

Connor gives

"I may say that I have little doubt that

Brigham Young could cause the Indians to desist from attacks on the Overland
Mail Line •... , " but for other considerations Connor did not recommend
acceptance of Brigham Young's offer.
A more feasible source of currently available troop units to be used
to reinforce Connor was from within the Department of the Pacific itself and
attention was easily focused on Companies A, B, and D, Third Infantry--units
of Connor 's own regiment which had been deployed in the Humboldt and hence
unavailable for service in Utah at the time Connor departed from California for

14
15

16

0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 1101.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 1112.

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 494.

125
the District of Utah. By early December and relieved from the Humboldt
mission, Company A was already at Fort Churchill and Companies B and D
were at Camp Union, near Sacramento .
was also at Fort Churchill.

17

Company L of the Second Cavalry

Having to wait until the roads were passable, it

was June 10 before a battalion and the two companies of the Third Infantry,
under Lieutenant Colonel Jeremiah B. Moore, departed Camp Union.

18

It is

significant to note that the reinforcement element for Connor also included
a sizeabl e increase in his field artillery weapons: two brass 6-pounder guns,
one 12-pounder howitzer, and one 12-pounder mountain howitzer.
The battalion reached Fort Churchill on the 25th, and, joined by
Company A, Third Infantry, and Company L, Second Cavalry, already there,
departed in early July enroute to Salt Lake City.

19

At Fort Ruby the compo-

sition of the party for Utah was modified slightly; Company B was retained
there as part of the garrison and Company C, which had been part of the Fort
Ruby garrison for nearly 1 year moved onward to Salt Lake City, together
with Companies A and D, Third Infantry, and Company L, Second Cavalry.
In summary, Fort Ruby was now garri soned by Companies Band F,
Third Infantry.
17
18
19
20

20

Lieutenant Colonel Moore r em ained at Fort Ruby in command.

Official Records, vol. L , pt. 2, p. 244.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 484.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 496, 501, and 516.

Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 507 and 713, e rroneously indi cate Company E as part of the Fort Ruby garrison. Company E had been at
Camp Douglas since October 1862.
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The reinforcement force for Salt Lake City was composed of Companies A,
C, and D, Third Infantry, and Company L, Second Cavalry. The exact dates
of arrival a r e not known . The return for Company L, which preceded the
infantry force, s hows that unit at Camp Douglas on September 30;

21

the three

infantry reinforcement companies were at Camp Douglas at least by December
31, 1863 ,

22

.
and probably two months eariler.

The Nevada Volunteers

General Halleck was fully convinced of the military nece ssity to
reinforce Connor in Utah. On March 19, 1863, he directed General Wright
to r einforce Connor as early as possible and authorized Wright to raise additi ona l troops for that purpose in California or Nevada.

23

Under this authoriza-

tion, First Nevada Volunteer cavalry and later infantry were provided for the
District of Utah.
On the 2nd of April General Wright requested two volunteer companies
of cavalry and two of infantry from Governor Nye of Nevada.

The "not-too-

speedy" Governor's Proclamation was not issued until April 26.

24

True to

form, interest was greater in the cavalry area, but the requi rement t hat

21
22
23
24

Orton, 194.
0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 713.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 357.
0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 413.

127
volunteer cavalry units provide their own horses posed a particular problem.
Nevada troops were directed to rendezvous at Fort Churchill.
one cavalry company was ready for muster.

25

By June 14,

Two weeks later, the second

cavalry company was projected to be ready soon. But it was not until
September 29 that Companies A and B, First Battalion Nevada Cavalry, could
be ordered to Camp Douglas.
on October 10.

26

They actually departed from Fort Churchill

Additional troop units from Nevada were not available until

the summer of 1864, and were deployed at that date primarily to replace
California units which were about to complete their service commitments of
three years.
General Wright described the status of the Nevada Volunteers in
April 1864, one year after the initial call, as follows:
Cavalry: six companies were then mustered into the service.
Companies A and B had been sent to Camp Douglas the previous
October. Companies C, D, E, and F were at Fort Churchill,
but it had been possible to equip only one of these four companies
with mounts.
Infantry: two hundred men for infantry had been enrolled and were
at Fort Churchill, soon to be organized into A and B, Nevada
Territorial Infantry.
In late July 1864, the Nevada force was r eady for deployment.
Companies C and F, Nevada Cavalry, went to Camp Douglas.

25
26
27

0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 484.
Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 631 and 652.
Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 923 and 926.

27

Companies D
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and E remained to garrison Fort Churchill. Company B, Nevada Territorial
Infantry, was ordered to Fort Ruby as potential relief for Companies Band F,
Third Infantry California Volunteers. Companies A and B, Nevada Cavalry,
organized into a battalion under Lieutenant Colonel A. A. C. Williams, replaced
Company I, Third Infantry California Volunteers, at Fort Bridger in early
August 1864.

28

However, from whatever the source, there was some question in
Connor 's mind as to whether reinforcement units could reach him in Utah.
He r epor ted to General Wright a Mormon assertion that " I shall not be reinforced, and that if the attempt is made they will cut off the reinforcements in
detail and attack me."

29

No attempts to interfere occurred.

Challenges to the Continued Utilization of Camp Dougla s

The continued utilization of the troop installation at Camp Douglas was
an ever-present problem to General Connor. On July 31, 1863, General Wright
wrote simultaneously to the adjutant general, to Governor Doty, a nd to Connor
tha t he had "it in contemplation to re-occupy Fort ... Crittenden as the
principal military post in the District of Utah. "

30

The General's reasons

included a supposed easier availability of supplies away from the City, but

28
29
30

Rogers, 85.
Orton, 511.
Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 545 and 547.
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related prima ril y to a desire to reduce the friction and possibilities of confrontation between the Mormons and the troops in Salt Lake City.
In preparati on for a possible move to Fort Crittenden, Connor was
directed to ascertain what buildings there could be obtained, at what price, and
when they could be occupied by troops. General Wright's ''contemplation" also
involved stopping the reinforcements enroute from California under Lieutenant
Colonel Moore at Fort Crittenden, if possible, rather t han advance them to
Camp Douglas.
The possibility of removal of troops from Camp Douglas raised
several questions.

This possible relocation of troops within Utah "will not

affect the district headquarter s, which will still remain in Salt Lake City,
should you [Connor] so desire it." Connor was further assured that this proposed relocation to Fort Crittenden did not imply an intent to withdraw the
troops from Utah.
There is no record of response by the adjutant general or Connor to
General Wright's "contemplation." The governor ' s r esponse, however, was
quick and forceful, and probably more comprehensive than General Wright had
intended. On the 9th of Augus t Gove rnor Doty advised Gene ral Wright that,
because of the Indians, the "continued occupation of the po s ts at Soda Springs,
Fort Bridger, and Ruby I deem indispensable ..•. "
Douglas was m or e complex.

31

official Records , vol. L, pt. 2, p . 583.

31

The matter of Camp
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This city is the seat of all power in this country, and the only
point from which the authority of the Government over the
Indians or people can be, I think, successfully maintained.
. . . I think it would be a detriment to the public service if
this post should be abandoned • • . . If a collision occurs
between the civil officers of the United States and the Mormons this is the place where it must occur, and where those
officers will require instant protection and assistance.
The gove rnor concluded his "lecture" on strategy to General Wright
with a recommendation that the garrison at Camp Douglas be neither increased
nor diminished.
General Wright's position was quickly modified. On the 19th of
August, he wrote as follows to Connor:
The instructions ... relative to changing the position occupied by
your command from Camp Douglas to Camp Crittenden ... are
modified ... to the extent that if, in your judgmept, the withdrawal
of the troops from Camp Douglas would produce an impression
on the minds of the Mormons that the removal was in consequence
or disapprobation of your course while in command, or in any
manner injurious to the interests of the Government, you will
retain Camp Douglas as your principal s tation. 32
General Wright must have believed that he could anticipate Connor's
reaction, fo r on the 20th, he rather lamely closed the issue with the adjutant
general:

•

the 31st of July I advised you that I had under consideration the
propriety of removi ng the troops from the immediate vicinity of
Great Salt Lake City . .. but previous to the receipt of the Governor's
letter I had determined to maintain our present station at Camp
Douglas. 33

32
33

official Records, vel. L, pt. 2, p. 581.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 582.
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A Proposal for Troop Withdrawal

A second challenge to the troop deployment occurred in early January
1864, when Utah territorial delegate to the House of Representatives, John F.
Kinney, wrote to Major General Halleck, General-in-Chief of the Army, "suggesting that the removal of the command under General Connor would very
much accommodate the people I have the honor to represent. "

34

Kinney's

proposal was for the removal of the troops from the Territory, not merely
relocation from Camp Douglas.
His reasons were many.

He questioned the continued necessity for

the troops, based on the mission they were supposedly dispatched to Utah to
perform, that is, defense of the overland routes against the Indians. He noted
a season of poor crops, and a resultant general shortage of food in the territory.

He alleged that Camp Douglas was located within the corporate limits

of Great Salt Lake City and that the troop location on the bench was spoiling
water for city domestic use from creeks originating above that area.

He

further suggested that Connor and his brave office rs and men should be
accorded their oft-expr essed desire to serve directly in "the great struggle
to subdue this wicked rebellion."
Halleck referred Kinney' s letter to General Connor for report and
Connor responded at length, with a copy to General Wright, on February 15.
After refuting the arguments advanced by Kinney, Connor added: "I deemed it
34
Official Records , vol. L, pt. 2, p. 716.
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not only prudent but absolutely necessary to tbe respect due to and the dignity
of the Government that the camp should be located and maintained in the immedia te vicinity of the headquarters of Brigham Young and his attendant nest
of traitors . "

35

Connor closed with the observation that regardless of how

desirable would be transfer to the active scenes of the East, "neither they
[Connor's troops) nor I have constituted Mr. Kinney our spokesman .•.. "

36

General Wright's comment to the adjutant general on Connor's
response was dated March 5, 1864:
During the last year the removal of the troops from Camp Douglas
was maturely and carefully considered, and I was fully persuaded
that the present location at Camp Douglas was the proper position.
I have but little faith in the loyalty of the Mormons. . . • I would
most earnestly recommend not only that Camp Douglas be maintained, but that it be strongly re-enforced. 37

Reorganization of the California Volunteers

Members of the troop units of the California Volunteers utilized in
the District of Utah completed their commitments to service (three years) in
the late months of 1864. Rather than provide replacements, decision was made
to curtail the participation by California units coincident with the departure of
the initial personnel. This decision involved several redeployment and reorganization actions.

35
36
37

0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 748.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 751.
Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 778.
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In October 1864, units of the Second Cavalry, except for Companies
L and M which remained at Camp Douglas, were withdrawn to Camp Union,
California, and were eventually mustered out there in March 1866.

38

The

Third Infantry was reorganized and consolidated into a batallion of four
companies--A, B, C, and D--by District of Utah Special Order 87, October 29,
1864.

39

Personnel for these four companies were provided by veterans and

new recruits.
The various problems confronting Connor a s summarized in this
chapter were typical of the wide scope of activities which circumstances may
force on any military commander. All required much of Connor's time and
attention; only the matters of relations with the Mormons and the measures
considered to reinforce his command were serious problems.

38
39

orton, 168.

orton, 505. All companies of the Third Infantry Battalion subsequently played roles under Connor in his role as commander of the District
of the Plains. The Third Infantry Battalion California Volunteers was finally
mustered out on July 27, 1866.
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CHAPTER VIII
PERIPHERAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF CONNOR'S COMMAND

The major military activities in the District of Utah involved the
deployment of the troops, occasional field operations against the Indians, and
an attempt to establish a Morrisite settlement, tmder army sponsorship, at
Soda Springs on the Oregon Trail. However, there were additional activities
of less importance, but which must be included in a survey of District military
operations.
Among these additional activities were measures taken by Connor in
response to the secessionist threat, as perceived by him and his military
superiors. Although military actions against secessionists in the District of
Utah were minor, secessionists continued to co ncern Connor for a full two
years. Of interest is the wide variety of actions taken agai nst a suspected
disloyal ele ment.
Overt military operations constituted one option.

For example, in

late September 1862 , Connor directed hi s commander at Fort Ruby to locate
a "band of traitors or guerrillas" rumored to be some place in t he vicinity of
Humboldt.

1

Administration of the required oath of allegiance to the Union received
emphasis. Movement of emigrants through the territories who appeared to

1
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 128 and 144.
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lack the required allegiance or respect to the Union annoyed Connor's troops.
The commander at Fort Ruby reported to Connor in June 1863 that he had
stopped an emigrant train of sixty men, most of whom reportedly were secessionists, and had "them all drawn up in a line beneath our flag and administered
the oath to them in presence of the whole command. "

2

Emigrant control within Salt Lake City received attention. When a
provost guard was established by Connor in July 1864, one of the reasons for
his action was the control of disloyal emigrants passing through the City.

3

The possible impact of large numbers of "notoriously disloyal" emigrants on the populations of California and Oregon was a worry.

Concerning

such people, Connor concluded "it is apparent that administering the oath of
allegiance has but little restraining effect .. , .. "

4

Two other categories of activities, having much more impact on Utah
terrttory and its inhabitants, stemmed from the personality and character of
Connor himself.

Patrick Edward Connor was an energetic military commander

with an inquiring mind. These two characteristics led him and his troops into
many ventures, some of which had only an indirect or peripheral application to
areas of military concern. Two such ventures--reconnaissance and road construction, and mining--extensively involved his troops and are considered here.

2
3
4

0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 496.
Hance and Warr, 62.
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Reconnaissance and Road Construction

Connor's reconnaissance of the route from Ruby Valley to Salt Lake
City a nd of conditions in the city itself in September 1862, presaged Connor 's
later activities of this general type . This man lost no opportunities to discover
more about the areas in which he was operating and of applying that knowledge

to assist the users of the overland routes.
Chaplain Anderson, writing for the San Francisco Bulletin, discussed
one of Connor's many road improvement m easures , undertaken while still en
route fo r Utah.
The stage road runs from River Bed around a long mountain spur
to Point Lookout--thirty-four miles. While the animals were
resting, Colonel Connor discovered a pass from Indian Springs
Canyon to Lookout Valley, and, with a large fatigue Earty, cut
a good road where nature had not already made one.
T he diary of one of Connor's troopers records the activity of October 14 as:
"Made a road over the mountain. "

6

The chaplain designated the new route,

which saved twelve miles, as "Connor's Cut-Off. "
The expedition from Camp Dougl as to establi s h Camp Connor at Soda
Springs illustrates Connor's intense activity in area reconnaissance and in s ubsequent road improvement or construction.

From Brigham City north to Soda

Springs, Connor had deliberately selected for the cavalry a "less frequented

5

6

Rogers, 40.
Rogers, 259 .
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road" for the sole reason of becoming familiar with his territory. Also ,
Connor was aware that much of the emigrant traffic during 1863 was bound for
mines at Bannock City in what is today extreme southwestern Montana, located
generally north of Soda Springs: The fact that the travel route went from
Soda Springs down the Snake River nearly seventy miles to a ferry and back
up the river to a point north of Soda Springs puzzled Connor. In connection
with his expedition to establish Camp Connor, he determined to investigate
this problem.
With the design of finding a practicable route for a wagon road
through some pass in the mountains w4ereby a more direct course
could be made, I sent Lieutenant Clark with a detachment of twentyfive men ... to cross the Blackfoot near its source at the base of
the foothills, and, proceeding up the Snake sixty or seventy-five
miles, turn to the south, seek out such a pass, and join the command at Soda Springs. This expedition was eminently successful,
finding a good pass for a road ... striking Snake River seventy
miles above and east of the present ferry. 7
To facilitate the use of his new route to the Bannock City mines,
Connor selected a new ferry location over the Snake River which became
known as " Connor's Ferry." This route was extensively used. A Captain
Fish, in the fall of 1863, returning from escorting emigrants to Montana, found
a guard of Connor's men at the ferry and 150 wagons from the Denirer area
waiting to cross.

8

7
Official Records, vo!. L, pt. 1, p. 228.
8

Pedersen, 90.
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Even after all of this reconnoitering effort, Connor and the cavalry
arrived at Soda Springs before the infantry and the Morrisite settlers they
were escorting.

Taking full advantage of the time thus made available , Connor

sent detachments both north and south from Soda Springs to explore the
CO\Ultry.
Of particular interest to the party exploring to the south was the location of a direct and practicable wagon road to the settlements in Cache Valley.
Connor reported:
the entire practicability of making at small expense of labor a
good wagon road from the northern settlements of Cache Valley,
crossing Bear River at or near the battle-ground through a gap
in the mountains, and thence northerly along the western bank of
Bear River to Soda Springs. 9
0

o

0

In the fall of 1863, a detachment of sixty of Connor's men under
Major John M. O'Neill of the Second Cavalry, "built a wagon road between
Franklin and Soda Springs, shortening the route twenty miles. "

10

Additional

road improvement or construction was completed during the summer of 1864
when a detachment of eighty-five men worked for over three weeks to improve
the Chalk Creek wagon road between Camp Douglas and Fort Bridger.

9
official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 229.
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Rogers, 108.
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The Price Expedition to the Colorado River

One of Connor's operations was devoted entirely to reconnaissance.
On March 30, 1864, Connor provided a preliminary view of the operation In a
rather unusual communication to Department of the Pacific.
The more I think and inquire about the Colorado route the more convinced I am of the necessity and importance of opening the route.
Communication at all seasons of the year with navigable water will
be of the utmost importance txJ the speedy development of this
Territory. Consequently I have concluded to make a military road
from this place (Camp Douglas] to Fort Mojave, and shall start a
force for that purpose as soon as the grass has grown sufficiently
to sustain the animals. 12
Presumably Connor was thinking In terms of a new, better, shorter,
route for the provision of m111tary supplies for his forces. However, he spoke
of a measure important to the "speedy development of this Territory." Connor
pointed out that such a route would be practicable for year-round traffic and
would be approximately 500 miles in length. He inquired of his higher headquarters how many months of the year the Colorado was navigable as far upriver as Fort Mojave and whether co=!ssary supplies would be available
there for the return trip of Connor's detachment. It is interesting to note that
the Mormons also were considering development of this same communications
route.
On April13, General Wright approved the Connor proposition to open
such communications and directed the ava!lab111ty of the necessary co=!ssary
supplies.
12

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 802.
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On the 7th of May, 1864, orders were issued to Captain Price,
Company M, Second Cavalry, Lieutenant Conrad, and sixty-one of his men
to determine "whether a route from the Colorado River to Salt Lake City can
be made superior to the present route from Carson City to Salt Lake, or equal

to it. "

13

The party, transported by sixty-four horses and four six-mule teams ,

departed Camp Douglas on May 9th and on the 11th were at Fort Crittenden.
They followed the San Bernadino road--excellent from point of view of road
condition and available water and grass--to Mountain Meadows.

1n sixteen

days they had covered 302 miles. At Mountain Meadows they erected a monument to the victims of the massacre which had occurred there in September
1857, rested for two days, and departed for Muddy Creek.
Beyond this point the route was difficult and the party suffered. The
road was in such poor condition that working parties were sent in advance to
improve it. Animal condition had begun to deteriorate seriously. On the 3rd
of June the detachment was at Camp 24 on the Muddy, having travelled 396
miles, six furlongs, and twenty-one rods.
miles had been covered in nine days.

14

Only ninety-eight additional

Side scouts, traveling alternate routes

on both sides of the main pa rty, had found no suitable alternate routes.

Be-

cause of the poor condition of the animals , a detachment of sixteen men, two

13
14

Official Records, val. L, pt. 1, p. 355.

Distance measurement was usually by means of an odometer
attached to one of the wheels of the six-mule wagons. A one-wheel odometer
device was al so used occasionally. See Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, 201.
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of the wagons, nineteen horses, and eleven mules were left at the camp on the
Muddy.
The remainder of the party--the two officers and forty-five men-crossed the desert to Las Vegas "without much trouble," but beyond Las Vegas
a shortage of water caused severe problems.

Four horses became crazed

and had to be shot. Ten men and more animals were left at a camp at Lewis'
Springs. Twelve more horses were lost between Lewis' Springs and ElDorado
Canyon on the Colorado. This was only forty-five miles from Las Vegas.
On the 16th of June, Captain Price and the remaining portions of his
detachment reached Fort Mojave, "completely worn out and exhausted, half
the men barefooted, horses scarcely able to walk . " This distance from Camp
Douglas to Fort Mojave was recorded with amazing detail as 585 miles, four
furlongs, and nineteen rods . The party had endured terrible hardships, but
most were due, in the opinion of Captain Price, to the poor condition of the
animals at the very start of the expedition, rather than to the character of the
road .
Captain Price was enthusiastic about the route and drew several conelusions based on his expedition.

First, there was no nearer, better, or more

practicable route than the present one from Camp Douglas to Las Vegas.

15

Second, the southern terminus of a route to the Colorado River should be in the

15

This route closely parallels present U.S. Highway 91. Hunt, 203;
Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 358.
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vicinity of El Dorado Canyon, since the river is navigable at least to that
poi nt . Third, the road from Camp Douglas to the mouth of El Do rado Canyon
is superior to the mail road from Salt Lake City to Cars on City.

Fourth, the

total length of the proposed new road will not exceed 450 miles . Thi s would
require a trip of twenty-six to twenty-eight days for a f r eight team.
On August 24, the expedition ended; Company M r eturned to Camp
Douglas . The returns of the Company include these data:

16

Principal route, Salt Lake to Fort Mojave, as
measured by odometer-1314 miles
Secondary routes checked--

829 miles

Observation lines--

555 miles

Total
Time on expedition--

2798 miles

114 days

Despite the hardships and deprivations endured by Captain Price and
hi s m e n, the attitude of the Captain following the arrival at F ort Mo jave i s
testimony of his high regard for Connor and a tribute to Connor ' s leadership.
''Whatever of hardships and suffering the expedition may have endured amount
to nothing, if success, in his [Connor's] judgment, has not been accomplished
by it. , l 7
Connor was pleased.

Eight months later, in a report intended to sum-

marize his accomplishments in the District of Utah, Connor w rote :

16
17

orton, 184.
Official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 360.
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Last summer I sent an ell:pedition from Salt Lake City for the
purpose of opening a wagon-road communication between that
place and the head of navigation of the Colorado River. The
expedition was entirely successful, and now goods are shipped
by that route. 1 8
Pedersen describes the effort as a grandiose scheme to link the Utah
settlements with California via the Colorado River which subsequently ended
in failure.

19

On the Connor memorial in the Post Cemetery at Fort Douglas are
included five accomplishments of his life; one is listed as "The Father of Utah
Mining." A summary of Connor's activities and those of his men
suggests that the appelation was well deserved.

20

strongly

Connor was directly involved

in the discovery and assaying of the first silver-bearing galena ore at Bingham
Canyon in mid-September 1863. He organized the first mining company in the
territory and built the first "precious" ore smelter.
districts and framed the law for their government.

He established four mining
He promised military pro-

tection for miners against all types of threats. He encouraged his officers and
men to prospect for minerals. He advertized the mining potential of the

18
19

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 1185.
Pedersen, 148.

20
Leonard J . Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom: An Economic History
of the Latter-day Saints 1830-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1958), 201.
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territory in an attempt to attract miner immigrants. Connor and his Volunteers
also were r esponsible for the establishment in July 1864 of the first nonMormon town in the territory, Stockton, named after Connor's home-town in
California.

21

Mining is, of course, not normally a military function.

However, the

extent to which Connor used his troops in such ventures and the purposes to be
achieved made it a military function in his Distric t. Connor issued instructions
to his troop commanders in late September 1863 concerning policies for
permitting prospecting by the soldiers. These policies were summarized for
the Department of the Pacific by Connor on October 26 .
. . . I have considered the discovery of gold, silver, and other
valuable minerals in the Territory of the highest importance ....
The discovery of such mines would unquestionably induce an immigration to the Territory of a hardy, industrious, and enterprising
population as could not but result in the happiest effects, and in
my opinion presents the only sure means of settling peaceably the
Mormon question. . . . I have looked upon the discovery of mines
in the Territory as in the highest degree important--first to this
people and secondly to the Government . . . . Having reason to
believe that the Territory is full of mineral wealth, I have instructed
the commanders of posts and detachments to permit the men of their
commands to prospect the country in the vicinity of their respective
posts, whenever such course would not interfe r e with their military
duties . . . . The results so far have exceeded my most sanguine
expectations. 22
On the lOth of November, General Wright forwarded Connor's dispatch
of October 26 to Washington with the comment that the discovery of valuable
21

Rogers, 116. Stockton was built near Camp Relief in Rush Valley,
and was associated with the Rush Valley Mining District.
22

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 656.
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mines in Utah and Connor's policies would "exercise a powerful influence to
wipe out that damning stain upon the Christian morality of the Am erica n
people. "23
The commander at Fort Ruby was not as favorably impressed as had
been General Wright.

Lieutenant Colonel Moore complained to Connor's

headquarters that the military duties required of his troops left little time for
prospecting.
cult.

He found compliance with Connor's directive on mining diffi-

24
Circulars, published by Connor's headquarters, on November 14,

1863, and March 1, 1864 , announced Connor's policies to the general public
and committed military

p~otection,

as necessary, to miners.

25

Even when cavalry companies were sent to the field primarily to
observe and influence the Indians to peaceable r elations, the necessity to be
alert to the possibility of discovering minerals was not ignored.

Instructions,

paraphrased as "thoroughly explore and prospect the country over which you
travel!' were included in orders from Connor to the company commanders.
Operations involved systematic exploration of the territory for m inerals.

23
24
25
26

Offic ial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 669.
0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 638.
Rogers, 112; Official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 774.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 845 and 846.

26
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Two additional, later r eports by Connor re - state his policies with
reference to the mine r al resources of Utah territory. On J uly 21, 1864, he
wrote:
... my policy in this Territory has been to invite hither a large
Gentile and loyal population, sufficiently peaceful means and
through the ballot-box to overwhelm the Mormons by mere force
of numbers, and thus wrest from the Church--disloyal a nd
traitorous to the core--the absolute a nd tyr a nnical control of
temporal and civil affairs . . . • With this view, I have bent every
energy and means of which I was posses sed, both personal and
official, towards the discovery and development of the mining
resources of the Territory, using without stint the soldiers of
command, whenever and wherever it could be done without detriment to the public service. 27
And in April, 1865, he saw his policies , in retrospect, as follows:
. . . I turned my attention to a development of the mineral wealth
of the Territory, with a view to encourage a different class of
emigration, and thus eventually break up a system of religion and
government at once infamous and abhorrent to every refined mind.
. . . my officers and men ... with great ene rgy prospected the
country, and succeeded in discovering rich gold and silver bearing
rock. It is now a settled fact that the mines of Utah are equal to
any west of the Missouri River, and only await the advent of
capital to develop them. 28
All of Connor's best efforts did not r e sult in a la rge influx of Gentile
miners to Utah. Little occurred except prospecting until 1869. There were
several reasons for this delay.

Fi rst, even though the majority of the men

in the Volunteers had come from mining areas of Califor nia and Nevada, they

27

whitney, 2:110.

28

official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 1185.
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had had no experience with smelting the mineral-bearing ore.
other factors.

30

29

There were

Richer mines were located elsewhere. Second, the distance

of Utah from major transportation terminals in the mid-West or on the Pacific
coast made the Utah mining uneconomical at that time. Only the development
of railroad transportation to and within Utah and an adequate labor supply
would make Utah mining a paying proposition.

Finally, the Mormon Church

"u sed its own devices to prevent the kind of subversion the Colonel [Connor]
intended. " The church was understandably opposed to Connor's efforts to
alter drastically the composition of the Utah population.
Historians' evaluations of Connor's motives fo r attempting to advance
the mining industry are not entirely uniform. As an example, Stenhouse saw
that Connor "had no occupation for his troops--they were eating the bread of
idleness and were discontented at being detained in Utah , and not taking part
in the war. "

31

Prospecting would appease Stenhouse's assumed boredom of

military life for the soldier and also give the possibilities of enriching both
themselves and the country. Whitney saw a diffe r ent motivation, more in
accord with Connor's official expressions. "During the first year of his
sojourn in the Territory, [Connor] began to evolve a grand scheme for the
opening and development of the Utah mines and simultaneously for the

29
30
31

stenhouse, 715.
Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom, ... , 202.
stenhouse, 713.
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overthrow . . . of the hated Mormon power. "

32

Arrington observes that,

after silver-bearing ore had been discovered, Connor "delightedly planned to
solve 'the Mormon problem' by starting a mining boom. "

33

Neff assumes the motivation to be one of seeking any possible avenue
for penetration of the Great Basin economy. Since all other economic possibilities had already been monopolized by Mormons, "here [mining] was the one
chance to secure an economic foothold in the Basin, other than through the
national payroll. "

34

Connor's intense concern with various aspects of his surroundings
involved his troops extensively in two major operations--reconnaissance
and road construction, and mining--which normally had only peripheral
application for a military force.

However, Co.n nor was ingenious in relating

all of his activities directly to the national interest and the Civil War.

32
33
34

Whitney, 2:107.
Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom, ... , 201.

Neff, 633. Neff offers no documentation for this view. His opinion
impresses this author as being strongly anti-Connor.
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CHAPTER IX
CONNOR--AN EVALUATION

Patrick Edward Connor was the only commander of the Military District of Utah.

The purpose of this Chapter is to suggest his significance to the

hsitory of the area and to evaluate his effectiveness as a military commander.

Personal Characteristics

Connor was a man of considerable physical courage and calmness
under stress.

1

However, possessed of a fiery tempe r, firm opinions, and

capable of decisive action,

2

he was not conciliatory in dealing with people.

3

He was a man of great perserverance and dedication to his concept of his duty.
stenhouse stated: "General Connor never had orders to arrest Brigham Young,
or he would have done so--or tried. "

4

His great attention to detail has already

been illustrated in the preparation of his military orders.

During the troop

movement to Utah Connor avoided marching on Sundays. Nevertheless, "dress
parades and inspections were still ordered regularly"--regardless of the sand

1
0ff!cial Records , vol. L, pt. 1, p. 184; Lewis, 94; Tullidge, 280.

2

Utley, 223.

3

Irving Stone, Men to Match My Mountains: The Opening of the Far
West, 1840-1900 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1956), 215.
4

stenhouse, 607.
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or sagebrush.

5

Hunt saw him as a "fighting general," "an undaunted warrior

[who] assumed command with his customary vigor and thoroughness."

6

The

Salt Lake Tribune of December 18, 1891, reporting Connor's death, cited his
"dauntless soul," "patriotic heart," and "distinct personality." The Telegram
of that same date described him as "a man of pronounced opinions, of vigorous
character, and of moral and physical courage. "
Not all characterizations are favorable.

Tullidge saw Connor as

"panting for military glory, as well as inspired by patriotism .... "
refers to him as "Superpatriot Colonel Connor. "
cious;"9 Neff described him as "bellicose. n

8

7

Arrington

Colton saw him as "pugna.-

10

Accomplishments

Connor's report, submitted to the Department of Missouri in April
1865, provides his views as to the major accomplishments during his period
of command of the District of Utah .

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

11

Included were:

Pedersen, 22.
Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, 210 and 218.
Tullidge, 274.

Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom: ... , 201.
Colton, 190.
Neff, 632.
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(1) Subjection of the Indians.
(2) Reconnaissance to the Colorado Rive r.
(3) Discovery of extensive mines and the development of
the mineral wealth of the Territory.
(4) Attraction to Utah of a population of loyal (i.e. , nonMormon) men.
(5) Protection to those not belonging to the Mormon Church.
(6) Establishment of a free press.
Items 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Connor's summary have been dealt with at
length in prior chapters of this study. A few words of explanation are in order
concerning items 5 and 6.

Connor held the view that not all Mormon residents

of Utah were, in fact, disloyal.
the church leadership.

He saw the problem as being primarily with

He believed that the federal government should provide

protection and relief to "a people oppressed and downtrodden by a most galling
church tyranny . .,lZ He saw the hope that "but a few years will elapse before
Utah will be redeemed from her infamy and degradation and contribute a loyal
and healthy support to our common country instead of being, as she now is, a
foul and filthy ulcer upon the body politic. "

13

Pertaining to the establishment of a free press, the Union Vedette,
the Camp Douglas newspaper, was sponsored by Connor and began its publication on the 20th of November, 1863. When it changed to daily publication on
January 5, 1864, this was the first daily paper in the territory. The Daily
Union Vedette continued publication until October 18 , 1867.

12
13
14

14

stone, 215.
Official Records, vo!. L, pt. 2, p. 1186.

Dwyer, 259, provides an excellent summary of the early journalistic
efforts from Camp Douglas.
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Historical writers saw his accomplishments in much the same way
as did Connor. Hunt commends his abilities as a military commander and
additionally notes his interest in the settlement of the territory and in the
development of its mines.

15

Hance and Warr place his military achievements

in the founding of Fort Douglas and as an Indian fighter in the forefront, but
lament that his other talents and capabilities are not observed in history.

16

Connor is identified as the "first gentile of Utah" for his very considerable
influence both economically and politically on the territory. The activities of
the "father of Utah mining" and the publication of the first daily paper in the
territory are cited as examples. In addition, Connor's abilities as a "master
of diplomacy" are asserted for his success in averting hostilities between the
troops and the Mormon settlers. Because of Connor's efforts in the development of mining, Anderson characterizes him as "the gentile answer to Brigham
Young's doctrine that land is better than gold. "

17

Due to his political activities

Connor's political friends accorded him the unofficial titles of "Father of the
Liberal Party" and "Liberator of Utah. "

15
16

18

Hunt, The Army of the Pacific: ••• , 203.
Hance and Warr, 30.

17

Nels Anderson, Desert Saints: The Mormon Frontier in Utah
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), 246.
18
Stone, 336; Howard Roberts Lamar, The Far Southwest, 1846-1912:
A Territorial History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 362.
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Two Salt Lake City newspape rs of December 18 , 1891--the Tribune
and the Deseret Evening News--provide contemporary evaluations of Connor's
contributions.
Deseret Evening News: The first striking event in the career of
Colonel Connor in the Territory was his march to Bear River,
north of Cache Valley, in January, 1863, when, in the depth of
winter, he attacked the hostile Indians who had been a constant
terror to the settlers , and completely routed and almost annihilated their camp. . . . The people of the North were delivered
from Indian scares and will always have cause to remember the
valor of Colonel Connor. . . . Gene ral Connor engaged extensively
in mining interests but was not gifted with great business ability
and did not succeed financially. He was a natural soldier, and
would, no doubt, have gained great military prestige if his lot had
been cast in other fields with large r opportunities for the exercise
of his military talents. He was a man of much force of character.
His faults were those of common humanity and they go with his worn
out body to the tomb.
General Connor will remain a notable figure in Utah history and he
will be remembered as a brave and gallant soldier.
Salt Lake Tribune: History will not do justice to General Connor's
memory. . • • He lived in an age filled with heroic names, and the
heavier thunder of mighty battlefields in a measure dwarfed the
exploits of our soldier. . . . we grieve that it could not have been
possible for him, on some mighty battlefie ld of our great war, to
have had the opportunity to show to the whole world how grandly
he could have led a column on to glory or the grave. . . . no one
who was not in the west knows how troublous were t he times, on
how slender a thread at last the Golden State hung in the Union, or
how much one such spirit as that of General Connor counted.
In the face of the sullen hate which met him he founded Fort Douglas,
and he gave the people who were then here their first idea that behind
the flag of the United States there was a majesty and power which
must be respected.
. . . In business he could never keep his details up with his enthusiasm,
and he made a mistake when he left the army. He was not educated;
he often erred in business judgment, but when it came to country he
was true as steel, and his judgment was clear as a diamond. Behind
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it all was a courage and a tenacity of purpose which lasted to the
very end.
Although Neff is not one of Connor's staunchest supporters, one of his
brief comments concerning the chance substitution of Colonel Connor for Colonel
Carleton to command the District of Utah assesses Connor's significance as
.
.
19
havmg changed the course of Utah htstory.

Military Stature

Connor was an outstanding military commander. The performances
of his troops under adverse geographic and climatic conditions and in the
presence of a sullen-to-hostile civilian populace were tributes to inspiring
leadership.

His battle planning and the conduct of actions against the Indians

at both Bear River and Spanish Fork Canyon marked him as an Indian fighter
of unmatched abilities.

The breadth of interest of Connor and his diligence in

pursuing his goals add to his stature as a frontier military figure.

Such

diverse activities as area reconnaissance, extending the bounds of settlement,
and the use of troops to assist in the development of Utah mining were further
examples of significant military endeavor.
Professional military commanders have been trained for generations
to understand and to apply certain fundamentals to the exercise of their commands and to advance the successful conduct of military operations. These
fundamentals , termed "principles of war" in the military jargon, were applied

19

Neff, 629.
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with a rare skill by Connor--a voluntee r officer whose military competence
came through experience.

Especially noteworthy were his use of surprise,

the maneuver of his troops in battle, and the coordinated utilization of all
three of his combat elements--infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
Connor's reputation with General Wright, his military superior until
July 1, 1864, and an experienced Indian fighter himse lf, was unexcelled.

The

Official Records are replete with examples of Wright's praise for Connor.
Phrases such as "admirable discipline," "energy," "sound judgment,"
"undaunted firmness," "self-possession under all circumstances," "heroic
conduct," and "industry and untiring zeal" describe a soldier.

20

Connor was

also highly regarded by Governor Harding who described him as that "brave
and accomplished commander, in whom we all have so much confidence.

n

21

Connor's fine reputation also existed outside the official community.
Ben Holladay is quoted as specifically requesting i n October 1864 the assignment of General Connor to combat the Indian threat on the Plains.
His familiarity with Indian warfare, prompt a nd efficient protection
to the Western line, and wholesome dread of the savages of his
name, point to him above all othe r s as the man for the work of
punishing these marauders. The winter is appr oaching, when
Indians can alone be tracked, pursued, and seve r e ly punished. It
is the right time for the work, and Connor can do it. I but express
the firm conviction of all who have witnessed hi s p rompt operation
and now see the result in Utah. Everything is quiet here, and

20

official Records, vol. L, pt. 1, p. 1164 , pt . 2, p. 95, 130, 253,
275, 369, 407, and 948.
21

officia l Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 315.
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Connor c an well be s pared for neces sary time to accomplish the
work speedily a nd effectually wit h m eans at his command. 2 2
Circumstances late in the wa r placed Connor s uc c e ssively under the
command of Major Genera l Irvin McDowell and Majo r General John Pope, the
two stalwarts of the Manassas battlefields of Virgini a . In all fairness to
historical perspective it must be noted that neither of t hese commanders
reposed the confidence in Connor that had General Wright.

McDowell was

concerned with the efficacy of Connor's policies towards the Mormons, and
Pope found his policies towards the Indians excessively repressive.

23

Influence on Mormon Relations

Whatever credit is accorded Connor for his ac complishments in Utah,
always detracting in some mea sure are criticisms of two aspects of his
policies--his treatment of the Indians, and hi s r e lations with the Mormons.
These subjects have been dealt with in Chapters II, IV, V, and VII.

It

is the

purpose of this section only to conside r the extent to which Connor was
individually responsible for the strained relations exi sting between federal
officials and the Mormon inhabitants of Utah during the Civi l War period.
Connor's policy towa rd the Mo r mons was one of aggressive strength
and is best summarized in his own wo rds, a s "any indication of weakness

22
23

Rogers, 146.
Offi cia l Records, vol. L, pt . 2, 1. 1100; Rogers , 183.
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or vacillation of my part would precipitate trouble. "

24

The historians' assessments of Connor's policy lack uniformity.
Whitney suggested the possibility that Connor was the architect of the a ntiMormon sentiment.
It is not imp111obable that Colonel Connor himself, who was a Mormonhater and made no pre tensions to the contrary, was the cause of
Harding's defection from his former friendly attitude. Steeped in
prejudice against the Saints .. . it is very possible that the warlike
Colonel ... took early occasion to engraft his own views upon the
weaker mind of t.te pliant Executive, as well as upon Judges Waite
and Drake .... 2

Colton supports this view.

26

Whitney betrays a lack of consistency in his as sessment, however,
for he later suggests that Connor's initial anti -Mormon attitudes stemmed
from "men less honest and sincere in their opposition to the Saints" than was
Connor himself.

27

What Whitney's history introduced as a possibility, Neff asserts as
fact.

Connor is accused of inciting Governor Harding to opposition to the

Mormon regime.

28

Neff a lso abhors the "undisguised attempt" of Connor to

use hi s influence and his troops in the attainment of the objective to overthrow

24

25
26
27
28

orton, 517.
Whitney, 2:82.
Colton, 184.

Whitney, 2:113.
Neff, 652.
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Monnon control and institutions in Utah.

For these attempts, Neff brands

Connor as "an unfortunate obstac le to progress, a retarding factor to the
advancement of society. "

29

Two later historians relieve Connor of the onus of responsibility for
the anti-Mormon friction.

Governor Harding is identified as the villian.

30

A post-war military report by General W. B. Hazen makes this
assessment of Connor's Mormon policy: "General Connor ... I think, treated
Mormonism too harshly, due probably to his zeal as a Catholic; yet he exercised
a strong influence against Mormonism, and was a true man in the interests of
the government . ... "

29

31

Neff, 633.

30

Alice E. Smith, James Duane Doty, Frontier Promoter (Madison:
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1954), 374; Pedersen, 25 .
31

nwye r, 50. This report was prepared in February 1867 and
submitted to Representative J. Bidwell of California.

159

CHAPTER X
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF SPECIFIC ISSUES

The Salt Lake Tribune, December 18, 1891, in writing of Connor's
death, was prophetic in observing that "history will not do justice to General
Connor's memory. " His accomplishments are largely ignored by historians;
the areas of controversy are almost invariably portrayed to his discredit.
Efforts by historians and writers to addres s the general subject of
employment of federal troops in Utah territory during the Civil War have
sparked disagreement and controversy.

The major controversies are en-

compassed in attempts to answer the following closely inter-related questions:
(a) Was the protection of the overland mail and telegraph lines a
valid military mission?
(b) Did the California Volunteers have another mission or missions--

either officially directed or unilaterally developed?
(c) Why were the federal troops in Utah territory located at a new
post, Camp Douglas, near Salt Lake City, rather than being
stationed at the post of the Utah War, Fort Crittenden?

illustrative Quotations

The orders with which Connor was complying when he moved his
troops to Utah directed him to "advance to the vicinity of Salt Lake .•• and

160

select a suitable position for a post. " He was to do this "to protect the Overland Mail Route within this department [Department of the Pacific]. , l
The quotations below provide historians' and writers' reactions to the
official descripti on of the mission of the California Volunteers.

The sources

have been arranged in chronological order and the date of the source book
publication has been indicated in parentheses in an attempt to suggest a possible
genesis and evolution of some of the ideas.
Stenhouse (1873)
. . • a body of Californi a volunteers . .. were sent on to the Overland
Mail Route to protect that and the telegraph-line across the plains,
but the commander [Connor) had also instructions to establish posts
near Salt Lake City .
. . . that officer had a programme of his own, a nd the volunteers
continued their march nearer to $lilt Lake. 2
Tullidge (1 886 )
Although the Utah militia had been offered for the protection of the
Overland Mail and Telegra ph line, Secretary Stanton deemed it
prudent to entrust the permanent service to the California Volunteers
rather than to the Utah militia. Utah was placed unde r a military
surveillance during the war, and California was made he r sister's
keeper .
. • . General Connor designed with his troops to reconstruct Utah .
. . . asking of the Government for the mission of a semi-military
dictatorship over utah. 3

1
2
3

0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 5 and 6.

stenhouse, 601-602.
.

Tul hdge, 273 , 330, and 340.
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Bancroft (1890)
Ostensibly for protection against Indians , though in fact because
the mail route and telegraph line were not considered secure in
the hands of the saints, a nd perhaps also for the purpose of holding
the territory under military surveillance, Colonel Connor was
ordered to Utah .... 4
Whitney (1894)
.. . whi le ostensibly to protect the mail routes and keep the Indian
in check , were really to watch and overawe the Mormon people,
the loyalty of whose leaders the Secretary of War had discovered
some pretext for doubting. This [was] unnecessary and undignified
service . •. insulting to the citizens of Utah .. . • 5
Hafen (1 926)
They [Connor's troops] were to garrison the forts and protect
the Overland Mail route. 6
Neff (1940)
Bellicose Colonel Connor, officially assigned "to protect the overland mail," an easy matter, assumed the undelegated function of
combating Mormonism. Marooned in the Basin, and destined to
a life of military inactivity, the vigorous and a ggressive mind of
the General more and more centered on the inhabitants against
whom the finger of distrust and suspici on had ever pointed. 7
Dwyer (1941)
Albert Sydney Johnston and his army decamped as the impending
struggle between North and South became more menacing , but
federal concern for the policing of the Territory resulted in the

4

Bancroft, 611.

5
whitney, 2:73.
6
7

Hafen, 247.
Neff, 632.

162
establishment, in 1862, of a more permanent military force with
headquarters in Salt Lake City. The advent of Colonel Patrick
Edward Connor and his California Volunteers, in the early autumn
of that year, marks the beginning of a long-drawn battle between
the Mormon majority and the Gentile minority for the political and
economic control of the region.
The presence of a military force in Utah, though its avowed purpose
had nothing to do with the Mormons or Mormonism, served to
accentuate the social and religious conflicts between the members
of the dominant sect and the scattered non-Mormons ...•
Whether the Mormons might have cast their lot with the Confederacy,
or whether they might have used a victory of that cause as a signal
for the assertion of their own ill-suppressed desire for independence,
are, of course, academic questions. Lincoln's administration chose
to take no chances; hence, Camp Douglas was established under color
of protection for the Overland TraiL. 8
Arrington (1958)
Commanded by Colonel (later General) Patrick Connor, these Union
troops were instructed to prevent Indian hostilities and "keep an eye
on the Mormons. " • . . Superpatriot Colonel Connor required all
those furnishing supplies to his troops repeat an oath of allegiance
to the Union. 9
Colton (1959)
Ostensibly this troop movement was for the protection of the Overland
Mail route and telegraph lines from Indian depredations. Actually a
major determining factor was the belief by high federal officials that
the mail route and the telegraph lines in the area were not secure in
Mormon hands, and that a military surveillance should be made in
the Territory. 10

8

nwyer, Preface v, 4, and 6.

9Ar-n·ngton, G
reat Basin Kingdom: .•. , 201.

°Colton, 163.

1
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Furniss (1960)
Nevertheless the Government ordered a large detachment of men to
utah ostensibly to keeJ: open the postal and telegraphic communications
between the East and West but possibly also to ensure the Mormons'
loyalty.ll
Lewis (1961)
Another puzzling aspect of the situation was that whereas Secretary
Cameron's first message had specified that the men were wanted to
protect the overland mail between Carson City and Fort Laramie,
his request for this second and much larger force stated only that it
was to be placed at the disposal of General Sumner. 12
Hance and Warr (1962)
1n 1862 with the rumblings of the Civil War, the Department of the
Army, Pacific, apparently determined that another fort should
be established in the Utah Territory--ostensibly to serve in guarding
the Overland Mail Route--but it is speculated that this new fort in
reality was once again established to keep a close watch on the activities of the Mormon settlers. . •• the Federal government so far
suspected Utah's loyalty as to detail Colonel • • . Connor, with 300
California-Nevada volunteers, to duty in Utah. 13

Dupuy (1964)
To insure their [Mormon) continued compliance and free transit of
immigration westward, Fort Do1las, overlooking the city , (Salt Lake],
was later built and garrisoned. 1

11
12
13
14

Furniss, 230.
Lewis, 27.
Hance and Warr, 22.

R. Ernest Dupuy, The Compact History of the United States Army
(New York: Hawthorn Books, lnc., 1964), 109.
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Lamar (1966)
!Connor had a] ... threefold purpose of ending Indian depredations,
opening the trail, and keeping the Mormons loyal. 15
Review of the above quotations and related material by these authors
results in several subjective, personal judgments. The historical evidence
does not support the views of the "authorities" quoted.
What has, through repetition, generally come to he regarded as
history is based largely on undocumented opinions of the earliest writers.
Stenhouse was the originator of the bleak portrayal of Connor's activities in
Utah. Tullidge, Bancroft, and Whitney expand Stenhouse's concept of Connor's
"programme" into one of military occupation of Utah.

None of these authors

documents his statements, and their sources on these specific subjects are,
in the main, unknown.

However, it is acknowledged that Stenhouse, Tullidge,

Bancroft, and Whitney were contemporaries of Connor. All--with the possible
exception of Bancroft-- knew Connor and their personal knowledge and contacts
would certainly have contributed to their analysi s and history of Connor.

On the

other hand, whether these contacts would have resulted in beneficial contributions and unbiased history is ques tionable in view of the circumstances of
Connor's post-war activitie s when their histories we re being written.

Connor' s

economic activities in mining and Liberal Party political activiti es , a ttempting
to end Mormon politica l domina tion of Utah, would not endear him to many of
the local his torians.

15

La ma r, 359.
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In any case, the suspicions of Stenhouse and the opinions of Tullidge,

Bancroft, and Whi tney have come to be acc!3pted as valid history.

Their ideas

have been accepted and repeated by Arrington, Colton, Hance and Warr, Dupuy,
and Lamar.
Whitney.

Neff further embroiders the opinions of Tullidge, Bancroft, and

He and Whitney together have postulated--without documentation or

logical analysis--that troop presence in Utah was "unnecessary" and that the
defense mission was "an easy matter." Only Hafen, Dwyer, and Furniss have
remained reasonably objective--as viewed by this writer.

Consideration of the Troop Mission(s)

The requirements for and the national historical experience of providing protection to the overland routes of communications and travel are
clearly established. The withdrawal of regulars from the routes at the outset
of the Civil War necessitated alternate means of protection.

These means

involved temporary, expedient measures, short-term use of volunteers provided by the Utah militia, and the use of volunteer units from California and
Ohio.

The defense tasks, from a military point of view, were complex.

The

areas over which protection was required were vast; the specific routes to be
protected were diverse; the facilities of the stage and telegraph companies
were extremely vulnerable to Indian raids; and the troops designated to provide
the protection were too few in number and not sufficiently mobile to compensate
for the limited size of the military force.
Most of the quotations stated above express a belief that, in reality,
Connor's troops had missions other than protection of the overland routes.
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Tullidge, Bancroft, Whitney, Neff, Dwyer, Arrington, Colton, Hance and
Warr, Dupuy, and Lamar all state some variation of a mission of military
surveillance, a mission to insure the continued loyalty of the Mormons to the
Union. Stenhouse and Lewis are less specific, but suggest the presenc e of
something vaguely sinister. The positive declarations by many of the earlier,
widely read authors of the period set the pattern. Ideas advanced by them concerning a concept of military occupation of Utah Territory were copied by
others, in some instances even in nearly identical language.
The official orders do not give Connor a mission of keeping an eye on
the Mormons.

Pedersen, doing doctorate level research on an aspect of this

subject area, concluded:
Official orders and correspondence give no indication that the troops
were ordered to Utah to keep a steady hand on the Saints, but
certainly this feeling was expressed privately. 16
Although the official mission charged to Connor's troops was clear,
the mission did, in fact, undergo subtle change. Reasons for this change came
from several sources.
The attitude of the territorial governor, a federal official, was a
potential influence on the uses and usefulness of federal troops in the territory.
Governor Harding wrote to Secretary of State Seward on August 30. 1862,
almost two months prior to the arrival of Connor's troops, that: "Young was a
disloyal tyrant ... who planned to use Indians to wipe out Gentile whites in

16

Pedersen, 50.
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Utah." Harding "begged for a military force to make 'treason dumb'."

17

Ha rding presented a rambling, inconsistent speech to the assembled troops
when Connor reached Salt Lake City.

Included was a statement to the effect

that he was aware that their mission was one of peace and security, and that
he wanted this known by all.

18

On the 3rd of February, 1863, Harding again

wrote to Seward that: "I am certain, that if it was not for the presence of
Connor's Command, it would be unsafe for me to remain."

19

That this attitude was known to Connor is clear. On September 14,
1862 , he reported to Department of the Pacific: "The Federal officers desire
and beg that I will locate near the City. The Governor especially is very urgent
in the matter. "

20

The most convincing sources tending to establish the existence of
ntissions, other than the official, obvious mission of the Callfornia Volunteers
and concerning the troop locations in Utah, came from Connor himself and his
military superiors.

Connor visited Salt Lake City for a few days in early

September 1862 on reconnaissance in advance of his troops.

He returned to

Fort Ruby on the 13th to rejoin his troops and wrote to the Department of the
Pacific the next day concerning his initial, extremely unfavorable impressions

17
18
19
20

Lamar, 362.
Rogan, 39.
nwyer, 12.
official Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 119.
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received during his brief visit.

These impressions provided the bases for

Connor's recommendation conce rning a new troop location in lieu of Fort
Crittenden.
It will be impossible for me t.O describe what I saw and heard in
Salt Lake, so as to make you realize the enormity of Mormonism;
suffice it, that I found them a community of traitors, murderers,
fanatics, and whores. The people publicly rejoice at reverses to
our arms, and thank God that the American Government is gone, as
they term it, while their prophet and bishops preach treason from
the pulpit. The Federal officers are entirely powerless, and talk in
whispers for fear of being overheard by Brigham's spies. . . . I
have a difficult and dangerous task before me, and will endeavor to
act with prudence and firmness ...•
I found another location, which I like for various reasons . . . . It is
on a plateau about three miles from Salt Lake City; in the vicinity of
good timber and saw-mills, and at a point where hay, grain, and
other produce can be purchased cheaper than at Fort Crittenden. It
is also a point which commands the city, and where 1, 000 troops
would be more efficient than 3, 000 on the other side of the Jordan.
If the general decides that I shall locate there, I intend to quietly
intrench my position, and then say to the Saints of Utah, enough of your
treason; but if it is intended that I shall merely protect the overland
mail and permit the Mormons to act and utter treason, then I had as
well locate at Crittenden. 21
General Wright approved the location a t Salt Lake City and so advised
the adjutant general in Washington on the 22nd of September. That "appears
to be the best location for the accomplishment of the object in view, viz., the
protection of the Overland Mail Route and the due execution of the laws of the
United States. "

22

22
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Connor's mission had now been subtly extended by the last ten words
of Wright's sentence. This subtle extension of the mission was necessitated
by circumstances found to exist by the local commander, and there is no
evidence to indicate that it resulted from the prior intent of higher ci vi! or
military authorities ,

23

as alleged by Whitney

24

and others. There was a

difference between what the tcoops were sent to Utah to do, and what they were
required by local circumstances to do once they got there.
In November

1863, Wright spoke of the forces sent from California

"for the protection of the Overland Mail Route and occupation of the Territory
of Utah. "

25

These facts relating to the views held by General Wright, Connor's

superior, do not seem consistent with Stenhouse's assertion that Connor "had
a programme of his own •... "

26

Connor was, in fact without exception, always

within the strict bounds of military propriety.
In addition to having the approval or direction of his superior military

headquarters, it is important to note that Connor was a federal official in Utah
territory and his obligations were extensive to his government. He felt these
23

The requests of Governor Harding on August 30, 1862, to Secretary
Seward for troops, cited earlier in this chapter, must be discounted as influencing either the decision to send troops or their mission in Utah Territory.
These expressions were too late to have influenced ma tters from Washington.
The governor's views would, however, strongly impact on Connor, once the
two men began an official association.
24
25
26
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obligations keenly.

As he stated, although it was his e ndeavor to maintain

amicable relations with the Mormons and avoid conflict, these endeavors must
be "compatible with the strict and proper fulfillment of the obligation resting
upon me. "

27

Connor spoke of the actions necessary to obtain "the respect due

to, and the dignity of, the Government, "
public peace ....

n

29

28

and of the need to "preserve the

In commenting on a rumor that the Mormons offered to

defend the overland routes for a fee, provided the federal troops were removed,
Connor stated his belief that Brigham Young could, in fact, cause the Indians
to desist in their attacks "and were the protection of that institution [the Overland Mail] the only or the main object of Government in establishing troops in
this Territory, it might be well to accede to his wishes. "

30

The "salutatory" editorial in the initial Union Vedette, the Camp
Douglas troop newspaper, November 20, 1863, provides a summarization of
the missions and goals of the California Volunteers.
. . . [there are some who] seek to mislead the multitude as to the
intentions and wishe s of the Government and its representatives,
civil and military, in Utah. . .. While as soldiers, we came not
to make war on this people neither in thi s enterprise is it our
design to intrude upon their every day life. When we say that the
primary object of sending troops to utah last year, was the protection of the Overland Mail and Telegraph lines, we but repeat what

27

28
29
30
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every man of ordinary intelligence knows to be a fact. . . . it is
the desire of the military authorities to live in peace, protect the
interests and advance the welfare of the people of Utah, respect
for the Government and the institutions of the land, should be
voluntarily accorded by one and all ..•.
Military mis sions are often subsequently interpreted erroneously in
the light of unrelated, but contemporary, events . An individual, Presto Burrell,
who had been in California since 1855, is quoted as saying: "Then came the call
for men to join Colonel P. Edward Connor's Company, to rescue a religious
group [presumably the Morrisites] in difficulty in Utah. "

31

Likewise, there

is no evidence to support this aspect as being a mission fo r Connor's troops.

Why Camp Douglas ?

Selection of a position in the vicinity of Salt Lake City as a location
for the bulk of Connor's troops can be adequately supported purely on the basis
of military and other practical considerations. Considering that troops were
already designated for Fort Churchill and Fort Ruby in Nevada, a post in Utah
was required to provide geographic coverage of those portions of the overland
routes which were Connor's responsibility.
Fort Crittenden, the Utah War post of Johnston's army , was not
selected. That post had been abandoned in July 1861

to private owners, and

by September 1862 was generally in ruins. The price for the government to

31
Adeline Wiklund, "Valley of Dreams," Idaho Poets and Writers
Guild, The Idaho Story (Iona, Id aho: Ipas Publishing Company, 1967), 1:52.
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reclaim the existing facilities was considered exhorbitant.

32

An additional

consideration was that the abominable location and condi tions existing at Fort
Crittenden during its military utilization were well known .

33

Finally, there

may have been prestige considerations in selecting a location other than Fort
Crittenden. There was a feeling that the Cedar Valley location had been forced
on the U.S. Army during the Utab War without regard for military require ..
ments.

34

Location at Salt Lake City offered a be tter solution. The City was a
hub of communications--postal, telegraph, and emigrant roads. A supply of
wood and water was readily availabl e , as was forage for the animals. Subsistence for the troops and other support from Mormon sources was also a
possibility.
However, the troop locations were inextricibly associated with the
troop mission. If the troop mission, in fact, had been expanded to include that
of surveillance of the Mormons, what better location than in close proximity
to Salt Lake City?
The decision to locate troops in the vicinity of Salt Lake City has
generated much extreme comment from some of the historical writers. Rogan,
32

Rogers, 279.

33

Particularly see Horace Greeley, An Overland Journey from New
York to San Francisco in the Summer of 1859 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1964), 207. 208 .
34

see Tullidge, 223, 281; Rogers, 50; and

~ls Anderson,

185.
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citing Neff as the authority, contends "that Connor' s quickly acquired erunity
for the Mormons made it dangerous to allow him to select his [troop] locations
freely in Utah, " and "that Connor took the side of the [Governor] Harding
group .... "

35

Such a concept is faulty.

First, both Harding and Connor were

federal officials. Agreement between the two should not be cited to the disadvantage of either. Second, the inconsistency between giving a military commander a mission of area responsibility and restricting or prescribing locations
for his troops inimical to the mission is obvious. The eventual selections of
Fort Churchill, Fort Ruby, and Camp Douglas were made for a number of
practical and military considerations from a list of potential locations which
had also included Simpson's Park in Nevada and Fort Crittenden in Utab. The
total list covered planning contingencies commencing in November 1861, and
was never intended to represent what Neff had termed "designated military
stations. "
The fact of the matter is that the objections to the troops being at
Camp Douglas were, in all probability, much more closely related

to~

they

were there at all than with the specific location.
Patrick Edward Connor was an important figure both to the history of
Utab and of the American West.

The degree of his involvement with the events

of his time and the stature of his accomplishments far exceed the reputation

35
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accorded to him by history. A modest attempt to redress the balance has been
a purpose of this thesis.
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Appendix A: Commanders, District of Utah

Unit Commanders
The names of individual unit commanders pertaining to organizations
of the District of Utah a re of significance to this study and to a comprehension
of much of the related literature. Organizations, names of commanders, and
dates of command (when known) are tabulated below?
Unit

Commander

District of Utah

Patrick Edward Connor

Aug 6 '62-Feb 17 '65*

*Utah District added to Dept. of Missouri
Second Cavalry,
California
Volunteers

Andrew J. Smith
Columbus Sims
George S. Evans
Edward McGarry*

Oct 1 - Nov 13 '61
Nov 13 '61 -Ja n 31 ' 63
Feb 1 '63-May 31 '63
Jul 16 '64

*Promoted to colonel Nov 21 '64
Company A

Edwin A. Rowe
David J. Berry
Edward B. Loring*

Sep 10 '61 - 0ct 10 '62
Oct 12 '62 - Jan 20 '64
J an 21 '64

*Promoted to captain Jun 5 '64
Company H

Daniel McLean

Sep 5 '61

Company K

Samuel P. Smith

Sep 27 '61-May 9 '65

Company L

Albert Brown

Sep 11 '61

Company M

Charles McDermit
George F. Price

Sep 11 '61-Nov 13 '61
Nov 13 '61

1
orton, 196-293, and 522-589.
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Commander
Third Infantry,
California
Volunteers

Patrick Edward Connor

Aug 23 '61-Mar 30 '63*

*Promoted to brigadier general
Robert Pollock

Mar 31 '63-Nov 14 ' 64**

**Position deleted due to consolidation of the regiment
Company A

Thomas E. Ketchum
William M. Johns

Oct 10 '61 -Sep 23 '64
Sep 24 '64-Mar 31 '64

Company B

Jeremiah B. Moore
Lysander Washburn

Sep 5 '61 -May 4 '63
Jul 27 '64

Company C

John H. May
James W. Stillman

Oct 26 '61-Mar 31 '63
Apr 1 '63

Company D

William M. Johns
IM.llard Kittredge

Sep 24 '61-Sep 23 '64
Sep 24 '64

Company E

Charles Tupper
Josiah Hosmer

Sep 20 '61-May 30 '63
May 31 ' 63

Company F

Izatus Potts
Francis D. Todd

Sep 23 '61-May 26 '64
May 27 '64-Nov 1 '64

Company G

John B. Urmy
Caleb Gilman

Dec 9 '61-Sep 30 '64
Sep 30 '64-Dec 20 '64

Company H

David Black

Sep 24 '61-0ct 21 '64

Company I

Micajah G. Lewis
Willard Kittredge

Sep 16 '61-Jun 9 '63
Jun 10 '63-Aug 22 164

Company K

Samuel W. Hoyt
John F. Staples
Joseph C. Morrill

Oct 10 '61.-Mar 31 ' 63
Apr 1 '63-Feb 29 '64
Aug 20 '64

First Battalion,
Nevada Cavalry

A. A. C. Williams
Milo George

Company A

N. Baldwin

Company B

E. B. Zabriskie
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First Nevada Infantry
Company B

George A. Thurston

Installation Commanders
The commander of the largest tactical unit at a given installation
also served as the installation commander. When iwo or more companies
constituted the installation garrison, a specific officer, usually the senior
captain or a major or lieutenant colonel, was designated as the installation
commander.
Installation

Commander

Dates

Camp Douglas

Col. P. E. Connor

Oct 26 '62-Mar 30 '63

Col. Robert Pollock

Mar 30 '63-Nov 14 '64

LTC Jeremiah B. Moore

Dec 31 '64

Capt. Micajah G. Lewis

Dec 31 '62

Capt. George F. Price

June 30 '63

Maj. P. A. Gallagher

Dec 31 '63

Maj. John M O'Neill

Dec 31 '64

Fort Churchill

Maj. Charles McDermlt

Dec 31 '62-Aug 30 '63

Fort Ruby

Maj. P. A. Gallagher

Dec 31 ' 62

LTC Jeremiah B. Moore

Dec 31 '63

Capt. G. A. Thurston

Dec 31 '64

Capt. David Black

May 20 '63-0ct 29 '64

Capt. J. W. Stillman

Dec 21 '64

Maj. John M. O'Neill

Jun 30 '64

Fort Bridger

Camp Connor

Camp Conness

185
Appendix B: Command Strengths

Command strength--both personnel and pieces of field artillery--are
shown in Table 1. Several features of interest are illustrated.

First, even

though Connor's troops were located at as many as six different locations, his
total authorized command strength never exceeded 1, 317; the maximum strength
present for duty was 1, 195. A second feature of significance is the relatively
large portion of his authorized strength made up of non-military personnel
(e . g., contractors, wagoners, sutlers, laundresses, etc.). Third, Connor
was able to maintain present for duty a high percentage of his authorized
strength until the dates of termination of the three-year enlistments of his
Volunteers approached.
Utley speaks of an undesirable average annual turn-over in military
personnel due to desertion, discharge, and death of approximately 28%, and
other circumstances that "decreed that actual strengths always [were]
below authorized strengths by as much as 18%. ·•

1

Maintenance by Connor of high troop strengths in an environment
hostile by nature and by the attitudes of a high percentage of the inhabitants
of the territory is an accomplishment of major proportions.

1

Utley, 18 and 19.
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TABLE 1
PERSONNEL AND ARTILLERY STRENGTHS, DISTRICT OF UTAHa

Present for Dutl
NonOff. Enl.
Mil.

Total

Total
Auth.

Present
vs.
Auth.

Dec. 31, '62

37

792

190

1019

1060

96%

6

Jun. 30, '63

47

857

161

1065

1226

87%

6

Dec. 31, '63

42

920

233

1195

1307

91%

9

Jun. 30, '64

31

673

92

796

1317

60%

9

Dec. 31, '64

25

653

130

808

979

83%

7

Date

Pieces
of
Field
Art'y

aExtracted and compiled from the Official Returns of the Department of the
Pacific, prepared semi-annually as of June 30 and December 31, and as
contained in U.s. Government War Departme nt, Official Records, vol. L,
pt. 2, p. 505, 711, 883, and 1109. The Military District of Utah, for the
purposes of Table 1, is assumed to have been in existence between August
6, 1862--the date Connor assumed command-- and Feb ruary 24, 1865--the
date the Territory of Utah was transferred from the Department of the
Pacific to the Department of Missouri.
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Appendix C: Stationing of Company-Size Troop Units

The varied locations and considerable redistribution of the companies
of Connor's force are illustrated by Figure 2, Disposition of Company-Size
Troop Units. A desirable flexibility in t hei r use results.
Several points, by way of explanation of Figure 2, are appropriate:
1.

Since the Official Returns,

1

on which Figure 2 is based, were

prepared semiannually "as of" J une 30 and December 31, the data provided by
these sources are valid as of those dates. Whenever possible, dates pertaining
to specific troop units have been modified for more preciseness when other
relevant data was available.
2.

Fort Churchill was detached from the District of Utah on August

20, 1863.

3.

The Second Cavalry Regiment was withdrawn from command of

the District of Utah in October, 1864.
4.

The Third Infantry Regiment was consolidated and reorganized

from ten to four companies on October 29, 1864.
5. Research associated with the preparatio n of Figure 2 has suggested the existence of several e rrors in the Offic ial Returns of the Department
of the Pacific as printed in the Official Records, Part II.
lowing pertain to the errors detected.

Page references fol-

Page 507: There were only three

1
0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 271, 505, 711 , 883 , and 1109.
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Figure 2. Stationing of Company-Size Troop Units, District of Utah.
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companies of the Third Infantry at Camp Douglas on June 30, 1863, rather
than four; Company H had been relocated to Camp Connor in May.
E, Third Infantry, at Camp Ruby, should read Company F.

Company

Company E was

at Camp Douglas. Pages 713 and 885: The e rror concerning Company E,
which appears in the Return for June 30, 1863, is repeated in the Return as
of December 31, 1863.

Page 1111: The troop unit, Company B, 1st Nevada,

s hown at Camp Ruby should read Company B, 1st Nevada Infantry.
B, 1st Nevada Cavalry, is properly shown at Fort Bridger.

Company
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Appendix D: Patrick Edward Connor

Biographic Sketch

Patrick Edward Connor was born in Kerry County, southern Ireland,
on March 17, 1820.

1

He emigrated from Ireland to New York City with his

parents at an "early age. "

2

Connor received some education in New York,

limited, however, because of the economic necessity that young Connor work.

3

On Nqver11ber 28, 1839, Connor enlisted in the First Dragoons and
served his five-ye ar enlistment in Company I on the western frontier, after
which he returned to New York City and engaged in the "mercantile business. "
In 1846 he emigrated to Texas where his pri ncipal activity was military . On
May 6 of that year he joined a company of the Texas Foot Riflemen, Texas
Volunteers , as a lieutenant under Colonel Albert Sydney Johnston, the Regimental comma nde r.

This organization was subsequently mustered into the

service of the United States on July 7 for use in the Mexican War.

4

Connor

1
Rogers , 2, discusses the modification in the family name from
O'Connor to Conner a nd Connor. Since from early adulthood the pr eferred
name was Connor, such spelling has been used throughout this study. Ha nce
and Warr, 22, e rroneously indicate County Kearney as the place of bi rth.
2

Tullidge, 274; Fox, 1, i ndicates Connor 's age on arrival in New
York as sixteen. Carter, 6:116, indicates that Connor was nineteen when he
arrived in New York. In the absence of facts, the Tullidge stateme nt,
although imprecise, is preferred.
3
4

Fox, 1.

Rogers, 2.
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was promoted to captain on February 12, 1847, and thereafter commanded his
company. During the war Johnston's regiment was engaged in the Battles of
Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Bnena Vista. On the basis of such evi5
dence, some writers such as Tullidge indicate Connor's participation in all
of these battles.

However, Rogers points out that the official records only

show Connor's participation in the Battle of Buena Vista. In this engagement
6
Connor was wounded in the left hand a nd was given "honorable mention in
7
dispatches" --a form of recognition fo r military achievement.
from rheumatism and left the service on May 24, 1847.

Connor suffered

8

Connor moved to California, arriving there on January 22, 1850.
By 1853 he had settled in Stockton.

9

He engaged in a variety of economic pur-

suits such as lumbering, and construction contracting, and was the postmaster
at Stockton. In ten years he had "accumulated a fortune. "

10

His military and

paramilitary interests were not neglected during the "California period." He

5
6
7

Tullidge, 274.
Fox, 4; Rogers , 2, 4.

Bancroft, 625.

8

Rogers, 4; Heitman, 1:322. Both Tullidge, 274, and Carter, 115,
seem to suggest that Connor's departure from the service was related to his
wound in combat.
9
Rogers, 4.
10

Bancroft, 625 .
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was a member of the California Rangers , a group that ended the outlaw career
of Joaquin Murieta in May 1852, and was captain of the Stockton Blues .

11

Connor married Miss Johanna Connor at San Francisco on August 14,
1854.

12

Miss Connor was, at the time of her marriage, a resident of Redwood

City; she originated, however, from County Kerry in Ire land, as had Connor
hlmself.

From thls marriage at least seven children were born. Sons born

in 1856 and 1859 in Stockton died early. A third son, Maurice Joseph, born in
Stockton on March 19, 1861, accompanied the Connors on the troop march to
Utah.

13

Katherine Frances was born at Camp Douglas in 1863 and Patrick

Edward, Jr., was born in Salt Lake City in June 1866.

14

Two other sons,

Eugene Titus and Hi.llory Grant, were born in 1869 and 1873 , respectively, in
California.

Mrs. Connor died in Redwood City in 1889.

and the daughter survived Connor.

15

The four sons and

Maurice Joseph, Patrick Edward, Jr., and

Patrick Jr.'s wife, Mary Scott Connor, are a ll buried in the Connor plot at
the Post Cemetery, Fort Douglas.

11

Rogers, 12.

12
Rogers, 11. Salt Lake Tribune, December 18, 1891, e rroneously
indicates the place of marriage as Redwood City. Hance and Warr, 23,
erroneously indicate the year of marriage as 1853 .
13
Rogers, 12 and 48; Hance and Warr, 23, erroneously indicate the
name of thls surviving son as Thomas Jefferson Connor. Also, see Fox, 6.
14

Rogers, 123.

15
Rogers, 252.
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Connor, almost immediately following the governor 's call for volunteers, offered his services and on September 4, 1861, was mustered in as
colonel, Third Infantry California Volunteer s.

He was promoted to Brigadier

General of Volunteers on March 30 , 1863. On March 13, 1865, he was
appointed Brevet Major General of Volunteers "for gallantry and meritorious
service. "

16

After declining a comm ission as colonel in the Regular Army fol-

lowing the Civil War, he was honorably mustered out on April30, 1866.
This did not entirely end his mili tary involvement in Utah.

17

1n 1870

he was appointed by the Governor of Utah to command the Utah territorial
militia

18

-- an assignment that must have been particularly galling to the

Mormons.
Connor 's military experience was extensive. 1n October, 1864,
Connor wrote that "I have s ince my manhood been nine years in the military
service of the United States .. . . "

19

--and from tha t date he would serve an

additional yea r a nd one-half.
Connor remained in Utah following his rel ease from military service
to e ngage primarily in his various mining interes ts. The Connors lived in
Stockton, a town founded by Connor.

16
17

Hei tman, 1:322 .
Ibid . ; Hance and War, 34.

18
19

During the period of Utah residence,

Dwyer, 70.

0fficial Records, vol. L, pt. 2, p. 1011.
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Connor became very active in the Liberal Party, as a means of giving expression to minority views contrasting to the Mormon majority.

He was residing

at the Walker House in Salt Lake City at the time of his death on the evening
of December 17, 1891. After a large civil-military funeral on the 20th, he
was buried at the Post Cemetery at Fort Douglas among his troops lost at the
Battle of Bear River.

Physical Appearance and Personal Characteristics

At the time of his enlistment at age nineteen, Connor was described
as having blue eyes, brown hair, a fair complexion, and as being five feet,
six and one-half inches tall.

20

He is later--and probably inaccurately--

described as "fiery whiskered" and "red-headed. "

21

From photographs

Connor appears to have been slightly built and small in stature.

20

Rogers, 260. Fox, 2, apparently in error, indicates his height as
five fe et , one-half inch.
21

Stone, 215; Lamar, 358.

195

VITA
Max Reynolds McCarthy
Candidate for the Degree of
Master of Science
Thesis: Patrick Edward Connor and the Military District of Utah: Civil War
Military Operations in Utah and Nevada, 1862-1865
Major Field: History
Biographical Information:
Personal Data: Born at Boise, Idaho, November 22, 1919, son of
John R. and Gladys Percifield McCarthy; married Oretta M.
Hanson January 28, 1943; two children--Kent and Patricia.
Education: Attended elementary school in Boise and Turner, Idaho;
graduated from Grace (Idaho) High School in 1937; received
the Bachelor of Science degree from Utah State University,
with a major in military science, in 1952; received the
Master of Arts degree from The George Washington University, with a major in international affairs, in 1963; did
graduate work in history at the University of Hawaii, University of Utah, and University of Colorado (Colorado Springs);
completed requirements for the Master of Science degree,
specializing in American history, at Utah State University in
1975.
Professional Experience: 1973 to 1975, Senior Military Operations
Analyst, BDM Corporation; 1942-72 air defense artillery
officer, United States Army; retired with rank of colonel;
while on active duty graduated from the British School of
Antiaircraft Artillery (1949), the U.S. Army Artillery School
(1951), the Command and General Staff College (1954), and the
Army War College (1963); commanded air defense artillery
battery (twice), battalion, and group; Assistant Professor of
Military Science and Tactics (1943-44) and Professor of Military Science (1968-1970), Utah State University; served overseas in Europe (twice), Iceland, and Hawaii; 1940-41, surveyor and draftsman, Department of Agriculture.

